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Abstract
 This thesis is, in part, a defence of a broad-based approach to epistemology. We 
should be wary of taking too narrow a focus and thus neglecting important aspects of 
knowledge. If we are too focused on one methodology then we are likely to miss
insights that can come about from a different perspective. With this in mind, I 
investigate two particular methodologies in detail: Kornblith’s naturalism and Craig’s 
‘genealogical’ approach. Kornblith emphasises the importance of looking at knowledge 
in the context of the natural world, thus stressing the continuity between animal and 
human knowledge. Craig, on the other hand, focuses on a distinctly human aspect of 
knowledge: the importance of enquiry and the sharing of information. As such, the two 
theories of knowledge that are developed have different emphases. I argue that by 
bringing them together we can better understand what knowledge is. 
This leads us to the other main contribution of this thesis, which is a defence of the 
role of reflection in epistemology. This has often been neglected in contemporary 
epistemology, primarily because of the effectiveness of externalist theories of 
knowledge. The focus on externalism has lead to reflection being sidelined. I do not 
argue that reflection is necessary for knowledge, but rather want to bring back 
attention to the important role that it plays in human life. Reflectively accessible 
justification is necessary for our knowledge claims and therefore plays a vital role in 
enquiry. If we add reflectively accessible justification to knowledge then it is both more 
stable and more valuable. Even if it is not necessary for knowledge, reflection should 
not be neglected. 
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Introduction
For a very long time, knowledge was understood in an internalist fashion; that is, it was 
thought that reflectively accessible evidence or reasons were required for knowledge. In 
order to know a proposition p, you must be aware of some evidence for p. However, 
in contemporary epistemology the general move has been away from such theories to a 
more externalist account of knowledge; that is, one that does not require reflectively 
accessible evidence. An externalist theory seems preferable in that it can deal with 
problems such as scepticism and Gettier cases and also fits better with many of our 
intuitions about knowledge, such as the idea that non-reflective animals and infants can 
have knowledge. Because externalist theories of knowledge are preferable, there has 
often been a downplaying of the importance of having reflectively accessible 
justification. 
This thesis has two main aims. The first is to suggest that in order to develop a 
complete theory of knowledge we need to take a very broad perspective, encompassing 
intuitions from both sides of the internalist/externalist debate. If one concentrates 
purely on the continuity between animal and human knowledge, for example, you will 
develop a very different theory from someone who concentrates on the way that 
knowledge is used to communicate information between agents. The only way in which 
we will come to fully understand knowledge is to take into account the various 
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different perspectives. The second aim of the thesis is to suggest a possible theory of 
knowledge that takes both internalist and externalist intuitions into account. 
The thesis will begin by examining the role of conceptual enquiry in philosophy in 
general and in epistemology in particular. Traditionally, philosophy has proceeded by 
manner of conceptual enquiry. If we want to investigate knowledge, for example, our 
investigation would begin by looking at our intuitions about knowledge and testing 
them in various thought experiments. From this testing of our intuitions we could, in
theory, develop a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that govern the application 
of the concept of knowledge. 
Many contemporary epistemologists, however, find fault with this approach and 
chapter one examines this debate. Firstly we shall look at why, historically, conceptual 
enquiry has been the primary method of philosophical investigation. This seems to 
come down to perceiving an intimate connection between concepts and the 
phenomena that they describe. It also seems that the concepts that are of philosophical 
interest are of a particularly complex kind and conceptual enquiry is needed simply to 
disentangle what is meant by a particular concept. 
We shall then examine several arguments against conceptual enquiry, none of 
which succeeds in proving that conceptual enquiry is not a valid and useful form of 
investigation in philosophy. There is, however, a good case to be made for conceptual 
enquiry not being the only form of investigation in philosophy. Useful insights into 
both concepts and the phenomena that they describe can be gained from non-
traditional methodologies. A naturalist methodology may give us an insight into how 
knowledge functions in the natural world and help us to focus on the continuity 
between animal and human knowledge; a socially focussed methodology may give us 
insight into the social role that knowledge plays; and, a concentration on our actual 
practices of knowledge ascription may prevent us from moving too far away from 
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reality and into the world of the philosophical abstract. Ultimately, there are insights to 
be gained from these different perspectives and we should be wary of becoming 
blinkered to other approaches. The best theory of knowledge will be one that takes 
into account insights gained by all these different perspectives (and whatever other 
relevant perspectives there may be). 
Having cleared the ground, so to speak, with regard to methodology, we move on 
in Chapter Two to cover some background with regard to theory; the debate between 
internalists and externalists. This debate can be divided into two separate questions, 
one about justification and the other about knowledge. Internalism about justification 
claims that justification must be reflectively accessible and internalism about knowledge 
claims that internalist justification is necessary for knowledge. Externalism in both 
cases is the denial of internalism.  There is a strong case for understanding justification 
in an internalist way: the intuition that two subjects who are identical with regard to 
beliefs are also identical with regard to justification; a perceived connection between 
justification and responsibility; and various thought experiments seem to point towards 
this conclusion. However, this does not mean that knowledge must also be internalist 
in nature. 
In fact, the case against internalism about knowledge is very strong. Gettier cases, 
sceptical arguments, chicken sexers, and the fact that we happily ascribe knowledge to 
infants and animals all seem to point towards externalism. Internalism struggles to deal 
with these cases but externalist theories can give answers and explanations for all of 
them. It is not entirely plain sailing for externalism, however. Barry Stroud suggests 
that an externalist answer to scepticism can never be fully satisfactory. Chapter Two 
introduces Stroud’s problem but there will be further discussion in Chapter Five. 
Another problem is that there will be something lacking in an externalist account of 
knowledge that does not take internalist intuitions into account or at least explain how 
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we come to have such intuitions. The chapter concludes by discussing two such 
theories, the virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa and the disjunctivism of John 
McDowell. 
In Chapter Three we move on to a detailed investigation of one particular
methodology: Hilary Kornblith’s naturalism. Kornblith argues that knowledge is a 
natural kind and as such should be investigated empirically like any other natural kind. 
He argues that knowledge plays an important causal and explanatory role in cognitive 
ethology – the science of animal cognition – and that is can only play such a role if it is 
a natural kind. He then argues that human and animal knowledge are of the same kind, 
meaning that the externalist understanding of knowledge developed from cognitive 
ethology must also be the correct understanding of human knowledge. 
There are problems with both stages of Kornblith’s argument, but even if they can 
be resolved, there is a larger problem. His focus on animal knowledge underplays the 
importance that reflection plays in human knowledge. By using animal knowledge as 
his starting point it skews the focus of his investigation onto only that which is possible 
for non-reflective creatures to have. However, humans have reflective capabilities and 
this cannot fail to have an effect on knowledge. It may be the case that our knowledge 
is, at heart, identical to that of non-reflective creatures, but that cannot be the whole 
story. For a full understanding of knowledge, we need to take into account how we, as 
human beings, use and interact with knowledge. 
Chapter Four examines an approach that puts the social importance of knowledge 
at the heart of its investigation. Edward Craig argues that the origins of the concept of 
knowledge lie in a need for us, as information-sharing beings, to be able to tag reliable 
informants. Human beings are not always reliable and sometimes make false claims, 
both intentionally and unintentionally. Thus, we need to have a way of telling which 
informants are the good ones. A good informant as to whether or not p is one that is, 
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accessible to the enquirer, recognisable by the enquirer, as likely to be right as the 
enquirer needs and someone with whom the enquirer can communicate. This 
protoconcept of knowledge has undergone a process of objectification away from the 
needs of a specific enquirer on a particular occasion to someone who is potential of use 
to someone in some situation, meaning that to be a knower is to be potentially a good 
informant rather than an actual good informant. 
Craig’s focus on the social development of knowledge also skews the way that he 
looks at knowledge. He neglects the continuity between human and animal knowledge 
because he is focussed on the human context. Also, because he is looking at the issue 
from the perspective of the enquirer, he places little importance on reflection. 
However, given the importance that is placed on being able to give grounds for your 
belief, it seems that reflectively accessible reasons must take a central role in the social 
development of knowledge. If we are to believe the Gricean claim that it is 
inappropriate to claim knowledge unless one has sufficient grounds, then it seems that 
reflectively accessible evidence is of great importance when it comes to sharing 
information. Taking this into account, we can extend Craig’s view such that, to be a 
good informant one must also have good reflectively accessible grounds for one’s 
belief. 
That is not to say that we should ignore the insights gained from Kornblith’s 
investigation. It is important to bear in mind both the evolutionary history that has 
made us capable of having knowledge and the cultural evolution that has brought 
about the concept of knowledge as it is used today. We should acknowledge that there 
is a continuity with non-human animals, a shared core phenomenon that is properly 
called knowledge. In addition, because humans are both reflective and social, the role 
of reflectively accessible justification cannot be underplayed. Chapter Four concludes 
with sketching a suggestion for incorporating both of these insights.  Knowledge at 
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heart must be externalist, something that we share with non-reflective creatures. 
However, we also need to make space for reflection. Rather than arguing for a different 
kind of knowledge, it is suggested that there is knowledge simpliciter and knowledge-
plus; that is, knowledge plus justification. 
Chapter Five goes on to discuss the implications of this theory, in particular with 
regard to the various value problems that are much discussed in contemporary 
epistemology. The Meno problem asks how knowledge can be more valuable than mere 
true belief if they have the same practical value. The answer that I give is that, in fact, 
knowledge is not more valuable than mere true belief but that knowledge plus 
justification is more valuable. Justification adds value beyond the value of having mere 
true belief or even knowledge. Of course, an explanation is needed as to why we 
believe that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. My suggestion is that in 
most cases, our knowledge is accompanied by internalist justification. This, combined 
with the fact that we require reflectively accessible grounds for knowledge claims means 
that in almost any situation in which we would claim to know, we would have 
justification for our claim. This explains why internalism had a hold in epistemology 
for so long and why we have the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere 
true belief. Blind knowledge, however, is not more valuable than true belief. 
A second advantage of this theory is that it can explain why the externalist answer 
to scepticism is unsatisfactory, despite being adequate. We cannot have a knowledge-
plus answer to scepticism as there is no way that one can have reflectively accessible 
evidence that one is not a brain-in-a-vat. Thus, one can only know that one is not a 
brain-in-a-vat but only in an brute externalist fashion. Thus, although we know, we 
know in a way which is not valuable. 
Thus, taking into account the different perspectives and methodologies that are 
suggested in the literature can lead to a more rounded theory of knowledge which is 
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able to deal with some of the problems faced by more narrowly focused theories. I do 
not pretend to have covered every possible perspective, nor every perspective that can 
be found in the literature. However, we can take this theory as a starting point and 
further add to our understanding by taking in to account further insights gained 
elsewhere. The danger of remaining too narrowly focused is that we will miss out on 
some important insight that would lead to greater understanding of knowledge. 
CHAPTER ONE
How Should Epistemology be Done?
This chapter aims to do two things: firstly, to defend the validity of conceptual enquiry 
as a method of enquiry in epistemology; secondly, to suggest that conceptual enquiry 
alone is too narrow a methodology. Traditionally epistemology, like all philosophical 
investigation, has been conducted through conceptual enquiry; that is, we examine our 
concepts in order to understand better the phenomena that they describe. This enquiry 
has standardly taken the form of reductive analysis – a search for necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the application of our concepts. For example, enquiry into the 
concept of knowledge has usually resulted in the claim that knowledge is true belief 
plus another condition, such as reliability or justification. However, in recent times 
there has been a move against conceptual enquiry in general and reductive analysis in 
particular, with alternative methodologies, such as experimental philosophy, being 
advocated instead (e.g. Nichols et al (2003), Weinberg et al 2008). 
This chapter begins by looking at the reasons why, historically, conceptual enquiry 
was thought to be an appropriate form of enquiry for philosophy. The main 
motivation appears to be the perception of an intimate connection between concepts 
and their associated phenomena. It also seems that the concepts that are of interest to 
philosophers are ones that are inherently complex in a way that other concepts are not. 
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We shall then examine the arguments against conceptual enquiry: the claim that we 
should directly investigate phenomena, not just concepts; the claim that our concepts 
are inherently complex; and the claim that our concepts are in some sense parochial. 
None of these criticisms succeeds in showing that conceptual enquiry is not a 
legitimate methodology for epistemology, but they do provide interesting suggestions 
for alternative methodologies. Reductive analysis, however, is more problematic than 
conceptual analysis in general, and we will examine one suggested alternative: the 
‘practical explication’ of Edward Craig (1990). A practical explication does not require 
that we rely on our intuitions alone; if our intuitions are inconsistent then we can reject 
them in favour of a more consistent account. In addition, it does not ask for necessary 
and sufficient conditions that define all cases of knowledge, but rather conditions that 
define a prototype of knowledge. This will allow us to accommodate more perspectives 
on knowledge, making our theory more comprehensive.
1.1 Arguments For Conceptual Enquiry
Although conceptual enquiry was for a long time the standard form of investigation in 
philosophy it may not be immediately obvious why this should have been the case. 
One might think, as Hilary Kornblith (2002) suggests, that our time would be better 
spent investigating the phenomena that we are interested in directly. In this section I 
shall look at the reasons that ‘traditional’ philosophers have given for pursuing such an 
investigation using A. J. Ayer (1957/1973, 1973) and Peter Strawson (1992) as two 
examples. Firstly, I shall examine the idea that there is an intimate connection between 
concepts and the things that they describe. To be an instance of knowledge, for 
example, is to meet the conditions to be classed as knowledge. Secondly, the concepts 
that interest us as philosophers are particularly complex and as such they require 
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conceptual investigation. As philosophers we are not interested in all concepts, and 
complexity may be one distinguishing feature of philosophically interesting concepts. 
Because of this complexity it seems that even in pursuing non-conceptual enquiry we 
will need to begin with conceptual enquiry. 
1.1.1 The connection between concepts and the phenomena they describe
According to Hilary Kornblith:
Not so long ago, philosophy was widely understood to consist in an investigation of 
our concepts…. The idea that philosophy consists in, or at a minimum, must begin 
with an understanding and investigation of our concepts is, I believe, both natural and 
very attractive. It is also, I believe, deeply mistaken. On my view…the subject matter 
of epistemology is knowledge itself not our concept of knowledge. (Kornblith 2002:1)
Traditional epistemology at the very least begins with conceptual enquiry.. It seems that 
to some extent this will be true of any philosophical enquiry whether or not concepts 
are the main focus of investigation. If nothing else, enquiring into the concept has the 
effect of clearing the ground. We need to identify what exactly it is that we are 
attempting to enquire about. However, this is likely to be true of all investigations. The 
role that conceptual investigation has played in philosophy is obviously much more 
central.  However, this is not, as Kornblith seems to suggest, because philosophers 
were preoccupied with the concepts themselves. Instead, concepts and the phenomena 
that they describe were seen as intimately and inherently connected; by examining the 
concepts it was thought that we could find out about the phenomena. 
Ayer suggests that ‘already knowing the use of certain expressions [philosophers] 
are seeking to give an analysis of their meaning’ (Ayer 1957/1976: 8). Although this 
claim explicitly concerns the meaning of linguistic expressions there is a parallel claim 
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about concepts: linguistic expressions express concepts, and the concepts expressed are 
fixed by the meanings of linguistic expressions. Analysis of meanings, therefore, goes 
hand in hand with the analysis of concepts. Philosophers are not merely investigating 
the meaning of words but rather are trying to uncover ‘the work that the word…does’ 
(Ayer 1957/1976: 28). One may talk of investigating meanings or of investigating 
concepts but the aims of such investigations would be similar. In understanding the 
meaning of a word we should be uncovering what it would be for something to fall 
under that concept. 
According to traditional philosophy, investigating the concept should tell us 
something about the phenomenon that it describes:
It is therefore indifferent whether… we represent ourselves as dealing with the words 
or dealing with facts. For our enquiry into the use of words can equally be regarded as 
an enquiry into the nature of the facts which they describe. (Ayer 1957: 29)
Ayer also claims that examining concepts:
…throws light not only on the workings of our language but also on the character of 
the world it serves to describe. There is in any case no sharp distinction between 
investigating the structure of our language and investigating the structure of the world, 
since the very notion of there being a world of such and such a character only makes 
sense within the framework of some system of concepts which language 
embodies…[O]ur experience is articulated in language, and the world which we 
envisage existing at times when we do not is still a world which is structured by our 
method of describing it… we cannot detach ourselves from every point of view…The 
idea that we could prise the world off our concepts is incoherent; for with what 
conception of the world should we then be left? (Ayer 1973: 49)
What Ayer seems to be saying in these passages is that by investigating our concepts 
we will better understand the facts that those concepts describe. We can only 
understand the world in terms of our concepts and we cannot move completely away 
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from them. As concept-using beings we can only view the world through the prism of 
our concepts. There may be facts that exist independently of our conceptual structures 
but in our thinking and talking about those facts we must deploy our concepts. 
Conceptual enquiry will therefore give us greater insight into how we understand the 
world, which in turn should give us insight into how the world works. Presumably our 
concepts have come about as a reaction to the world around us and should tell us at 
least something about how the world works. Our concept of a cat has presumably 
come about through the observations of and interactions with cats that people have 
had throughout history and so we would expect that the concept can tell us something 
about what cats are. 
One natural way of understanding the connection between concepts and 
phenomena is that a concept determines what falls under that concept. Certainly this is 
very simply the case for some concepts. To be a bachelor just is to be an unmarried 
man. In cases such as these it is clear that conceptual investigation will uncover 
something about the phenomenon that the concept is describing. 
Natural kinds are usually thought to be determined by the world and not by our 
concepts. Water is the substance with chemical structure H20, irrespective of whether 
any concept of ours represents this fact. That is not to say that we cannot find out 
interesting things about water simply by examining our concept of it. Examining our 
concept of water will not tell us what the underlying structure of the substance is but 
we can discover that it is usually liquid under normal, room-temperature conditions, 
that it is thirst-quenching and so on
Strawson (1992) suggests a similar justification of conceptual analysis to Ayer’s. In 
investigating the concept we can find out about the actual phenomenon that we are 
investigating. In fact, he goes as far to say that it is preferable to investigate via 
conceptual analysis rather than trying to investigate the phenomenon directly:
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By talking about our conceptual structure, the structure of our thought about the 
world, rather than, as it were, directly about the world, we keep a firmer grasp on our 
philosophical procedure, a clearer understanding of what we are about. (Strawson 
1992: 33)
  
He goes on to suggest that there are certain concepts or types of concepts, such as our 
concepts of ‘material object’ and ‘states of consciousness’, that are so pervasive in our 
thinking and talking about the world that it is:
…quite inconceivable that these concepts should have this universal employment 
unless we took it for granted that there were, or existed, in the world things to which 
those concepts, or concepts of those concept-types applied. So the question ‘What are 
our most general concepts, or types of concept, of things?’ and the question: ‘What are 
the most general types of things we take there to be¸ or exist?’ really come to the same 
thing. (Strawson 1992: 33) 
What Strawson is saying is that our most general concepts and issues about ontological 
categories go hand in hand. This is not to say that we can assume from the fact that we 
have such concepts that the things that those concepts identify must exist, but rather
that if we want to investigate the general types of thing that exist the best starting point 
that we have is to look at the concepts of the things that we take to exist. 
The very fact that we have such concepts should carry some theoretical weight, 
claims Strawson:
…it is a fact that we must give great weight to, that the pervasiveness and generality of 
certain concepts or concept-types carries ontological implications in the undisputed 
sense; that is, implications about what we ordinarily and quite generally take to 
exist…[It] would surely be reasonable to get a clear grasp of how they do function 
before trying to evaluate the reasons which some philosophers might have given for 
challenging our general accepted working ontology. (Strawson 1992: 34)
Chapter One: How Should Epistemology Be Done? 
14
He goes on to say that philosophers who put forward such challenges must surely start 
from somewhere, such as ‘some abstract considerations about existence and identity, 
or unity and plurality’ (Strawson 1992: 34), and so cannot avoid calling on those 
concepts. We will be best equipped to engage with, and assess, such challenges if we 
have a good understanding of the concepts involved. Presumably, if opponents stray 
too far from our normal usage of such concepts then we would have good reason to 
challenge their suggestions. 
However, according to Ayer, philosophy should not be restricted to describing the 
way in which our concepts operate. Our investigations can also be normative in nature: 
Philosophers do not limit themselves to uncovering the criteria which we actually use 
in assessing different types of statement. They also question these criteria; they may 
even go as far as to deny their validity. (Ayer 1957: 30)
In questioning a set of criteria we may produce paradoxes, such as the Cartesian 
sceptical argument, but these are not just philosophical perversions. Instead, discussion 
of what lies behind these problems and paradoxes can be informative about the 
concept under discussion. 
However, even if philosophy goes beyond simple conceptual enquiry, it is still a 
vitally important starting point to our investigations: 
If someone wishes to convince us that he has a better way of describing the world, he 
has to make it intelligible to us, and this means that he has to relate it to concepts that 
we already have… This is not to say that philosophy is restricted to the practice of 
conceptual analysis, but it is only there that it can profitably begin. (Ayer 1973: 43)
Although there might be deficiencies in our conceptual scheme we must start with the 
concepts that we have, and we cannot move too far from them. If someone suggested 
an analysis of knowledge that was completely removed from our ordinary conception 
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of it, we would be right to question whether we were actually talking about the same 
thing. Any radical departure from a commonly held concept would have to be justified 
and it would have to be recognisable that the concept applies to what we were 
investigating in the first place, unless of course the revision was linked to an error 
theory about the latter.  
1.1.2 Some concepts are inherently complex
In fact there is further reason that conceptual enquiry is important. We do not feel the 
need to analyse all concepts philosophically; we have no interest in philosophically 
analysing the concepts of ‘apple’ or ‘taxi driver’, for example. The kind of concepts that 
are traditionally subject to philosophical enquiry, such as ‘knowledge’, ‘justice’, ‘truth’ 
and so on, seem to be inherently complicated. Although we are very competent users 
of these concepts, it is not immediately obvious what unites the cases that fall under 
them. There is no easy way of explaining why all cases of knowledge count as 
knowledge or why all just acts can be gathered together under the one concept. This is 
not the case with, for example, ‘apple’. We can see that all apples have a similar shape, 
taste, and smell and come from the same kind of tree. We may not know what it is that 
underlies these similarities but we can identify features that make each individual 
similar to others of the same kind. 
Secondly, in exploring such concepts we often become more confused rather than 
less. It seems that as soon as we commence a philosophical investigation into such a 
concept we are led into confusion and often outright contradiction. Some concepts 
seem to have in-built conflict; for example, there seems to be an inherent tension in the 
concept of free-will that is revealed with very little reflection: neither a determinist nor 
and indeterminist account appears to be compatible with it. The problem seems to be 
Chapter One: How Should Epistemology Be Done? 
16
built into the concept from the very start. That is not to say that we cannot solve such 
problems but rather than there are inherent tensions in certain concepts, which is 
exactly what makes them suitable candidates for conceptual enquiry. 
A similar complexity or tension also exists in the concept of knowledge and 
emerges as the problem of scepticism. That the concept of knowledge is inherently 
complex in this way goes a long way to explaining the preoccupation with scepticism 
that is found in traditional epistemology. The sceptical problem can be understood as a 
paradox: from premises that seem intuitively correct we are led to an unacceptable 
conclusion. A brain-in-a-vat (BIV) is a disembodied brain floating in nutritional 
solution and connected by electrodes to a very powerful computer. Via these electrodes 
the BIV is ‘fed’ experiences. The experiences are indistinguishable from the 
experiences that the BIV would be having if it was actually experiencing the real world. 
If the experiences are subjectively indistinguishable then it seems clear that I cannot 
know that I am not a BIV, because if I were I would be having ostensibly the same 
experience as I am now. This, however, seems to undermine my knowledge of the 
‘external’ world:
1) If I know that I have hands then I know that I am not a BIV. 
2) I cannot know that I am not a BIV.
So, 3) I cannot know that I have hands. 
Although the two premises appear to be intuitively plausible, together they lead to the 
unpalatable conclusion that I cannot know that I have two hands, or any other 
proposition about the external world for that matter. 
Some philosophers (e.g. Schiffer 1996, Spicer 2008, Weatherson 2003) have gone as 
far as to suggest that the concept of knowledge is inherently flawed. Spicer, for 
example, argues that the sceptical puzzle demonstrates that we have ‘inconsistent 
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intuitions of extension’ (Spicer 2008: 51). He then argues that the best explanation for 
this inconsistency is an inconsistency in our folk epistemology, which in turn means 
that there are in fact no conceptual truths about knowledge. I shall discuss this in more 
detail in section 1.2.2, below but what is clear is that if there is an inherent flaw in the 
concept of knowledge then this will only be uncovered by conceptual investigation of 
some kind. In order to discover whether a concept is flawed we must first engage with 
that concept. 
If it is the phenomenon of knowledge that we are interested in, then why should it 
be a problem, or even be of interest, that there is a tension in our concept? Surely this 
is only of interest if we are preoccupied with concepts. This is not the case for two 
reasons. Firstly, if there is tension inherent in a concept then it is going to be 
problematic to even identify the phenomenon that we are discussing. Take the case of 
scepticism, for example. Beliefs that seem to be paradigmatic examples of knowledge, 
such as the belief that I have two hands, seem to be undermined by the sceptical 
argument in such a way that they also seem intuitively not to be examples of knowledge. 
Unless we have some good, independent, reason to dismiss the sceptical hypothesis 
then our investigation will struggle from the start. Secondly, as discussed above, our 
concepts describe the world from a human perspective. If there is a tension in a 
concept then this may very well come down to some complexity inherent in the 
phenomenon under investigation. That is not to say that complexity in our concepts 
necessarily means complexity in the phenomena that they describe but rather that it is a 
possible indicator of such complexity. 
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1.1.3 Conceptual enquiry as a necessary first step
If philosophically interesting concepts are inherently complex in this way then it seems 
that it may be necessary in any investigation of such phenomena to engage in some 
level of conceptual enquiry. Even Kornblith, a staunch opponent of conceptual 
enquiry, admits that appeals to intuitions are a reasonable starting point for a naturalist 
investigation of knowledge (Kornblith 2002: 12-14). Whilst Kornblith does not talk of 
conceptual enquiry, he does claim that, in the first instance, we need to rely on our 
intuitions about knowledge. Kornblith draws an analogy between the job of an 
epistemologist and that of the rock collector. At the beginning of the investigation we 
need to rely on our intuitive judgements in order to collect rocks of the same kind, or 
examples of knowledge. Our intuitive judgements should pick out the most obvious 
cases. Once we have collected enough clear examples then we can move away from 
intuitive judgements and into empirical investigation about the underlying structure of 
the thing we are interested in. 
If, as suggested above, the concept of knowledge is inherently complex then the 
cases that Kornblith suggests will not be analogous. Even cases that seem to obviously 
count as knowledge throw up sceptical problems, which raises the question of whether 
they are cases of knowledge after all. It is not enough to simply collect obvious cases of 
knowledge. Further conceptual enquiry needs to be done to clarify which cases count 
as obvious cases of knowledge. If there is tension in our concept then it may not be as 
simple to collect cases of knowledge as it is to collect specimens of a particular type of 
rock. 
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1.2 Arguments Against Conceptual Enquiry
Here we shall examine three of the objections against conceptual enquiry: the claim 
that concepts are parochial, that they embody error and that there is a gap between our 
concepts and the phenomena that they describe. In each case, a problem is suggested 
and then it is claimed that the conclusion we should draw is that we need a change in 
philosophical methodology. However, although these problems suggest that conceptual 
analysis is not perfect they do not show that it is not a valid form of philosophical 
enquiry.
1.2.1 Concepts are parochial
One challenge to conceptual investigation comes from adherents of experimental 
philosophy, who claim that there may be systematic differences between the intuitions 
of people from different cultures and socioeconomic groups. The suggestion is that if 
there really are such systematic differences along class or cultural lines then in relying 
on the intuitions that we – that is, Western philosophers – have we may unintentionally 
be doing ‘ethno-epistemology’ (Nichols et al 2003), that is, an investigation into what a 
certain restricted group of people mean by the term ‘knowledge’. There is no reason 
for us to assume that all people have exactly the same intuitions, or that philosophers 
occupy some privileged position in this regard. If intuitions about scepticism, for 
example, are not shared by all, or at least the majority of, people then it is hard to see 
why it should be considered so worrisome. 
Experimentalism can be divided into two kinds, characterised by the following two 
theses:
The negative thesis: Armchair reflection and informal dialogue are not reliable 
sources of evidence for (philosophically relevant) claims about folk concepts.
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The positive thesis: Survey studies are a reliable source of evidence for 
(philosophically relevant) claims about folk concepts. (Kauppinen 2007: 97).
 Here I shall concentrate on the first thesis as it is this that directly attacks conceptual 
analysis. I see no reason why, in principle, surveys can not be a valid source of evidence 
in philosophy provided that they are carried out well. Potentially, even if concepts are 
shared by the majority, there may be insights that philosophers have missed or 
downplayed that could be brought to our attention by such surveys. They may also 
reveal a different emphasis or focus amongst the general public compared with the 
‘experts’. There are also many cases in which intuition appears to be divided amongst 
philosophers, such as in the debate between internalists and externalists about 
knowledge, and so to get data on people’s pre-theoretic opinions might be able to shed 
some light on such debates. 
Traditional philosophy can be divided into four projects: the normative, the 
descriptive, the evaluative and the ameliorative (Weinberg et al 2001/2008: 18-19). Here 
I shall concentrate on what is described as the descriptive project. This project aims to 
analyze either epistemic concepts or epistemic language. In particular it aims to 
understand what ‘our’ concepts are and how ‘we’ use epistemic terms. The concepts
are, claim Weinberg et al, ‘characterised rather vaguely by using the first person plural’ 
(2001/2008: 18) The implication of this statement is, of course, that in characterizing 
the project in these terms, something inappropriate is being done. Weinberg et al see 
the traditional epistemic project as being guided by what they call ‘Intuition Driven 
Romanticism’ or IDR (2001/2008: 19-20).  This method uses intuitions as the basis for 
coming to a reflective equilibrium about the concepts under discussion; an intuition is
‘a spontaneous judgement about the truth or falsity of a proposition’ (Nichols et al
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2003: 21). In epistemology, for example, Gettier cases are used to test our intuitions 
against a particular theory of knowledge. The assumption underlying IDR is that ‘our’ 
intuitions are everyone’s intuitions and this is an empirical claim that needs to be 
tested.   
Weinberg et al conducted a set of studies in which they set about testing (1) the 
intuitions of people from different cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds and (2) 
the intuitions of students who had been exposed to more or less philosophy 
instruction. In their studies they presented participants with various different scenarios 
based on important epistemological thought experiments. For each case they asked 
whether the subject in the scenario had knowledge or a true belief regarding a 
particular proposition. These judgements were recorded as the participants’ intuitions. 
For example, participants were asked to judge a ‘Truetemp’ case:
One day Charles is suddenly knocked out by a falling rock, and his brain becomes re-
wired so that he is always absolutely right whenever he estimates the temperature 
where he is. Charles is completely unaware that his brain has been altered in this way. 
A few weeks later, this brain re-wiring leads him to believe that it is 71 degrees in his 
room. Apart from his estimation, he has no other reasons to think that it is 71 degrees. 
In fact, it is at that time 71 degrees in his room. Does Charles really know that it was 
71 degrees in the room, or does he only believe it? (Weinberg et al 2001/2008:26)
Weinberg et al discovered that there seem to be systematic differences between 
people of different ethnicities and socioeconomic statuses. In particular, the reactions 
to Gettier cases seemed to be very different depending on cultural background. A 
majority of subjects in the East Asian group claimed that the subject did know in a 
standard Gettier case whereas in the Western group the majority thought that the 
subject didn’t know, which tallies with the standard intuition as presented in the 
                                                
1 The two papers, Nichols et al (2003) and Weinberg et al (2001/2008), are written by the same three 
authors, Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich. 
Chapter One: How Should Epistemology Be Done? 
22
literature. Similar results were found when comparing Westerners to subjects with a 
background in the Indian Sub-Continent. 
There were also differences with regard to socioeconomic status. Weinberg et al 
(Weinberg et al 2001/2008: 33), following usual practice in social psychology, divided 
subjects into two groups depending on whether they had a college education. Those 
that had not attended college were labelled low-SES and those that had were labelled 
high-SES2. The subjects were presented with a case based on Dretske’s ‘cleverly 
disguised mule’ case (Dretske 1970: 1015-6). Pat is visiting the zoo and points out a 
zebra to his son. If the zebra had been a cleverly disguised mule then Pat would still 
have thought that it was a zebra.3 However, the animal that Pat is looking at is a real 
zebra. As with the Truetemp case, the subjects were asked whether Pat ‘really knows’ 
or ‘only believes’ that the animal is a zebra. The results seem to show that people in a 
lower socioeconomic group are more likely to say that a subject knows than people 
from a higher socioeconomic group. 33% of the people in the low-SES group thought 
that Pat knows, compared to 12% in the high-SES group. Although the majority in 
both cases thinks that Pat ‘only believes’ the proportions appear to be strikingly, and 
significantly, different. 
The experimenters also looked at whether studying philosophy has an effect on 
one’s intuitions (Nichols et al 2003: 241-242). They took two groups, one of which 
consisted of students who had taken two or less philosophy courses; the ‘low-
                                                
2 Although they are following usual practice in the social sciences, different labelling may have been 
useful here. The relevant factor distinguishing these two groups seems to be college education, not 
socioeconomic status. If, as they attempt to show, the study of philosophy changes people’s intuitions 
then perhaps study in general will also have an effect. Undoubtedly, college education and SES generally 
go hand-in-hand, but perhaps it would be more informative in this case to label the groups according to 
their level of education rather than their SES.  
3 Interestingly, there have been actual cases of painted or dyed donkeys or mules being used in place of 
zebras. For example, in October 2009 the BBC reported that a zoo in Gaza was using donkeys dyed to 
look like zebras after their real zebras died 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8297812.stm, accessed 24/05/10). Also ‘Tijuana 
Zebras’ are a popular tourist attraction in Tijuana, Mexico. The story goes that white donkeys were 
originally pained with black stripes in order to show up better in black and white photographs. 
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philosophy’ group. The other group was made up of those who had take three or more 
philosophy courses; the ‘high-philosophy’ group. When presented with a BIV case, it 
was found that while the vast majority of the high-philosophy group thought that the 
BIV case rules out knowledge. In the low-philosophy group, on the other hand, there 
was a slight majority in favour of the conclusion that we can know in spite of BIV 
cases. Their suggested interpretation of this is that either philosophers are 
unintentionally teaching the standard intuition or that, again unintentionally, we are 
weeding out students with conflicting intuitions (Nichols et al 2003: 232). Interestingly, 
Nichols et al note that the BIV case is the only one in which they saw a significant 
difference between the intuitions of the low- and high-philosophy groups (Nichols et   
al 2003 242).
In addition to the finding that intuitions about certain matters differ according to 
group the study also found that there seem to be some shared intuitions. The vast 
majority in every group thought that you could not come to know something on the 
basis of a ‘special feeling’ that it was going to happen when this special feeling was only 
as accurate as guessing (Weinberg et al 2001/2008: 36). If this is the case then we may 
not share all of our intuitions about knowledge but there may be some core intuitions
about knowledge that are universally shared. 
As the authors themselves claim, these results are preliminary. The experiments had 
relatively small samples and have not yet been replicated. Many questions have been 
raised over the quality and effectiveness of the trials and I will not go into all of them 
here. Rather, I think there are two general hypothetical questions to be asked. Firstly, if 
it were shown that there are significantly different intuitions between different ethnic 
or class groups then what are the implications for epistemology? The suggestion of 
Weinberg et al is that this difference in intuitions undermines the project of using 
intuitions to make universal claims about knowledge. We cannot guarantee that our 
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intuitions are the only intuitions (or the only correct intuitions) about knowledge as it 
seems that intuitions are affected by culture in ways that we were unaware of.
The second question is of whether the kinds of experiment suggested can actually 
get at the intuitions we are interested in. Certainly, we should be wary of assuming that 
our intuitions are the only intuitions around, but that is not to say that we need to 
abandon conceptual enquiry altogether. Rather, it would seem to say that we need to 
do further investigation into our concepts. We need to check if our concepts are the 
same as the concepts of other groups of people. There seems to be no good reason to 
think that this could not be done through traditional methods of conceptual enquiry 
but with a larger set of people. The problem, it seems, is not so much that conceptual 
enquiry is suspect but that philosophers, as a group, are not sufficiently diverse. It is 
not that the method is at fault, but that we need to expand the range of people who 
take part in philosophical debate. 
Kauppinen claims that the type of experiments that have been carried out only test 
the subject’s ‘surface’ intuitions and not our ‘robust’ intuitions, which are what we 
should be interested in, philosophically speaking. Thus any apparent disagreement 
does not necessarily mean that there are actually cross-cultural differences. The best 
way to find out these robust intuitions, he claims, is by the traditional Socratic method 
of dialogue between the experimenter and subject. Presumably, in principle, we could 
uncover differences in robust intuitions – this should not be surprising as we encounter 
clashes of intuitions amongst philosophers relatively frequently – but we cannot 
discover these via the methods that the experimental philosophers suggest. If 
Kauppinen is correct, then the apparent differences that the experimental philosophers 
have suggested may not actually mean that intuitions vary cross-culturally. It also shows 
that there is a case for conceptual enquiry of a more traditional sort; discovering our 
robust intuitions will go hand in hand with enquiring into our concepts. 
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Kauppinen (2007: 97) defines ‘robust’ intuitions as intuitions
represented by those responses of non-specialists that are stable under arbitrary 
increases in consideration of relevantly similar circumstance, ideality of circumstances, 
and understanding of the workings of language. (Kauppinen 2007:110)
These are the intuitions that should be the focus of philosophical enquiry but we can 
only guarantee getting to these if the following conditions are met:
1. The subject is a competent user of the concept in question.
2. They have considered the case in sufficiently ideal conditions. 
3. Their answer was influenced only by semantic considerations. (Kauppinen 
2007: 101)
If these conditions are met then we will have access to the intuitions that are of most 
philosophical interest. They will not be met, however, in the type of experiment that 
Weinberg et al advocate. 
To be a competent user of a concept is to generally apply the concept in line with 
the norms of your linguistic community. This demonstrates that there is a normative 
dimension to meaning; it is possible to make a mistake about the content of the 
concept. If this is the case then we cannot simply deduce the rules guiding a subject’s 
use of a concept from the cases in which she applies the concept. Nor can we be sure 
that someone who is minimally competent will be able to deal with ordinary cases but 
not with the far off possible worlds that are often in play in philosophical thought 
experiments. 
Ideal conditions are those which are ‘conducive to avoiding performance errors’ 
(Kauppinen 2007:103). The robust intuitions that we are interested in are not ‘gut 
reactions, but simply…pre-theoretic judgements that may require careful consideration’ 
(Kauppinen 2007: 104). The more unusual or remote a case is, the more difficult it is to 
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bring forth an answer that truly reflects the concept. It may not be at all simple to work 
out what one thinks about a particular case and we may need to distinguish between 
different considerations that weigh on the case and even perhaps consider different 
cases to get things clear. If our judgement in one case does not fit with our other uses 
of that same concept, then it would not count as a robust intuition.
The third condition that Kauppinen suggests is that the subject should only be 
influenced by semantic concerns. However, semantic considerations are not the only 
ones that influence proper usage of a concept. There are also pragmatic considerations. 
For example, it would be misleading to say that yesterday you had lunch voluntarily
when there is no special reason for saying so. It is true, and semantically appropriate, 
but conversationally misleading as it carries the implicature that there is something 
notable about the fact that you dined of your own volition. If we are to identify
people’s semantic intuitions then we need to somehow isolate them from pragmatic
concerns.
Kauppinen argues that these conditions have not been met in the surveys 
completed by experimental philosophers so far. As such the subjects of those 
experiments may
only appear to understand the question, who may have an imperfect grasp of the 
concept in question, who may or may not think hard about the application of the 
concept in circumstances that may or may not be conducive to avoiding conceptual 
mistakes, who may or may not rush in their judgements, and who may or may not be 
influenced by various pragmatic factors. (Kauppinen 2007: 105)
Thus, the surveys may very well not be getting at the philosophically interesting robust 
intuitions but rather at the participants’ gut reactions, and so apparent evidence that 
intuitions about knowledge vary along social and cultural lines may not be as 
problematic as it first seems. 
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It is also not clear how, in the context of a survey of the type the experimentalists 
want, one could check that the conditions were ideal, and that subjects were giving 
properly considered answers, without conducting dialogue with the subjects. Nor is it 
clear how we could determine that a subject was focussing on purely semantic 
intuitions. The best way would presumably be to conduct a dialogue with the subject, 
asking why each answer was chosen and encouraging further reflection. However, this 
would not be the kind of hands-off observational research that the experimentalists 
want. Rather, it would be ‘a return to the good old Socratic method’ (Kauppinen: 
2006:106). Through dialogue we can make sure that distracting conditions and 
distorting factors have been removed in order to reveal the subjects’ robust intuitions.
 If, after conducting this kind of research it turned out that Americans and South-
East Asians had different robust intuitions then it would be correct to conclude that 
there are two different concepts in play but this has not yet been tested. It should be 
no surprise that those subjects who had had some philosophical training gave different 
answers to those without. Those who had some experience of philosophy were likely 
to be better at sorting through the distorting factors that affect our gut reactions and
more used to considering the kind of far-off possibilities that philosophers tend to talk 
about. This does not necessarily mean that doing philosophy changes one’s intuitions 
but rather that it helps one become better at uncovering one’s, possibly well-hidden, 
robust intuitions.
However, even if it were shown to be the case that robust intuitions did not vary 
according to social factors, any differences in surface intuitions are still interesting. 
Why would surface intuitions differ in an apparently systematic way if our robust 
intuitions are in fact the same? This in itself would appear to be an interesting area for 
investigation. That is to say, there may be space for the kind of investigation that the 
experimentalists suggest even if it does not do the job that they want it to. A full 
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investigation of knowledge would include investigations of our surface intuitions as 
well as our robust ones. 
Even if there are some differences in our intuitions about knowledge there is good 
reason to think that different cultures would develop similar concepts of knowledge.
Edward Craig suggests analysing the concept of knowledge from a state-of-nature 
perspective. If we do this then we may come up with reasons why a concept at least 
very similar to our concept of knowledge would be likely to arise in any society. Craig’s 
suggestion is that the concept of knowledge arose in response to the need to tag good 
informants. Presumably this need would exist in any group of beings capable of sharing 
information and capable of making mistakes. Even if we do not accept Craig’s 
approach or his theory of knowledge we can see that the concept of knowledge plays a 
significant and important role in human interaction. This, in itself, may be a reason to 
think that different societies would develop at least a similar concept of knowledge. 
It seems, therefore, that the case put forward by experimental philosophers is not 
as strong as it first appears. There is good reason to think that dialogue is a better way 
to discover what people’s intuitions are than simply asking questions in a survey. The 
moral is that we should encourage as many people as possible from as many 
backgrounds as possible to join in the practice of philosophy. If we also vary our 
methods of investigation to include experiment as well as conceptual enquiry we may 
develop a more complete understanding of all the aspects of knowledge. 
1.2.2 Concepts embody error
Finn Spicer argues that our folk epistemology is inconsistent, meaning that there can 
be no conceptual truths about knowledge. If this is the case then conceptual enquiry 
will not be an effective way of finding out about knowledge. Spicer first outlines a view 
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of what concepts are that, he claims, underlies many common theories of conceptual 
truth; inferential descriptivism (ID) (Spicer 2008: 44). ID claims that the identity of 
concepts is determined by their connection with other concepts, which are embodied 
in our dispositions with regard to those concepts. ID consists of three claims:
 Universality Claim: there is a set of inferences that all possessors of the 
concept knowledge are disposed to draw (let us call these core inferences);
 Identity Claim: the identity of the concept is fixed by its core inferences; 
 Semantic Claim: the semantics of the concept knowledge is fixed by its core 
inferences. (Spicer 2008:44-5)
To claim that something is a conceptual truth about knowledge is just to claim that it is 
one of the core inferences with regard to knowledge. The set of all of our core 
inferences about knowledge form a folk epistemology. 
However, because this folk epistemology is a tacit theory, it will not be 
straightforward to get at. Spicer (2008: 48-9) suggests that the best method would be to 
use an experimental method like the one suggested by Weinberg et al. We need to 
uncover people’s intuitions, but in a scientific manner. Once we have discovered what 
intuitions are held we can then deduce what the best explanation for each intuition is. 
These explanations taken together constitute folk epistemology. 
However, Spicer (2008: 50-2) is doubtful of the possibility of developing such a 
coherent theory. He thinks that there is evidence that our folk epistemology is 
inconsistent. When faced with a sceptical argument it seems that our intuitions are 
pulled in two contradictory directions. We have the intuition that we do know everyday 
propositions, but when we are faced with the BIV possibility we have the intuition that 
we do not know such propositions. It seems that we have inconsistent intuitions about 
the extension of knowledge. The best explanation of this tension is that there is an 
Chapter One: How Should Epistemology Be Done? 
30
inconsistency in our folk epistemology. The sceptical argument, therefore, should be 
taken as prima facie evidence that our folk epistemology is inconsistent. 
It should be possible to test this hypothesis empirically. Spicer (2008: 53) suggests 
that if we do have an inconsistent folk epistemology then we would also have a 
mechanism such that we would not generally be drawn into outright contradiction. 
Thus, it is likely that we would have a mechanism such that we only think about a few 
folk epistemological principles at once and our intuitions about knowledge would 
exhibit framing effects. Spicer suggests that the literature on contextualism suggests 
that this may be the case, but he would rather see some empirical data. To this end he 
has begun experiments to test this hypothesis but has not yet published any results. 
If folk epistemology is indeed inconsistent then there can be no conceptual truths 
about knowledge. According to the semantic claim, what knowledge is fixed by folk 
epistemology. If folk epistemology is inconsistent, then we have the choice to either 
deny the semantic claim or deny that there is any such thing as knowledge. One way to 
give up the semantic claim but to still hold on to something like ID would be to claim 
that some of the principles of folk epistemology are in fact defeasible. Spicer describes 
this position as ‘dual-status descriptivism’ (Spicer 2008:56). This view distinguishes 
between logical and empirical principles and of the two only the logical principles 
determine the reference of knowledge. These are the only conceptual truths about 
knowledge. Empirical principles are not conceptual truths but rather useful rules of 
thumb for ascribing knowledge. 
The problem for this theory, however, is that there is no obvious way of 
determining which principles are logical and which empirical. If we cannot distinguish 
between the two kinds of principle, then, although we can save conceptual truth, we 
can no longer consider it a priori. That is, we will no longer be able to infer from the 
fact that something is part of our concept of knowledge that it is therefore a 
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conceptual truth about knowledge. Thus, doing conceptual investigation will not be 
able to reveal the nature of knowledge as it will uncover both conceptual truths and 
rules of thumb with no way of distinguishing between them. 
Spicer thinks that there is good prima facie evidence that our folk epistemology is 
inconsistent. However, it looks as if there are alternative ways of explaining the same 
data. One way of explaining the intuitions is just to say that the intuitions are not about 
when one knows but about when it is right to claim that one knows. It may be that, 
although one does know that one is not a BIV, it is conversationally inappropriate to 
claim that one knows. When we make a claim to knowledge it carries with it the 
implicature that we have grounds to back up that claim. It could be that we confuse 
intuitions about when we have knowledge with intuitions about when it is appropriate 
to claim that we have knowledge (For further discussion of this see Pritchard 2005). 
An alternative explanation of the apparently contradictory intuitions of extension is 
the claim that there are in fact two senses of knowledge involved in the sceptical 
argument; for example, Sosa’s animal and reflective knowledge (Sosa 1997; 2007). In 
one sense a subject knows as long as her belief is formed in the right way. In another 
sense of ‘knows’, however, she only knows a proposition provided that she has formed 
it responsibly, that is, if it is warranted by her reflectively accessible evidence. If this 
were the case, then, when assessing a sceptical scenario, it could be that these two 
senses of knowledge are getting confused. The subject cannot know that she is not a 
BIV in the sense of having a responsibly held true belief because there is no reflectively 
accessible evidence that she could have that would show this to be the case; it is an 
integral part of the sceptical scenario that the subject cannot distinguish between the 
good and the bad case. That does not mean, however, that she cannot have a grounded 
belief, and therefore know, that she is not a BIV If this belief was in fact formed in the 
right kind of way then she can know this. 
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There are, therefore, ways of explaining the apparent contradictions. That is not to 
say that it would not be useful to do empirical research into whether certain intuitions 
are universally shared or not, but that even if we discovered that there was an apparent 
conflict in our intuitions, that would not mean that our folk epistemology is 
inconsistent. If we can give an explanation for why there is an apparent inconsistency 
then we will be able to answer Spicer’s criticism. Thus, he would need to show that it 
was not only an apparent conflict but an actual one. And, it seems that the only way 
that we will be able to determine whether it is a real conflict or not is by more 
conceptual investigation. Thus, Spicer’s argument does not show us that conceptual 
investigation is illegitimate. 
1.2.3 The gap between concepts and phenomena
A third objection to conceptual investigation is the claim that there is a gap between 
our concepts and the phenomena that they describe (See, for example, Kornblith 
2002). As such, if we are interested in what knowledge is then we should investigate it 
directly rather than looking at our concept of knowledge. Hilary Kornblith argues that 
knowledge is a natural kind and, therefore, investigating the concept alone will not get 
us very far. 
In his “Twin Earth” thought experiment Putnam (1975b: 223-227) argues that the 
meaning of natural kind terms is not determined solely by the ideas that we associate 
with them. He imagines that there is a far-off planet, ‘Twin Earth’, that is almost 
exactly like Earth to the extent that some of the people speak a language called 
‘English’. However, there is one respect in which Twin Earth differs from Earth and 
that is that the substance that speakers of Twin Earth English refer to as ‘water’ is not 
H2O but a substance whose chemical structure we shall abbreviate to ‘XYZ’. XYZ and 
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water are indistinguishable from each other at normal temperatures and pressures and 
have the same thirst-quenching and lake-filling properties as water. If scientists from 
Earth visit Twin Earth and examine the water then they will discover the difference in 
structure and report that ‘On Twin Earth the word ‘water’ means ‘XYZ’’ (Putnam 
1975b:223). The word ‘water’ means different things on Earth and Twin Earth. 
If we think back to a time before the discovery of the chemical structure of water 
then it would still be the case that there were two senses of ‘water’. Even though 
Oscar1, on Earth, and his Doppelganger on Twin Earth, Oscar2, would be in the same 
mental state when thinking about water, the extensions of the term ‘water’ would be 
different for each of them. On Earth ‘water’ refers to H2O and on Twin Earth it refers 
to XYZ, even if the people on those planets do not know the relevant chemical 
information. The reason for this, Putnam argues, is that when I point to a glass of 
liquid and describe it as water then I am presuming that the liquid I am identifying is 
the same as the stuff that I and the other people in my community describe as water. If 
that empirical presupposition is fulfilled then we have a necessary and sufficient 
condition for what it is to be water, it is to be the same as the stuff that I am pointing 
to. We may not know what the underlying structure is that makes water what it is but 
nonetheless that structure in some sense defines what “water" means.
If we agree with Putnam that meanings ‘ain’t in the head’ (1975: 227) then analysing 
the meaning of ‘knowledge’ or the associated concept will only tell us about our 
concept and not about the phenomenon that falls under it. If Kornblith is right that 
knowledge is a natural kind term then the same is true of ‘knowledge’. We will not be 
able to find out what knowledge is by examining only our concept of knowledge. 
Instead we should engage in an empirical investigation as we would for any other 
natural kind. 
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A natural kind ‘defines…a well-behaved category, a category that features 
prominently in causal explanations, and thus in successful inductive predictions.’ 
(Kornblith 2002: 62). As such, anything that features in causal explanation in the 
natural sciences should be considered a natural kind. Knowledge, claims Kornblith, 
plays an important causal and explanatory role in cognitive ethology – the study of 
animal cognition – and as such should be considered a natural kind. There is an 
underlying structure to knowledge – reliably formed, true belief – that explains the role 
that knowledge plays in animal survival: knowledge makes animals better equipped to 
survive.  Kornblith claims that it is common in the cognitive ethology literature to use 
the term ‘knowledge’ to describe animal behaviour and cites various examples such as 
Herman and Morrell-Samuels work on dolphins which talks about ‘knowledge 
acquisition’, ‘knowledge acquiring abilities’ and ‘knowledge requisites’ (Herman and 
Morrel-Samuels 1990/1996:289, cited in Kornblith 2002: 56). 
Kornblith’s argument appears to turn on his claim that knowledge is a natural kind. 
However, it is not clear that he needs to go that far. For the central claim that 
knowledge should not be investigated by conceptual analysis, all he needs to claim is 
that the most important truths about knowledge are not conceptual truths. If it were 
the case that every truth specifying the nature of knowledge were a conceptual truth 
then it would be appropriate to investigate it by conceptual analysis. It is, however, 
inappropriate to investigate something about which there are conceptual and non-
conceptual truths in a way that only took account of the conceptual ones. If this is the 
case for knowledge then a purely conceptual enquiry would be insufficient to find out 
what knowledge is; we should also do some empirical investigation. 
It is not clear, however, how Kornblith’s method actually differs from traditional 
epistemology, except that it advocates a different evidence base. In traditional 
epistemology we also collect various cases that clearly are and are not knowledge and 
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try to derive what knowledge is from those cases. Gettier cases and fake barn cases are 
supposed to be clear examples of where we lack knowledge and chicken-sexers are 
suggested by externalists as a clear case of where someone does have knowledge. The 
main difference between Kornblith’s methodology and traditional epistemology seems 
to be that he advocates taking our knowledge samples from cognitive ethology whereas 
traditional epistemology takes them from thought experiments. Kornblith appears to 
still be interested in the concept of knowledge; it is merely that he is interested in the 
concept held by cognitive ethologists, not philosophers. 
In taking this approach Kornblith seems to move too far away from the traditional 
data of epistemology. Whilst cognitive ethology offers a wealth of animal-based 
examples, Kornblith offers no examples of human knowledge behaviour. This is 
because he argues that there no important distinction to be made between human 
knowledge and the knowledge of non-human animals. If this is the case then cases of 
animal knowledge will suffice. However, having a broader base for our theory would 
surely be better, so it would be preferable to pick a theory that is based on evidence 
from both human and non-human behaviour, giving traditional philosophy the 
advantage over Kornblith’s method as he sets it out. I shall discuss this in more detail 
in Chapter 3 but it is important to note here that it seems that we would need to do 
some conceptual investigation to settle this question. If it turns out that we have two 
different concepts of knowledge, for example, then Kornblith’s claim that knowledge is 
whatever cognitive ethology says it is does not hold much weight. If we are at all 
interested in human knowledge, and Kornblith only discusses non-human knowledge, 
then it looks as if he has changed the subject. Conceptual enquiry, therefore, will still 
have some role to play even in Kornblith’s methodology. 
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It seems, therefore, that none of the criticisms of conceptual enquiry that we have 
discussed here is successful in showing that conceptual enquiry should be abandoned. 
If there is a close connection between our concepts and the things that fall under those 
concepts then we should expect to find out some things about our objects of enquiry 
just by examining our concepts. If the concepts are complex or even apparently 
incoherent then that may tell us that the situation in the world is a complex one. An 
inherent tension within a concept may give us reason to think that there is more than 
one thing being grouped under that concept, for example. Conceptual enquiry may not 
be the whole of philosophical investigation but it is certainly an important part. 
1.3 The Importance of Actual Practice
Mark Kaplan (2000. See also Kaplan 1991) suggests a problem of a different kind. In 
some cases traditional philosophical methodology appears to elicit intuitions that are at 
odds with our actual practice. For example, one assumption that appears to underlie 
the Cartesian sceptical argument is that in order for S to know that p, S needs to rule 
out any hypothesis that she is aware of that is incompatible with p (Kaplan 2000: 279-
80; c.f. Stroud 1984: 29-30). However, this is completely at odds with our everyday 
epistemic practice. In everyday cases, we do not expect people to be able to rule out 
every possible case, but only relevant cases (Kaplan 2000; see also Austin 1946/1979). 
We do not expect a witness in a court case, for example, to rule out the possibility that 
she was dreaming, unless there is a reason to think that this is likely.  
Barry Stroud (1984: 56-64) agrees with this description of ordinary practice but 
denies this means that the requirement that we rule out incompatible hypotheses is not 
a condition on knowledge. Rather, he claims that what is required for knowledge-claims
is different to what is required for knowledge itself. Whilst it may be completely 
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appropriate for me to claim that I know that p, this doesn’t mean that I actually do 
know p. There are circumstances such that I can legitimately claim to know without 
actually knowing. If I have incredibly good reason to think that I know that p then it 
may be appropriate to claim that I know that p even if it later becomes apparent that I 
did not actually know. What we can be said to know for practical purposes is different 
from what we know strictly speaking. 
Stroud distinguishes between the real-life context where one needs to make a 
decision based on one’s belief, and the context of philosophical investigation where we 
can sit back and examine the situation at leisure (Stroud 1984: 64-66). The fact that the 
witness cannot rule out the possibility that she was dreaming makes no difference for 
practical purposes. However, when we sit down and reflect upon the case we can see 
that it is not actually true that she has knowledge. In the context of a philosophical 
investigation we are not interested in what is good enough to do the job of knowledge 
but what knowledge actually is. Stroud believes that the conditions for knowledge that 
are developed in the context of philosophical reflection are the ones that we should 
take note of, irrespective of whether they match how we actually act or not. The 
conditions, he claims, remain the same whether in the philosophical context or not. 
However, practical concerns prevent us from applying them in real life situations. 
Although the conditions are constant, whatever the situation, there are pragmatic and 
social pressures that cause us to adopt a lower standard in most cases. 
Stroud gives an example to illustrate the way in which our investigation of 
knowledge can be shielded from normal practice in this way: the plane-spotter case 
(Stroud 1984: 67-8). The plane-spotters have a book that tells them the following about 
enemy planes:
1. If a plane has features x, y and w it is an E. 
2. If a plane has features x, y and z it is an F. (Stroud 1984: 67)
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In the first scenario the careful plane spotter (CPS) spots a plane that has features x, y, 
and z, checks the book and concludes that the plane is an F. The irresponsible plane 
spotter (IPS) only sees that it has features x and y but doesn’t check whether it has z, 
but still claims to know that the plane is an F. In the second case the scenario is the 
same except that there is a third type of plane G, not included in the book because it is 
rare or not dangerous, that has features x, y and z, the same as F-type planes.
There are three judgements that Stroud suggests are correct. 
i. In the first case the CPS knows the plane is an F but the IPS doesn’t. 
ii. In the second case neither plane spotter knows but the CPS is blameless for 
his lack of knowledge. 
iii. If the CPS was told of the existence of Gs he would withdraw his claim to 
knowledge. (Stroud 1984: 69-70)
When you read the dreaming argument, you are like the CPS in (iii), you become aware 
of something that undermines your knowledge. Although you thought that you knew 
that p, and are blameless for that, you do not, in fact, know that p. You can still claim 
to know for practical purposes but it is not really the case that you know.
Kaplan (2000: 290-2), however, claims that the reactions we have are much better 
explained by our everyday practices of knowledge attribution than Stroud’s 
explanation. It is only when a relevant hypothesis – the existence of Gs – is suggested 
that we no longer think that the CPS has knowledge. Only in the second case, where 
we have special reason for thinking that there is a relevant hypothesis do we think the 
CPS does not know. The CPS may say, in the second case, that he knows only for 
practical purposes but actually he doesn’t even know by our ordinary standards.  
Kaplan’s argument is that if we do not judge our epistemological theories by our 
ordinary practice then it is mysterious as to what we are judging them against. It is not 
Chapter One: How Should Epistemology Be Done? 
39
clear why our philosophical intuitions should take precedence over how we actually use 
the concept. That is not to say that there is not some use for conceptual enquiry and 
examining our intuitions about knowledge, but if these intuitions pull in a different 
direction to ordinary practice then our practice should be the default that we appeal to. 
If our intuitions are at odds with this then there is something odd about our intuitions, 
not about our ordinary practice. It is important that, in our philosophical theorising, we 
do not lose sight of the way in which our concepts are used in normal life. 
1.3 Alternatives to Reductive Analysis
There seems to be no reason to reject conceptual enquiry as a form of philosophical 
investigation. There are, however, good reasons to think that reductive analysis is not 
the best way forward. For a start, it is not clear that all concepts can be analysed into 
neat sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. In particular, if the concepts that we 
are investigating in philosophy are inherently complicated, as argued above, then it 
seems that they are likely not to be analysable in this way. If we add to this the fact that 
despite the work of many hundreds of epistemologists for many years we have still not 
come up with a completely satisfactory analysis of knowledge – at least not one that is 
widely accepted – then it seems that we may be heading on the wrong track. So, if we 
are unlikely to achieve a satisfactory analysis of knowledge, what are the alternatives? In 
this section we shall examine what reductive analysis is and how one might go about 
conceptual investigation without analysis, focusing in particular on Edward Craig’s idea 
of ‘practical explication’ (Craig 1990:8) of concepts. 
The ‘traditional’ method, which is often rejected in contemporary philosophy, is 
reductive conceptual analysis. This consists of the search for necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the correct application of a concept. As Ayer suggests:
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[The theory of knowledge] aims…at establishing criteria for knowledge; criteria which 
may possibly set limits to what can be known…[it] is primarily an exercise in 
scepticism; the advancement and the attempted rebuttal of arguments that are 
intended to prove that we do not know what we think we know. (Ayer 1973: 1)
Even if we know how to use the verb ‘know’, that does not prevent us from asking the 
philosophical question, ‘What is knowledge?’ Ayer suggests that this question can only 
be answered by asking further questions, such as, ‘Do cases of knowledge have 
something in common?’ and, ‘Is knowing a person or an object the same thing as 
knowing that something is the case?’ and so on. Such questions should then be 
‘put…to the test of particular instances’ (Ayer 1957/1976: 27). 
For Ayer, methodology is very important. Indeed, he writes: 
It is by its methods rather than its subject-matter that philosophy is to be distinguished 
from other arts or sciences… Philosophical theories are not tested by observation.’ 
(Ayer 1957/1976: 7)
It is not that philosophy looks at a particular range of topics distinct from other 
disciplines but rather that it looks at those topics in a different way. We could, 
presumably, conduct a scientific investigation into what knowledge is but that would 
not answer the philosophical question. When conducting scientific investigation, we 
investigate the objects that fall under a concept, it would not tell us about the concept 
or how to apply it. The traditional method by which concepts are investigated 
philosophically is to ask general questions about a concept and then see how particular 
examples suggest that we should answer them. For example, in asking what knowledge 
is, we may come up with the suggestion that it is true belief. However, one can then 
suggest a counterexample of a belief that is just accidentally true, leading us to conclude 
that knowledge should not be accidental, and so on. 
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That is not to say, however, that philosophical investigation is completely inward 
looking. Although the investigation is not conducted using experimentation, it is still 
world-directed. As Jessie Prinz says:
It is a bit misleading to describe [philosophical investigation] as nonempirical… The 
philosopher examines her own mental states, monitors patterns of behaviour and pays 
close attention to how language is used. (Prinz 2004: 27)
Nor is philosophy a solitary pursuit; discussion of ideas is vital to making progress. For 
a start, discussion with others may bring up errors in reasoning or other mistakes that 
have been made. However, this is not the only role that discussion plays. If I am 
interested in the concept of knowledge then I am not just interested in what knowledge 
means in my idiolect. I am interested in a shared concept that plays an important role 
in my interactions with others. Although we are interested in intuitions, unique 
intuitions are not the focus of interest. We are interested in concepts that are shared, 
which enable us to communicate and which pick out important phenomena in the 
world. We cannot discover what these concepts are simply by sitting alone and 
reflecting on them. This may be a first step but it is only through discussion with 
others and observation of the world that we can fully examine our concepts.  
We have still not answered the question of what exactly traditional conceptual 
analysis is, however. Strawson suggests two analogies for conceptual analysis. The first 
analogy is the view of analysis held by Wittgenstein and the logical positivists: analysis 
as therapy (Strawson 1992: 3-4. See also Wittgenstein 1953). When we try to think 
philosophically we are likely to get ourselves tied up in knots and to be led to 
conclusions that are unacceptable, if not paradoxical. The philosopher’s job is to help 
us out of these confusions and set us back on the right course. We should also be 
trying to simplify things, to reduce our concepts to more basic ideas. Wittgenstein also 
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suggests why we get into such a mess. In thinking philosophically we lose sight of how 
the concepts actually work. When the concepts are actually in use such problems do 
not arise: I usually have no problem identifying when knowledge is present or absent, 
but as soon as I start thinking philosophically I lose sight of that. The cure is to bring 
ourselves back to the way in which these concepts are used in normal, everyday 
language (Wittgenstein 1954: §116)
The second analogy is that doing conceptual analysis is analogous to investigating 
the grammar of a language (Strawson 1992: 4-5). Instead of the grammar of a particular 
language we are investigating the logical grammar of our concepts. One can be a fluent 
native speaker of a language but still struggle to express the grammatical rules that 
underlie the structure of the language. It is similar with concepts: we can be very 
competent users of the concept ‘knowledge’, but that doesn’t mean that we will be able 
to express what it is for something to be a case of knowledge. 
The grammar analogy implies that there is a hidden structure to our concepts that 
we can uncover through analysis. The therapy analogy, on the other hand, implies that 
the aim of analysis is to undo confusions that we get ourselves into when thinking 
philosophically. There is some truth in both of these accounts. Philosophical thinking 
does lead to confusion about certain concepts which we need to get out of but this is 
not to do with the manner in which the concepts are investigated. Instead, it is that the 
concepts themselves are inherently complex. 
Can there be useful conceptual investigation that does not aim for a reductive 
analysis? Strawson suggests that instead of reduction we should aim for ‘elucidation’ 
(Strawson 1992: 19). Instead of aiming to reduce a concept into simpler ones we 
should try to understand how it connects other concepts, aiming for a web of 
understanding rather than a series of reductive analyses. We shouldn’t worry about 
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circularity provided that we move in a ‘wide, revealing and illuminating circle.’ 
(Strawson 1992: 20-21) 
This gives us a suggestion for how we may proceed should we find that reductive 
analysis is untenable. There are ways in which we can come to a greater understanding 
of our concepts, and of the phenomena that they describe, even if we cannot give a 
reductive analysis. We can gain clarity without having to reduce our concepts to basic 
concepts. In some ways the task that Strawson suggests is harder than the traditional 
project. In order to fully elucidate what knowledge is, I may also need to investigate 
truth, belief, perception and a whole host of other concepts. However, this would give 
a greater understanding not just of what knowledge is but of the place that it holds and 
the role that it plays in relation to our other concepts. 
A more detailed description of how we might carry out a non-reductive 
investigation into our concepts is suggested by Edward Craig. We shall discuss Craig’s 
methodology in detail in Chapter Four, but in short Craig suggests that we should 
attempt a ‘practical explication’ (Craig 1990: 8) of knowledge. Instead of investigating 
the concept directly, Craig looks to the possible origins of the concept; why would we 
have developed such a concept, what use is it to us? In doing so, Craig hopes to shed 
light on the concept that we have now through looking at why and how it may have 
originated. 
We should not expect our definition of knowledge to fit with all cases of 
knowledge. Rather, if we achieve anything like an analysis of knowledge, we should 
expect it to define the prototypical cases only. Craig focuses on the purpose for which 
a concept has been developed and as such ‘We are asking not so much: when is the 
ascription of a certain concept correct, but rather, why is it applied? In freakish 
circumstances, a purpose may be achievable in unusual ways’ (Craig 1990:14). As such, 
we should not expect a neat set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions but rather 
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conditions that apply in prototypical conditions, some of which will apply in some 
cases and others in other cases. Many cases of knowledge, on Craig’s view, will not 
meet all of the conditions that we would traditionally see as being necessary. 
Although we may not want to adopt Craig’s methodology completely, we may want 
to take on board the flexibility of conditions that he suggested. We could still search 
for conditions for knowledge, but instead of rigidly defining all cases of knowledge, 
these conditions may describe conditions for prototypical cases, allowing for some 
variation in what it takes for something to count as knowledge. There is also something 
to be said for allowing that our intuitions can be mistaken. If we have confusing, or 
even contradictory, intuitions about knowledge then we should not worry excessively 
about having to bite the bullet and deny one of our intuitions, or claim that one or two 
intuitions are not true for all cases of knowledge. This is not too far a move from 
‘traditional’ philosophy. As we saw earlier the traditional job of philosophy is not 
merely descriptive. Rather, if we uncover inconsistencies in our concepts then we can 
adapt the intuitive concept to be more consistent. We do not have to be constrained to 
make our philosophical investigations exactly in line with our intuitive understanding. 
1.4 Towards a Comprehensive Epistemology
As we have seen, conceptual enquiry remains a legitimate form of enquiry in 
epistemology, although it need not take the form of reductive analysis. However, as we 
have seen above, there are several alternative methodologies have been suggested.  
What of these? There is no reason why these methodologies could not also properly be 
included within a philosophical investigation of knowledge. Although the role of our 
intuitions and concepts is important, there should also be space for naturalism, 
experimentalism and facts about ordinary practice. 
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However, there is one obvious problem with being so broad: there are likely to be 
considerable differences between the theories of knowledge that are produced by these 
different approaches. A naturalist will emphasise how knowledge fits in to the natural 
world, perhaps emphasising the continuity between human and non-human animal 
knowledge. A view that focuses on social practice, on the other hand, is likely to focus 
much more on the human side of things. The perspective with which one approaches 
the question ‘What is knowledge?’ is bound to have an effect on the theory of 
knowledge that is ultimately produced. In Chapters Three and Four we shall examine 
two different approaches, those of Kornblith and Craig respectively, and look at how 
each leads to a very different theory of knowledge. 
Although different theories will be produced by having different approaches to the 
questions of epistemology, this does not meant that the different theories are 
irreconcilable. Knowledge is a complex concept and it is likely that we have competing 
intuitions about it. If we bear in mind that we are not looking for a reductive analysis 
of the concept but rather conditions that define a prototypical case, then we can allow 
that something that is required for knowledge in one case may not be required in 
another. There may even be more than one prototype of knowledge, for example: one 
for human knowledge and another for non-human animal knowledge. If we are no 
longer seeking a reductive analysis then we have more flexibility in the theory that we 
finally develop. Thus, we may be able to take on board insights from various different 
methodologies. The more we can take on board, it seems, the more comprehensive our 
understanding of knowledge will be and we should aim for as comprehensive a theory 
as possible. We should not limit ourselves to conceptual enquiry alone but take on 
board insights from as broad a base as possible.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed various suggestions for how we might go about 
philosophy, and what philosophy should answer to. Although it has faced criticism in 
recent times, conceptual analysis will still be an important part of any investigation into 
knowledge. However, we should not think that this alone will be able to give us a 
complete epistemology. We need to look not only at the concept that we have but also 
at the associated phenomenon, the social role of knowledge and take on board any 
experimental data that there may be. It is only once we have taken all these different 
factors into account that we will have a comprehensive account of knowledge. 
CHAPTER TWO
Internalism and Externalism
The debate between internalist and externalist theories has come to dominate 
contemporary epistemology. Internalism about knowledge claims that we need to have 
reflectively accessible justification for our beliefs, if we are to have knowledge. 
Externalism, on the other hand, denies that we need to have any such reflective access 
in order to know, instead the knower simply needs to be connected to the facts in the 
right way. 
There seems to be some intuitive plausibility to internalism but once examined in 
more detail it appears problematic.  It seems impossible to give an answer to scepticism 
from an internalist point of view, for example. Externalism, on the other hand, can 
give a relatively simple answer to scepticism. Provided that we are not in fact being 
deceived then there is no reason that we cannot know many things about the world. In 
fact, provided that the belief is formed in the right way, we can even have knowledge 
of the denials of sceptical hypotheses (See, for example, Pritchard 2005: 69).  
Externalism is not without its problems, however. The fact that it eschews 
reflectively accessible justification leaves its answer to scepticism looking rather 
unsatisfactory. According to the externalist a subject lacks any reassurance that he is 
not being deceived. From the subject’s perspective he could just as easily be a brain-in-
a-vat as not. I suggest that the reason for this dissatisfaction is precisely that we cannot 
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have reflectively accessible justification that we are not being deceived. The 
dissatisfaction is not proof that the externalist is wrong but it is rather an indicator of 
the importance that we place on reflective accessibility. Thus, any adequate theory of 
knowledge should take account of internalist intuitions as well as externalist ones. The 
chapter will end by examining some theories that appear to take into account both sets 
of intuitions; McDowell’s disjunctivism and Sosa’s virtue epistemology.
2.1 Some Definitions
Before discussing the debate it is necessary to define some terms. ‘Internalism’ and 
‘externalism’ are not used in a uniform manner across the literature but I shall use them 
in the following way: 
 Internalism about justification: justification is provided only by what is 
reflectively accessible.
 Internalism about knowledge: knowledge requires justification conceived 
internalistically.
 Externalism about justification: justification need not be provided only by 
what is reflectively accessible. 
 Externalism about knowledge: knowledge does not require justification 
conceived internalistically4. 
Sometimes the epistemological debate is couched in terms of whether or not one 
should be an internalist about justification but in other places it is set out in terms of 
                                                
4 This way of drawing the distinctions can be seen in BonJour and Sosa (2003) and Pritchard (2005), 
amongst others.  
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whether or not one should internalist about knowledge. Where it is taken for granted 
that justification is understood as inherently internalist, the debate is essentially about 
whether or not justification is necessary for knowledge (e.g. Craig 1990; Gettier 1963; 
Kvanvig 2003; Lewis 1996). Some, however, appear to see ‘justification’ as a place-
holder for whatever condition differentiates knowledge from ‘mere’ true belief (e.g. 
Chisholm 1989: 75; Goldman 1980; BonJour 1980, 1985; Greco 2005; Kornblith 2002). 
Here, I have tried to separate the questions of justification and knowledge as they seem 
to be independent of one another. Even if we were to decide that justification was an 
internalist notion it is not clear that such justification would be necessary for 
knowledge. Perhaps, as Robert Audi suggests, ‘an internalist account seems preferable 
for justification and a[n] …externalist one seems preferable for knowledge.’ (Audi 
1998: 244) 
2.2 Internalism
This section will examine the case for internalism. Firstly, we shall look at two possible 
interpretations of what it means for justification to be ‘internal’, accessibilism and 
mentalism. We will then discuss the case for internalism about justification, concluding 
that there is one understanding of ‘justification’ that is inherently internalist. Whether 
such justification is necessary for knowledge, however is a different matter. We shall 
look at the case for and against this claim. The case against internalist knowledge 
appears to be overwhelming and gives motivation to the externalist alternative. 
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2.2.1 What constitutes ‘reflectively accessible justification’?
a) How should we understand ‘internal’? 
Whether or not there will be a good case for internalism about knowledge or 
justification will, in part depend on how exactly one spells out what it is for justification 
to be internal. There are two main options in the literature with regard to this: 
accessibilism and mentalism. There is also a third, more unusual, possibility –
disjunctivism – but we shall leave discussion of that for later in the chapter. An 
accessibilist account of knowledge claims that for a belief to be known it must be 
justified in a way that is reflectively accessible. That is, you can confirm whether the 
belief is justified or not by reflection alone. The claim ‘I am in pain’ is a prime example 
of a belief which is internalistically justified. Mentalism, on the other hand, claims that 
the justification for a belief must be part of the mental life of the subject (Conee and 
Feldman 2001: 233). 
The two positions are very similar and may, in practice, come down to the same 
thing. However, Earl Conee and Fred Feldman (2001:234-5) claim that mentalism is 
the preferable option. More specifically, mentalism can be understood in terms of the 
following supervenience thesis:
S  The justificatory status of a person’s doxastic attitudes strongly supervenes on the 
person’s occurrent and dispositional mental states, events and conditions. (Conee and 
Feldman 2001: 234)
This echoes the internalism/externalism distinctions in philosophy of mind and in 
ethics. In philosophy of mind, for example, internalism is also construed as a 
supervenience thesis, where a subject’s mental contents supervenes on states and 
conditions internal to that subject. Conee and Feldman argue that internalism in 
philosophy of mind and epistemology are concerned with similar issues. They are both 
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interested in explaining how ‘being in some condition which is of philosophical 
interest…is settled by what goes on inside of cognitive beings.’ (Conee and Feldman 
2001: 235). Equating epistemological internalism and mentalism makes this feature very 
clear; mental states, events and conditions are clearly internal to the subject. 
Accessibilism does not bring out this internality as clearly. In order to do so, it 
needs to be supplemented by the additional thesis that ‘what is relevantly accessible is 
always internal to something, presumably the mind’ (Conee and Feldman 2001: 235). 
There is nothing inherently internal in the concept of ‘access’ in the way that there is 
with mental states. So, argue Conee and Feldman, the mentalist thesis is preferable. It 
seems that in practice the two views will be extensionally identical, so perhaps we 
should take Conee and Feldman as pushing mentalism as the more fundamental of the 
two ideas (For further discussion of this see Pritchard forthcoming b: 2-3).  
However, it is not clear that the mentalist thesis fully captures the internalist 
intuition. One of the most important things about internalist justification is that it 
should be reflectively accessible to the subject but this is not necessarily the case for all 
of one’s mental states. For example, one can imagine a form of content externalism 
that would mean that this is not the case (Pritchard forthcoming b: 3). If the subject’s 
relevant mental states were not accessible to him then it seems unlikely that we would 
want to classify such a theory as internalist. Although the things that justify the belief 
are internal to the subject as far as mentalism is concerned he would not be aware of 
them. 
It is this very lack of awareness that often underlies internalist criticism of 
externalism. If Conee and Feldman’s theory can likewise make justification completely 
opaque then it seems that it has lost a large part of the motivation for internalism but 
without gaining any advantage that an externalist theory may have. The natural 
understanding of ‘internal’ justification is something that we can access by reflection 
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and this, rather than the mentalist conception, appears to be the preferable 
understanding of ‘internal’. As the two theories are likely to converge anyway, there 
should be no significant disadvantage to adopting this view.  
b) What do we need to have access to?  
The internalist claims that justification needs to be reflectively accessible, but what is 
justification in this case? Traditionally justification has been understood as grounds or 
evidence for one’s belief. Your belief is justified, according to the internalist, if you can 
back up your belief. Let’s take a simple case: John knows that the apple is on the table. 
To back this up John might appeal to current perceptual experience that there is an 
apple on the table; his memory that the apple is on the table or the testimony of a 
reliable informant that there is an apple on the table. Any of these things, along with 
many others, would act as justification for a belief. 
2.2.2 Arguments for internalism about justification
a) Justification and responsibility
One reason for claiming that justification is internal, is the connection between 
justification and responsibility (e.g. BonJour 1980:55, 1985: Ch.1; Ginet 1975: Ch. 3). 
One’s belief is only justified if it is held responsibly –  if you cannot be reproached for 
holding it. Responsibility appears to be tied up with internally accessible justification. 
Your beliefs are held responsibly if they fit well with the evidence that you have 
available to you. You are not to blame for believing falsely that the capital of Australia 
is Sydney if all of your evidence points in that direction. If, for example, you have been 
told by more than one (usually) authoritative source that this is the case. Even though 
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your belief is false, you are blameless. If, on the other hand, you have the same belief 
but that is because you persistently ignore the excellent evidence presented to you that 
the capital is in fact Canberra then you do not hold the belief responsibly; your belief is 
not justified. 
Responsibility is tied up with duty. If it is our epistemic duty to believe truly and 
avoid believing falsely, then we have an obligation to try to believe truly. It is 
irresponsible to form beliefs on the basis of little or no evidence or to reject beliefs in 
the face of good evidence. There is, of course, a parallel with the moral case. It is your 
duty to save the life of a drowning child if you can. If, however, you are unaware that 
there is a child drowning in the nearby lake then you will not be held responsible for 
not saving that life. If, however, you hear the child’s cry for help but ignore it then you 
will be blamed for not trying to help. If you try your best to save the child but fail then 
we will not blame you. In the epistemic case, you will not be blamed for holding a false 
belief if there was no way that you could find out the truth, for example, if you are the 
subject of a complicated and extensive practical joke which fools you into thinking the 
capital of Australia is Sydney. 
If this conception of justification is correct then it seems that justification must be 
an internal matter. You cannot be held accountable for not taking into account things 
that are outside your ken. If all of the evidence, as it appears to you, points to the idea 
that Sydney is the capital of Australia then your belief is justified, even if it is false. If, 
on the other hand, your reflectively accessible evidence shows that this is not the case 
then your belief is not justified. Thus, justification is an internal matter. 
b) The ‘New Evil Genius’ view
A second justification for internalism about justification is the ‘New Evil Genius view’ 
(Neta and Pritchard 2007: 381. See also, Conee and Feldman 2001:234; Lehrer and 
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Cohen 1983: 92-3). This claims that two subjects who are exactly alike with regard to 
beliefs have the same justification. In other words, you cannot be more justified than 
your recently ‘envatted’ counterpart. The brain-in-a-vat, a modern version of 
Descartes’ demon-victim, is a disembodied brain that is hooked up to a supercomputer 
which is feeding it experiences. These experiences are indistinguishable from the 
experiences of a normal human being. Thus, if you were a BIV you wouldn’t be able to 
tell you were and, conversely, normal human beings cannot rule out the possibility that 
they are BIVs. The new evil genius intuition is that whatever justification you have your 
recently envatted counterpart has the same. You are exactly alike with regard to beliefs 
and reasoning and so you must be alike justificationally. To hark back to the previous 
point, the BIV is epistemically blameless and so must be justified in his beliefs. 
c) Conee and Feldman’s cases
Conee and Feldman (2001) argue for an internalist account of justification with a series 
of thought experiments. In each case, one person appears to be more justified than 
another but the only difference between them is something internal. Here we shall 
examine two of their cases. The first case is that of two tourists, Bob and Ray, sitting in 
an air-conditioned hotel lobby (Conee and Feldman 2001:236). They have both read in 
the paper that today will be warm and consequently believe this to be the case. Bob 
then exits the lobby and walks into the blazing sunshine. At this point his belief 
becomes better justified than Ray’s. Conee and Feldman’s claim is that the only 
difference between the two men is an internal one and so the difference in justification 
must come down to an internal difference. 
A second example regards two birdwatchers. On spotting a particular bird alighting 
on a tree, the expert bird-watcher and the novice bird-watcher both form the belief 
‘That bird is a woodpecker’ (Conee and Feldman 2001: 237). The expert has good 
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reason to believe that it is a woodpecker. He’s seen many a woodpecker before and 
knows what characteristics to look out for. The novice, on the other hand, doesn’t
have a good reason. He just thinks all birds of a certain size are woodpeckers. In this 
case it seems that the expert is justified in his belief but the novice isn’t. If their visual 
experiences are the same then it seems that the difference can only be an internal one, 
having to do with their differing beliefs about woodpeckers. So, conclude Conee and 
Feldman, it is internal differences not external ones that make a difference to 
justification and so justification must be an internal matter. 
2.2.3 Arguments against internalist justification
John Greco argues that not only justification but in fact ‘no interesting or important 
kind of epistemic evaluation…is internalist’ (Greco 2005: 266, my emphasis). He 
argues that there are two types of evaluation with regard to people and their beliefs; 
subjective and objective evaluation. The objective point of view evaluates how well 
beliefs fit with the world and the subjective point of view evaluates how subjectively 
appropriate it is to believe a particular proposition. However, claims Greco, it is not 
the case that the former is externalist and the latter internalist, rather they are both 
externalist forms of evaluation.   
Responsibility, just like reliability, depends in part on etiology and accuracy and this 
is external to the subject’s perspective (Greco 2005:266). Whether a belief is 
responsibly held or not depends in part on whether it was responsibly formed and this 
may not be internal to the believer’s perspective. For example, Maria formed her belief 
that Dean Martin is Italian in an irresponsible way, on the basis of testimony that she 
knew to be unreliable. She now seems to remember that Dean Martin is Italian and has 
no reason to doubt that this is the case (she cannot remember how she formed the 
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belief). The fact that she formed this belief irresponsibly means that she is not justified, 
claims Greco, but this is an external not an internal matter; she is not aware of the fact 
that she formed the belief irresponsibly. 
 Having good reasons, claims Greco, is not the same as believing for good reasons. 
You might have good reasons available but believe a proposition for other, bad 
reasons. For example:
A math student knows all the relevant axioms but doesn’t see how the axioms support 
a theorem that must be proven on the exam. Eventually he reasons fallaciously to the 
theorem, and believes it on the basis of his fallacious reasoning. (Greco 2005:261)
The fact that your belief is based on bad reasons may not be available to you and 
therefore not internal to your perspective, so justification is not purely an internal 
matter. Greco extends his argument to claim that no form of epistemic evaluation is 
internalist. One could stipulate a kind of justification that removed any externalist 
aspect but such evaluation would be entirely uninteresting. Etiological concerns will 
always have a role to play (Greco 2005:266). 
However, this misses something important about our epistemic position. We are 
often in the position of having to evaluate our own beliefs and knowledge. In doing 
this, the only information that we have available to us is what is internally accessible. 
As far as you can tell your belief is held in a responsible way. This is surely an important 
sense in which you are justified. Greco claims that such justification is uninteresting but 
surely it will be highly interesting to the subject who is trying to assess how well 
justified his belief is. 
Greco, as with many externalists, concentrates on an objective perspective of 
evaluation. ‘We are social, highly inter-dependent, information-using, information-
sharing beings’ (Greco 2005: 226-7), he claims, and so it should be no surprise that we 
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are interested in the history as to how beliefs are formed. Whilst this is undoubtedly 
true, it does not show that external factors should be of primary importance. In order 
to be part of a network of information-sharing beings we have a responsibility to 
identify which beliefs seem the most likely to be true from our own perspective. We 
filter and assess our own information before sharing it and it would be irresponsible to 
pass on information for which we have no reflectively accessible justification. The very 
fact that we are part of a network of beings who share information shows that there is 
an interesting type of evaluation that is purely internal.
With this in mind, we can re-examine Greco’s Maria example. It is not clear that 
Maria holds her belief responsibly. According to Greco, she simply ‘seems to 
remember clearly that it is so, and… she has no reason for doubting her belief’ (Greco 
2005:261). It is not clear that Maria could count as blameless in holding this belief even 
if we take an internalist perspective. She cannot remember what evidence she had for 
the belief that Dean Martin is Italian. If you cannot recall any evidence, or any reason 
that you might have for believing that p then it would not be responsible to pass on 
such a belief, or claim it as knowledge. In terms of asserting knowledge, at least some 
qualification would be required. For example, ‘I’m pretty sure that Dean Martin is 
Italian, but I can’t remember why I think that.’ Whether or not such justification is 
necessary for knowledge, it is of vital importance in our interactions with others. This 
significant aspect of justification appears to have been rather overlooked in 
contemporary epistemology and we shall examine it in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. 
It is not clear, however, that the only way of understanding ‘justification’ is 
internalist. Williams (2001:21-3) suggests that there are two ways of assessing 
someone’s belief, subjectively and objectively. Unlike Greco, however, he has an 
internalist understanding of subjective justification. Whether a belief is responsible is 
dependent on the evidence that the believer can access. We could say that this 
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dimension of assessment concerns whether or not the person is justified. We can also 
ask whether a belief itself is justified. Is the belief in actual fact well-formed, 
irrespective of what the believer thinks. Williams describes these types of justification 
as ‘personal justification’ and ‘adequate grounding’ respectively (Williams 2001:22).
There is, therefore, an important sense in which ‘justification’ is an internalist 
notion, but it is far from clear that it is the only way of understanding it. Indeed, as 
discussed above, some writers appear to understand ‘justification’ as a place-holder for 
the third condition on knowledge. If we adopt Williams’ position on this then we can 
allow for both the intuition that justification is an internalist notion and the intuition 
that it is whatever turns true belief into knowledge. For the sake of clarity I shall not 
use Williams’ terms but rather refer to internalist and externalist justification. 
2.2.4 The case for internalism about knowledge
The arguments for internalism about justification often yield arguments for internalism 
about knowledge. Underlying this understanding is the idea that knowledge is, or 
implicates, justified true belief, whatever justification may turn out to be. This confuses 
the issue as there does seem to be a natural understanding of ‘justification’ which is 
internalist, and, as argued above, there may in fact be more than one way to interpret 
the term. In this section we shall look at how well the arguments for internalism about 
justification transfer over to claims about internalism with regard to knowledge. 
In the preceding section we looked at the connection between knowledge and 
responsibility. Through his clairvoyant cases, BonJour (1980: 59-65) argues that such 
responsibility is indeed required for knowledge. In the most interesting case, Norman is 
a completely reliable clairvoyant but has no reason to think that he is, or to think that 
such a power is even possible. One day, due to this reliable clairvoyant faculty, he 
Chapter Two: Internalism and Externalism
59
comes to believe that the President is in New York but he has no other evidence either 
way. According to BonJour this cannot be knowledge because it is not responsibly 
held. 
Norman’s belief satisfies the criteria for knowledge according to a reliabilist 
account of knowledge; he has a true belief formed by a reliable belief forming process. 
It is also likely to count as knowledge on other externalist accounts of knowledge. 
However, claims BonJour, it is irrational and irresponsible for Norman to hold such a 
belief. From Norman’s internal perspective the belief about the president could just as 
well be an accident or a hunch, neither of which would be knowledge (BonJour 1980: 
62). The problem is that there is no way for Norman to tell whether or not his belief 
was formed in a reliable way. Beliefs based on his faculty of sight are responsible 
because he has had enough experience to know that his sight is reliable. However, he 
has had no chance to test whether his faculty of clairvoyance is reliable or not and so 
does not hold beliefs responsibly based on that faculty. 
In fact it seems odd that Norman is even forming beliefs under these 
circumstances. If he is unaware of his clairvoyance then presumably it simply strikes 
him as being the case that the president is in New York. Perhaps in the same way that 
it simply strikes me that the cup is on the table when I’m looking at the cup. However, 
if a fact simply strikes one, without any obvious cause, it would be very odd to accept 
it. If Norman was accustomed to suddenly form ideas about the president’s 
whereabouts and had established some kind of connection, then it would make sense 
that he would take this being struck as meaningful. If, however, it comes out of 
nowhere then it seems odd that he should simply accept that the president is in New 
York on the basis of nothing more than a feeling that it is the case.
Certainly, when it comes to assertions of knowledge it is usually assumed that 
someone who claims to know can also put forward some evidence to back up their 
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claim and if they can’t then it would be a reasonable response to say that they don’t 
actually know. Grice (1975), for example, argues that the most important 
conversational maxim is that of quality, which breaks down into two further maxims:
1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. (Grice 1975: 46)
It is conversationally inappropriate to violate either of these maxims, by stating as fact 
a proposition that you either believe to be false or for which you do not have adequate 
evidence, even if it is true. If you make a claim to know, either explicitly or implicitly, 
then you generate the conversational implicature that you have adequate grounds for 
your belief.  If evidence is required in this way for knowledge claims then we might 
think that this gives us prima facie reason to think that knowledge itself requires 
evidence. 
However, the fact that it may be inappropriate to claim to know does not mean 
that the subject does not in fact know. The conditions for having knowledge may very 
well be different from those for claiming knowledge. It is inappropriate to claim 
knowledge if you do not have evidence to back it up, but that does not mean that you 
do not have knowledge. As suggested in the previous section, it may be important 
from a social perspective that we do not claim knowledge when we lack evidence, but 
we may nevertheless have knowledge. Basically, the appropriateness or not of 
knowledge claims does not necessarily tell us anything about the conditions under 
which one can be said to have knowledge.
It could be, therefore, that the inappropriateness of Norman’s belief is not so much 
to do with whether or not he has knowledge but more to do with whether it would be 
appropriate for Norman to claim knowledge. If he does indeed form the belief (which 
seems questionable), then nonetheless it would be inappropriate for Norman to claim 
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that he knows where the president is as he has no way of backing up his claim. This, 
however, is independent from the question of whether or not he has knowledge. 
Although there is a clear connection between knowledge assertions and responsibility, 
there is nothing in the Norman case itself that shows that this is the case for 
knowledge. 
2.2.5 Problems with internalism
a) Scepticism
Sceptical arguments pose a big problem for the internalist. In fact, the sceptical 
problem can be understood as arising from an internalist perspective on knowledge. 
The standard sceptical argument in the contemporary literature begins with the BIV 
case as outlined above. We can use this case to form the following sceptical argument:
1. If I know that I have two hands then I know that I am not a BIV. 
2. I do not know that I am not a BIV.
Therefore, 
3. I do not know that I have hands. 
If I cannot rule out the possibility that I am a BIV, then I cannot know any everyday 
propositions as seemingly obvious as the proposition that I have two hands. As the 
BIV case is set up in such a way that it is impossible for a subject to it rule out then it 
seems that it will be impossible to know anything about the ‘external’ world. 
The sceptical argument is often understood as a paradox; from two premises that 
seem intuitively plausible we can deduce an unacceptable conclusion. The conclusion is 
particularly devastating because it is not just the claim that we do not, as a matter of 
fact, have knowledge but rather that there is no possible way that we can have 
knowledge. Because of the way that the BIV case is set up there is no way that you 
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would ever be able to be sure that you are not a BIV and so the very possibility of 
having knowledge is ruled out. 
The sceptical problem appears to arise out of an internalist idea of knowledge. The 
idea that we need to rule out alternative hypotheses, such as the BIV scenario, only 
makes sense if we think in terms of reflectively accessible justification. Your reflectively 
accessible justification may be undermined if you cannot rule out the possibility that 
you are a BIV because as far as you can tell you may be a BIV. This isn’t problematic for  
an externalist account because no such justification is required for knowledge.  
b) Gettier Cases
Gettier cases are situations in which a subject has an internalistically justified true belief 
that p but fails to have knowledge that p, demonstrating that internalistically justified 
true belief is not sufficient for knowledge5. For example, Jane comes down for her 
breakfast in the morning and, by looking at her (usually reliable) clock forms a true 
belief that it is 8.07. However, unbeknownst to Jane, the clock stopped exactly 12 
hours ago and it is simply luck that she happened to look at exactly the right moment. 
If she had been even a minute earlier or later she would have formed a false belief. 
Although she has an internalistically justified true belief it seems that she cannot have 
knowledge; she’s just too lucky6. 
It might be thought that the problem in the above case is that Jane is in some way 
reasoning from a false premise. She is acting on the assumption that the clock is 
functioning as normal. However, Gettier cases have been suggested that supposedly 
involve no false lemma. For example, John looks into a field, sees a fluffy white animal 
and comes to a true belief that there is a sheep in the field. However, the animal he 
                                                
5 Gettier cases are named after Edmund Gettier who first proposed them in his 1963 paper ‘Is Justified 
True Belief Knowledge?’ 
6 This example is originally (pre-Gettier) due to Bertrand Russell (1948: 170-1). It has since been adopted 
as a Gettier case by Alvin Plantinga (1997) and Duncan Pritchard (2005), amongst others. 
Chapter Two: Internalism and Externalism
63
spotted was actually a big, white, fluffy dog which happens to be standing in front of a 
sheep7. There doesn’t seem to be an error of reasoning in this case but John still has a 
justified true belief that does not amount to knowledge. That is, it is not clear that John 
is making an inference from a false assumption. Rather the error is of misperception 
rather than misreasoning. 
Such cases demonstrate that internalistically justified true belief cannot be sufficient 
for knowledge, as internalist justification could always be undermined in this way. This 
means that any internalist theory of knowledge will need, in addition to internalist 
justification, an externalist ‘anti-Gettier condition and such a condition runs the risk of 
looking gerrymandered and ad hoc. Gettier cases demonstrate that a purely internalist 
theory is not possible and that adding an extra condition may be problematic. This 
gives externalism a distinct advantage. 
c) Barn façade type cases
Barn façade cases are similar to Gettier cases in that it is lucky that the subject forms a 
true belief, but luck is involved in a slightly different way. In Gettier cases something 
‘intervenes’ between the subject and the belief that they form. Their beliefs are justified 
but not by the thing about which they are forming the beliefs. The barn façade case is 
different. Here the luck involved is ‘environmental’. That is, nothing gets in the way of 
his belief forming processes, but rather something odd about the environment makes it 
impossible for the subject to have knowledge (Pritchard 2009; Pritchard forthcoming a). 
In the barn façade case, Henry is driving along the road and watching the scenery. 
He spots a barn in the distance and consequently comes to the belief that it is a barn. It 
is, in fact, a barn and so he has a justified true belief based on a veridical perceptual 
experience. However, Henry is unaware of the fact that he is in barn façade county 
                                                
7 This case originates in Chisholm (1989:93). 
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where they pride themselves on their extremely realistic barn façades. As it happens, 
Henry is looking at the only real barn in the county. Again, luck comes into play here. 
It doesn’t look like Henry can know because he’s just too lucky. If he had looked at any 
other apparent barn, he would have formed a false belief.8
What is interesting about such cases is that it’s not as obvious what has gone wrong 
with the subject’s belief as it is in a Gettier case. After all, the belief is formed in a 
normal way and is true but we want to say that it is not knowledge. It seems that 
Henry’s belief is too lucky but at the same time, he’s come to that belief in a good way. 
Internalism cannot give an answer to this problem as there is no way that an internalist 
condition of knowledge could rule out such cases.  
d) Animal and infant knowledge
There is also a problem for internalism when it comes to non-human and infant 
knowledge. We are generally happy to ascribe knowledge to animals and infants; we 
claim that the cat knows that there is food in her bowl or that the baby knows his 
mother. According to internalism this should not be the case. Neither dogs nor babies 
have the capacity to have reflective justification for their beliefs and so, according to 
internalism, they cannot have knowledge. By making reflection essential to knowledge, 
the internalist makes knowledge something that is impossible for any creature except a 
fully grown human (or at least an older child), thereby raising the bar for knowledge 
too high. One could, perhaps, suggest that animals do not really have knowledge or 
only have something analogous to knowledge but this doesn’t seem to fit with the way 
that we use the term knowledge. We do not hesitate to ascribe knowledge to non-
                                                
8 The barn façade case first appeared in Goldman (1976: 772-773), although Goldman has since 
acknowledged that it was originally due to Ginet, who suggested it in correspondence.
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reflective creatures and so there is no obvious reason to exclude animals and infants 
from the sphere of knowledge and so this is another problem for internalism. 
The case for internalism about knowledge, therefore, seems to be quite weak. It 
cannot answer Gettier or sceptical problems and nor can it account for our intuition 
that knowledge is not just restricted to fully grown human beings. As we shall examine 
in the next section, externalism does have an answer to these problems and can more 
easily fit with our intuition that knowledge can apply to animals and infants, which 
gives it something of an advantage.  
2.3 Externalism
2.3.1 The case for externalism
The externalist claims that internalist justification is not necessary for knowledge. That 
means that a subject can have knowledge even if he doesn’t have reflectively accessible 
justification. Instead having knowledge is a case of being connected to the relevant 
facts in the right way, for example, by having a reliably-formed true belief. This means 
that the externalist can give an answer to scepticism and has a more straightforward 
answer to Gettier problems than the internalist. Externalism also fits better with our 
intuitions regarding infant and animal knowledge and our intuitions about the 
knowledge of so-called ‘chicken sexers’. This section shall examine these arguments 
which constitute the case for externalism. 
a) An answer to scepticism
According to externalism, you do not need to be able to rule out the possibility that 
you are a BIV in order to know that you have hands. Instead, you can have knowledge 
of the ‘external’ world provided that your relationship to the world is of the right kind. 
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Thus, the fact that you cannot rule out the claim that you are a BIV is entirely 
irrelevant to whether you have knowledge or not. Having knowledge is simply a matter 
of having the right connection to the facts. 
The sceptical problem only arises if we approach knowledge from an internalist 
perspective. The BIV scenario is set up in such a way that it is impossible to have 
reflectively accessible evidence one way or the other because the two situations are 
subjectively indistinguishable. However, as soon as you deny that reflectively accessible 
evidence is needed for knowledge then it is no longer a problem. The sceptical 
problem doesn’t even get started. I can know that I have hands, provided that I am 
connected to the fact that I have hands in the right way. It may even be possible for me 
to know that I am not a BIV, provided that I am connected to that fact in the right 
way. I cannot have reflectively accessible justification for my belief that I am not a BIV 
but that is not an issue because such justification is not needed for knowledge. 
One might object that this externalist answer has not proved that we do in fact 
have knowledge. Rather, it has only shown that we have knowledge provided that we 
are in the good case. That is, we are normally embodied human beings not BIVs. 
However, even if this is the case, the externalist is still in a much stronger position than 
the internalist. Firstly, the sceptical argument appears to show that knowledge is 
completely impossible but the externalist has demonstrated how it is possible. 
Secondly, given that that the world is pretty much as we assume it to be, then we do 
know a lot of the things that we take ourselves to know. It may not be possible to 
prove to the internalist’s satisfaction that this is the case but provided it is then we have 
lots of knowledge.
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b) Gettier 
As we discussed above, in order to combat Gettier examples, any internalist account of 
knowledge will therefore have to add an externalist ‘anti-Gettier’ condition to 
knowledge, excluding the possibility of a ‘purely’ internalist theory of knowledge. The 
externalist, however, potentially has the advantage of simplicity here. Rather than 
having to add an extra condition to knowledge, an externalist condition can do two 
jobs at once. If we take knowledge to be reliably-formed true belief, then we do not 
need to add something extra to protect knowledge from Gettier cases as beliefs in 
Gettier cases do not appear to be reliably-formed; looking at stopped clocks is not 
generally a reliable way to find out what time it is. 
However, although externalism has a ready answer to some Gettier cases, it is not 
clear that it can answer all the problems that they raise. In the dog/ sheep Gettier case 
outlined above, for example, it is not clear that any unreliable process is being 
employed. The subject forms his belief through his, presumably reliable, perceptual 
faculties. Nor is it clear that the externalist has the advantage in barn façade cases. 
Henry forms a true belief that what is in front of him is a barn using his reliable 
perceptual faculties and he is actually looking at a barn. In this case, it is not clear that 
the externalist has the advantage. 
c) Animal and infant knowledge
Internalism, it is argued, sets the bar too high for knowledge, meaning that infants and 
animals cannot rightly be said to have knowledge. Externalism, on the other hand, has 
no such problem. If reflectively accessible justification is not needed for knowledge 
then there is no barrier to non-reflective creatures having knowledge. If, for example, 
having a reliably-formed true belief is sufficient for knowledge then this can be 
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achieved by any animal that can form beliefs reliably. Externalism fits our intuitions 
much better in this regard than internalism.  
d) Chicken sexers
The chicken sexer example varies from writer to writer, and is sometimes presented as 
a real-life case and sometimes fiction, but in all cases it is supposed to show that 
externalist knowledge is possible (See appendix for a detailed comparison between real-
life and philosophical chicken sexing). In the original chicken sexer case, Douglas 
Gasking (1962: 158-9) claims that the chicken sexer is trained to identify chicks by 
looking at photographs of chicks and making a judgement about whether they are male 
or female. He is then told whether he is right or wrong. After a period of time the 
trainee chicken sexer is increasingly correct in his judgements. Even though he may 
become completely reliable in distinguishing between male and female chicks, he 
cannot explain the basis for his belief. The example has since come to be used to 
demonstrate that a subject can have knowledge in the absence of reflectively accessible 
reasons. If the chicken sexer has knowledge in this case then it shows that we do not 
need reasons in order to have knowledge. 
However, the internalist might object that the experienced chicken sexer does 
indeed have reflectively accessible evidence for his beliefs about the chicks. He has 
tested his ability on many occasions in the past and knows that he is good at 
distinguishing between male and female chicks. So, if we want to make it a true case of 
externalist knowledge then we need to remove this factor. If we take the trainee 
chicken sexer at a point before he has been tested but after he has become good at 
chicken sexing, then he does not have any reason to think that he even has the skill, 
never mind knowing how he does it (see, for example, Foley 1987: 168; Zagzebski 
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1996: 300-1). If we still think that the chicken sexer has knowledge in this case then it 
knowledge must be externalist.
A slightly different version of the example can also be found in the literature. 
Brandom (1998: 175-6. See also, Pritchard 2005:43) claims that it is not only the case 
that chicken sexers do not know how they form their beliefs but that they are actually 
mistaken about how they do it. Specifically, the chicken sexers think that they are using 
some visual cue to distinguish the chicks but in fact they discriminate on the basis of 
smell. This development in the story means that even the limited grounds that the 
chicken sexer may have had – “I know it’s male because it looks male” – is 
undermined, meaning that there are no internally accessible grounds available to the 
sexer. 
The chicken sexer case, at least in its final version, is supposed to show that one 
can have knowledge without having reflectively accessible grounds for that knowledge. 
If we agree that the chicken sexer knows that a particular chick is male, or, even more 
minimally, that he knows that chicks in group A are different from those in group B, 
then reflection cannot be necessary for knowledge and therefore externalism is true. 
2.3.2 Types of externalism
The general guiding intuition behind externalism is that knowledge should not be 
accidental, or lucky. As with internalism, the way in which the guiding intuition is 
spelled out will make a huge difference to the plausibility of an externalist account.  
Here we shall examine two ways in which this has been done: reliabilist theories and 
modal theories of knowledge. 
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a) Reliabilism
The core intuition behind reliabilism is that knowledge is true belief formed in a 
reliable way. In particular, here we shall focus on ‘process’ reliabilism. That is, the idea 
that knowledge is true belief formed by a reliable process, a theory held by, for 
example, Alvin Goldman (1975; 1976; 1980; 1986). 
According to Goldman, one needs to look at the history of a belief to find out 
whether or not it is justified. If it was formed by a reliable belief forming process then 
it is justified. Bill is a birdwatcher who has good hearing and is familiar with the 
different songs of common birds. In the garden he hears a familiar ‘cuckoo’ noise. 
From this Bill comes to believe that there is a cuckoo in the garden. As his belief is 
formed by a reliable process, Bill has knowledge. Kate, on the other hand, is prone to 
auditory hallucinations of the sound ‘cuckoo’ and so when she hears the bird and 
forms a belief on that basis she does not have knowledge. The method by which she 
formed her belief is unreliable even if it leads to a true belief in this case and so she 
does not have knowledge.   
There are, however, some big problems with simple process reliabilism. Firstly, 
there is the ‘generality problem’ (Conee and Feldman 1997); the problem of specifying 
the process by which one comes to hold a particular belief. Reliability is not something 
that applies to one-off events. It is only ‘enduring mechanisms’ (Conee and Feldman 
1997: 2) that can be reliable. This raises the question of how to define a particular 
process. There are various ways to describe the process that is at work when Bill 
identifies the bird. For example, it is a case of auditory-initiated belief formation; a case 
of identifying a bird based on the noise that is heard; a case of classifying an unseen 
bird on the basis of its song and so on. There are innumerable ways to describe the 
situation. The question is, which one we should focus in on to find out if Bill knows. 
Presumably the reliability will vary depending on how the process is specified. Unless 
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we have a systematic way of understanding what process is relevant we will not know 
which description is the correct one. 
Another accusation is that reliabilism is guilty of ‘bootstrapping’ knowledge. 
Jonathan Vogel, for example, demonstrates this with his example of Roxanne (Vogel 
2000: 613-4). Roxanne believes whatever her petrol gauge says, even though she has no 
reason to think that it is reliable. On the basis of this Roxanne often forms beliefs of 
the form ‘The gauge currently reads ‘Full’ and the tank is full.’ From this she deduces 
that the further belief that the gauge is accurate. So, assuming that the gauge is reliable, 
Roxanne has formed both of these beliefs through reliable processes and so is justified 
in her belief that the gauge is reliable, without forming any further checks or gathering 
any further evidence. With additional deduction she could even come to the conclusion 
that she is justified in believing that the gauge is accurate. As bootstrapping could be 
applied to many different processes, both reliable and unreliable, this is highly 
problematic for reliabilism. 
Another problem is that of the Keith Lehrer’s ‘Mr. Truetemp’ case (Lehrer 1990: 
163). Lehrer imagines a man who has a microchip implanted in his brain such that he 
develops a completely accurate ability to tell what the temperature is. Whenever he 
thinks about the temperature he will come to a true belief about the temperature. 
However, he is unaware of his new ability and the device has the side-effect that he 
never checks whether his belief about the temperature is true or not, he just blindly 
accepts it. Lehrer claims that Mr. Truetemp does not know what the temperature is but 
according to reliabilism he must know – he has a true belief formed by a reliable 
mechanism. 
The Truetemp case is analogous to both BonJour’s Norman case and also to the 
chicken sexer case. It seems that there is a difference in intuitions here. Internalists 
claim that Mr. Truetemp, Norman and the chicken sexer cannot know and the 
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reliabilists claim the opposite about all of them. It is not clear that there is any obvious 
way to defuse this clash of intuitions, but perhaps if there were an externalist theory 
that made space for some internalist knowledge that would help. We will examine two 
such theories below in Section 2.5.
b) Modal epistemologies
Simple process reliabilism seems to be too problematic to be correct. However, there 
are other ways of interpreting the core externalist intuition which are more successful. 
One such way is to describe reliability in terms of accuracy across a range of possible 
worlds. Such theories don’t concentrate on history, i.e. on how beliefs are formed, but 
rather on how stable they are modally. That is, they focus on how easily a proposition 
could have been mistaken. A first suggestion of this nature is the idea of ‘sensitivity’.
A belief is sensitive iff had it been false S would not have held it (Sosa 1999: 146). 
If you test a child’s temperature with a fully functioning thermometer, you would not 
believe that the temperature was normal unless it was. If, however, the thermometer 
was stuck at 37°C then you would still believe that the child’s temperature was normal, 
even if he had a fever. So, if you are checking the temperature with a broken 
thermometer, you don’t know that the temperature is normal, even if it is (Dretske 
1971: 2). 
Robert Nozick (1981:172-6) expresses sensitivity in terms of possible worlds: a 
belief that p is sensitive if in the closest possible world in which p is false the subject 
would not believe p. Nozick also adds a second truth-tracking condition: in the closest 
possible world in which p is true, s believes that p. That is, in a possible world which is 
slightly different from this one but in which p remains true, s would still believe that p. 
Nozick adds this extra conditional because there are cases in which belief is sensitive 
Chapter Two: Internalism and Externalism
73
but we would not say that the belief was known. For example, a dictator is killed and 
his death is reported in the newspapers. However, a false retraction is then published 
by all the news sources. Geoff fails to hear the retraction, and so continues to believe 
that the dictator is dead. He has a sensitive true belief – if the dictator had not died, he 
would not believe that he had – but we are reluctant to grant Geoff knowledge in this 
case (Nozick 1981: 177).
Sosa (1999) argues that sensitivity is not necessary for knowledge and that we 
should instead adopt an alternative modal condition, the safety principle. Sosa suggests 
the following counter-example to the sensitivity account of knowledge:
On my way to the elevator I release a trash bag down the chute from my high rise 
condo. Presumably I know my bag will soon be in the basement. But what if, having 
been released, it still (incredibly) were not to arrive there? That presumably would be 
because it had been snagged somehow in the chute on the way down (an incredibly 
rare occurrence), or some such happenstance. But none such could affect my 
predictive belief as I release it, so I would still predict that the bag would soon arrive in 
the basement. My belief seems not to be sensitive, therefore, but constitutes 
knowledge anyhow, and can correctly be said to do so. (Sosa 1999:145)
What this example appears to show is that beliefs can fail to be sensitive but still be 
knowledge. Sosa’s belief that his trash bag will arrive in the basement fails to be 
sensitive because in the nearest not-p world – i.e. the one in which the bag snags – the 
subject would still believe that it was on its way to the basement. However, that 
possibility is so far off that intuitively it should not affect knowledge. 
Sosa suggests that what is required for knowledge is not sensitivity but rather 
safety:
A belief is safe iff S would not easily have held it without it being true.
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That is, in a range of nearby possible worlds in which S believes that p, p is true. Unlike 
sensitivity, safety is formulated in such a way that a wide range of nearby possible 
worlds is relevant to the assessment of a belief, rather than just the closest possible 
world. Safety does not face the same problem as sensitivity when it comes to the 
rubbish chute example. In the nearby worlds in which the subject believes that the 
rubbish is heading to the basement, it does end up in the basement.
The safety principle must be formulated in such a way as to require us to look at a 
wide range of close possible worlds, not just at the closest world[s] in which S believes 
that p. The reason for this is that there are cases in which a close, but not closest 
possible world undermines knowledge. For example, let’s take another thermometer 
example, this time from Pritchard (2005:72-3; c.f. Goldman 1986:45). In this case there 
are several thermometers in the medicine cupboard which are all apparently identical 
but in fact most of them are unreliable. Sue cannot tell the difference between the 
reliable and unreliable thermometers and just picks one at random. As it happens, the 
unreliable thermometers are closer to the back of the cabinet and Sue is more likely to 
pick one from the front of the cabinet. She does in fact pick a fully functioning 
thermometer and forms a true belief about her son’s temperature. If safety is restricted 
to only the nearest possible world[s] where Sue believes that p, then Sue’s belief would 
be safe, because in the nearest possible worlds she chooses another functioning 
thermometer. However, we wouldn’t say that she knows because it seems she could 
have all too easily picked an unreliable thermometer. However, if safety is formulated 
to encompass a wide range of close possible worlds in which Sue believes that p her
belief fails to be safe and thus would fail to be knowledge under such an account. 
Safety has another advantage over sensitivity. Sensitivity encounters a problem 
when it tries to answer scepticism (Sosa 1999:141-2). Your belief in an everyday 
proposition such as ‘I have two hands’ is sensitive and so constitutes knowledge 
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according to a sensitivity account. Your belief that you are not a BIV, on the other 
hand is not sensitive, because even if it were not true, you would still believe it. 
However, this means that we have to deny the closure principle, which states: if S 
knows that p, and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. This principle seems, 
intuitively, to be true but Dretske (1976), for example, decided to bite the bullet and 
deny closure. However, the safety theorist doesn’t need to make any such difficult 
decision because your belief that you are not a BIV is safe. Unlike with sensitivity, the 
safety principle does not force you to look to distant possible worlds and in all nearby 
worlds in which you still believe that you are not a BIV, you are in fact not a BIV.
Duncan Pritchard (2002) suggests that the safety condition can be strengthened 
even further and calls this new condition ‘super-safety’ (2002:297):
An agent has a super-safe belief in the contingent proposition φ if, and only if that agent 
has a true belief in φ and her belief in φ ‘tracks’ the truth as to whether φ across a wide-
range of near-by possible worlds (i.e. where φ is true, she believes it; where φ is false, 
she does not believe it. (Pritchard 2002: 297)
Like a standard safety account, Prichard’s account limits the range to close possible 
worlds but the advantage is that this condition tracks both belief and non-belief. 
Whereas a simple safety condition could allow that there is a nearby possible world in 
which the target proposition is true but in which the subject doesn’t believe it, 
Pritchard’s account would rule out such a world.
2.3.3 A problem for externalism 
Although externalism about knowledge is in a better position than internalism, it is not 
without criticism. Barry Stroud (1989/2001) argues that externalism cannot provide a 
fully satisfactory answer to scepticism. Although externalism can restore the possibility
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that we have knowledge it gives us no guarantee that we do in fact have knowledge. 
The best that we have is the conditional statement that if a certain type of theory is true 
then we can have knowledge. Beyond wishful thinking, it is not clear that we have any
reason to accept such a theory. Nor do we have any reason to pick one kind of 
externalist theory over any other. Stroud suggests an externalist version of Descartes 
who claims, like the real Descartes, that his clear and distinct impressions are 
guaranteed by God to be genuine and truthful (Stroud 1989/2001:138-9). Unlike the 
historical Descartes, he does not need to resort to a circular argument justifying his 
belief in God. Rather, he can just claim that provided that God exists then he does 
know the things that he clearly and distinctly perceives. 
Do we have any reason to reject this theory as opposed to reliabilism? Both explain 
how it is possible to have knowledge and Descartes’ theory has the added benefit that 
it also explains why at least some of our belief-forming processes are reliable and 
guaranteed to yield knowledge; they are guaranteed by God. If the externalist Cartesian 
is in the stronger position then other than prejudice there doesn’t seem to be any 
reason to choose the reliabilist account. 
Stroud argues that the externalist has not, therefore, fully explained how knowledge 
is possible. In order for a theory to be a satisfactory explanation of how knowledge is 
possible, we need to have a reason to believe that the theory is true. Stroud claims:
…having an explanation of something in the sense of understanding it is a matter of 
having good reason to accept something that would be an explanation if it were true. 
(1989/ 2001:140)
The externalist has no such reason and no reason to accept his theory over another 
explanation, such as the externalist Cartesian. A externalist theory can explain how 
knowledge is possible but this gets us no closer to knowing whether we do in fact have 
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knowledge. If we are in the good case – i.e. we are BIVs and we are connected to the 
world in the right way – then we have knowledge but we can have no reassurance that 
this is the case. This lack of reassurance is what makes the externalist answer 
unsatisfactory; as far as I can tell, I might be a BIV. 
Sosa is unconvinced by Stroud’s criticism of externalism, claiming that he demands 
too much of a theory of knowledge. Stroud imposes the following metaepistemic 
requirement:
In order to understand one’s knowledge satisfactorily one must see oneself as having 
some reason to accept a theory that one can recognise would explain one’s knowledge 
if it were true. (Sosa 1994: 272) 
However, even given Stroud’s assumptions about the nature of epistemology, we do 
not need to go this far, claims Sosa. Stroud claims that we want to understand how we 
know the things that we know and also that understanding ‘is a matter of having good 
reason to accept something that would be an explanation if it were true’ (Stroud 
1989/2001:140). However, this simply says that we need to have a good reason to 
accept the explanation; it says nothing of whether we should be aware of that good 
reason. According to an externalist theory, one can know that the theory is correct 
without seeing oneself as having a reason. So, even if the externalist does not see
himself as having a reason to accept his theory, that does not mean that he does not
know his theory. Stroud’s insistence on needing to see oneself as having a reason just 
uncovers a deep-seated internalism that he holds on to. 
However, Sosa’s defence doesn’t seem to get quite to the heart of Stroud’s 
problem. Stroud can accept that the externalist knows that his theory is correct but 
what he wants to deny is that he has a full understanding of his knowledge. In order to 
understand how he has knowledge he needs to have a reason to accept that the theory is 
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true. Stroud’s claim is not about what is necessary for knowledge, but rather for 
understanding, which we may take to be more demanding than knowledge. We won’t 
be in a satisfactory position with regard to understanding our knowledge until we have 
an explanation that we also have good reason to accept as true, even if we know it to 
be true. The problem that I take Stroud to be getting at is that to know externalistically 
is not sufficient for understanding; understanding requires having a good reason to 
accept the theory as true. 
Crucially, the type of reason that Stroud is thinking of here is a motivating reason. 
That is, a reason that the believer is aware of, a reason that is capable of motivating one 
to act. The mere fact that my flight is cancelled will not prevent me going to the 
airport, even if it constitutes a good reason not to go. It will only stop me driving to 
the airport once I become aware of it, in which case it stops me from setting out. In 
order for an explanation to be adequate one needs to have a motivating reason to 
accept it. That is, one has to be aware of a reason for accepting that theory as true. 
What seems to be at the heart of what Stroud is saying is the idea that in order to 
rationally accept one theory rather than any other of the same explanatory power, you 
need to be aware of a reason to accept that theory. If, as Stroud claims, the externalist 
Cartesian theory is just as good, if not better, at explaining how knowledge is possible 
then why should we accept contemporary externalist accounts as opposed to a 
Cartesian version of them. It is all well and good that one may know that if one’s 
externalist theory is correct then one knows. It is different to claim that your theory is
correct without being able to give reasons for why it is your theory that is the correct 
one. 
The problem is, in part, that you are in a very weak position dialectically. You can 
bring forward no reason for why someone should favour your theory over others. You 
cannot even give a good reason as to why you should favour your own theory. We 
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expect people to be able to justify their beliefs. If they cannot do this then it is not clear 
that their understanding is complete. A school pupil may know that E = MC2 but if he 
can bring forward no reasons for believing that to be the case, beyond the fact that his 
teacher told him so, then we would think that he does not understand the theory of 
relativity. It is important that people do not just have knowledge but that they also 
have reasons that back up their knowledge. Although we may not always require these 
reasons it is clear that at least in some instances a lack of such reasons will count as a 
deficiency. 
What is lacking in externalism is not that it cannot explain how knowledge is 
possible but that it leaves us in an unsatisfactory position. The externalist may know 
that she has knowledge, in an appropriately externalist fashion, but he cannot give a
reason why he, or anyone else, should accept his theory as opposed to some other. He 
is in the strange position that he may know that his theory is correct but cannot give 
any reason why he, or anyone else, should believe his theory to be the case. I think that 
what this brings out is that we have conflicting intuitions about knowledge. On the one 
hand there is the externalist intuition that reflectively accessible reasons are not 
necessary for knowledge. On the other hand is an internalist intuition that we need to 
have reasons to back up at least some of our knowledge for it to be satisfactory. 
2.4 Two Possible Compromises: Sosa and McDowell
Despite its own problems externalism is less problematic than internalism, but since we 
seem to have some internalist intuitions about knowledge then the best theory would 
be one that is externalist but that takes into account internalist intuitions in some way. 
There is not necessarily anything contradictory about this. As an externalist theory is 
one that claims that internalist justification is not necessary for knowledge, but that is 
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not to say that there is not any role for internalist justification, it is just that it is not 
necessary for knowledge. In this section we shall sketch out two different theories 
which take into account, to some extent, both internalist and externalist intuitions. 
2.4.1 Sosa’s virtue epistemology
Sosa’s safety account of knowledge has since developed into a form of virtue 
epistemology (Sosa 2007) 9. Virtue epistemology comes in several varieties but what ties 
them together is a focus on the knower rather than the belief that is known. The idea is 
that a proposition is known when it arises out of an epistemic virtue. This parallels the 
virtue-theoretic ethical position that says that an act is good if it arises from a moral 
virtue. The question then is, how do we define what an epistemic virtue is? Sosa 
defines it in terms of competences. There are various ways in which we can assess a 
performance. First, it may or may not be accurate; that is, it may or may not hit its 
target. Second, it may or may not be adroit; that is, it may or may not manifest a 
competence on the part of the performer. Thirdly, and most importantly, a 
performance can be apt or not. An apt performance is one that is successful (accurate) 
because it is competent (adroit). When it comes to belief, a belief is apt – and so is 
known – if, and only if, it is true due to the exercise of an epistemic competence in 
appropriate conditions.
Relativising to appropriate conditions is an important part of the theory. Our 
competences are only competences in some conditions. The fact that I have the ability 
to make a good cup of tea does not mean that I would be able to make a cup of tea on 
a ship in a storm or on the top of Mount Everest. This distinguishes aptness from 
                                                
9 For other versions of virtue epistemology see Zagzebski (1996, 1999) and Greco (1999, 2003, 2007).
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safety. A performance would be safe, according to Sosa, if it could not easily have 
failed. However, that the relevant conditions obtain could be a matter of luck so it 
could be the case that a performance is apt but that it’s not safe. For example, it could 
be the case that the archer luckily chose the one un-drugged drink amongst lots 
containing a sedative. This would mean that his subsequent bulls eye shot is not safely 
accurate – he could very easily have taken a drugged drink and missed – however, it is 
an apt shot as it is because of his ability that he scores the bulls eye. 
As with the shot, a belief can fail to be knowledge in several ways. One could have 
a true belief that was not adroit, as in cases where one trusts a source that is known to 
be unreliable but just happens to be right on this occasion. One could also have an 
adroit belief that is inaccurate. For example, when I come to believe that I have spotted 
a famous actress in a shop only for it to turn out to be a lifelike cardboard cut-out. 
Finally, I could have an accurate, adroit belief that fails to be knowledge, as in Gettier 
cases. If that same actress is standing behind her cardboard cut out then my belief that 
she is in the shop is true but not through the exercise of an epistemic virtue. 
Sosa’s theory of knowledge also has space for knowledge construed internalistically. 
Sosa wants to distinguish between ‘animal’ and ‘reflective’ knowledge (Sosa 1997: 422; 
2007: Ch2, Ch5; BonJour and Sosa 2003: 2). Animal knowledge is just apt belief i.e. any 
belief that is true due to the exercise of a competence is a known belief, and this is true 
of adult human beings, infants and (at least some) animals. However, for normal adult 
human beings there is also the possibility of having reflective knowledge or ‘apt belief 
aptly noted’ (Sosa 2007:32). Reflective knowledge involves a meta-competence; not 
only has the knower formed a belief in a competent way but they are also competently 
aware that they have formed a belief in this way.
Animal knowledge is externalist in nature. The subject does not need to know that 
her belief is apt. That it is, in fact, apt is enough for it to count as knowledge. Human 
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beings, however, are capable of more than just animal knowledge; we can also have 
reflective knowledge. According to Sosa, reflective knowledge is ‘apt belief aptly noted’ 
(Sosa 2007: 32, 34). That is, the subject not only has an apt belief that p but also that 
she has an apt belief that she has an apt belief that p. For example, Geoff might think 
that he has forgotten all the French that he learnt at school, but when pressed on what 
the French for ‘hello’ is he answers ‘bonjour’. He knows the answer but lacks an apt 
belief – in fact, any belief – that he knows it. However, Yvette, who is bilingual in 
French and English, has not only apt belief but also an apt belief regarding that apt 
belief. She knows that she knows that ‘bonjour’ means ‘hello’.
By drawing the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, Sosa can be 
seen as taking into account both internalist and externalist intuitions. Animal 
knowledge is clearly externalist, whereas reflective knowledge could be seen as taking 
into account more internalist intuitions. Internalists emphasise the need for reflectively 
accessible reasons for belief and it seems that to note aptly that one has knowledge 
would be inherently internalist, although not in a strong sense. Precisely what is 
involved in aptly noting one’s apt belief, however needs some more definition. Sosa 
claims that reflective knowledge: 
requires…an apt apprehension that the object-level belief is apt. What competence 
might a believer exercise in gaining such meta-apprehension? It would have to be a 
competence enabling him to size up the appropriateness of the conditions. (Sosa 
2007:108) 
This competence, however, may just be ‘the default competence of taking it for granted 
that conditions are appropriately normal, absent some specific sign to the contrary’ 
(Sosa 2007:111). We will lack reflective knowledge, therefore, in situations in which we 
do not exercise such a competence. Presumably in situations where the conditions are 
not appropriately normal and there is no sign that this is the case. 
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Here we can see a similarity with what internalists claim knowledge to be. Crucially, 
reflective knowledge requires ‘apt apprehension that the object level belief is apt’ (Sosa 
2007:108). This implies that some sort of realisation on the part of the subject that she 
does in fact have knowledge, which is exactly the kind of thing that internalists say. 
Reflective knowledge, according to Sosa, requires not only that your belief is 
appropriately formed but that you are aware that it is appropriately formed. For 
example, I have reflective knowledge that there is a cup of tea on the table because I 
can see that it is there and I am aware that the conditions are appropriately normal. 
It must be noted, however, that Sosa’s reflective knowledge is not strongly 
internalist in the way that some internalists would demand. It requires only that you 
have an apt belief that you have an apt belief. That is, you must have a second order 
belief that your first order belief is well formed. This second order belief, however, just 
needs to fulfil the same requirements as a first order belief. That is, it must be true 
because well-formed It is not clear that this brings in reflection of the sort that is often 
in play in internalist accounts of knowledge. You do not necessarily need to be able to 
bring forth evidence for your belief, for example. All you need to do is to have a well-
formed belief that your first order belief is well-formed, and that these beliefs must be 
true because well-formed. Thus, from the perspective of the knower you may still not 
be able to give any reasons as to why you have knowledge other than that you know 
that you are reliable. Although this may not be considered properly internalist by some 
it seems that it is in the internalist spirit. Your knowledge is not completely blind, you 
can at least give an answer to the question of how you know what you know – you 
know because you are good at forming beliefs about this particular matter. 
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2.4.2 Disjunctivism
Another, more unusual, suggestion which takes into account internalist and externalist 
intuitions is disjunctivism. One of the fundamental motivations behind internalism is 
the idea that subjects who are exactly alike mentally must be alike justificationally. 
However, despite being internalists in an important sense, disjunctivists, such as John 
McDowell (1998), deny that this is the case. McDowell can nonetheless be classed as 
an internalist because he thinks that one’s justification is constituted by facts that one 
can know by reflection alone, although, again, not in the strong sense suggested by 
some internalists. McDowell believes that one’s justification is constituted by a 
particular type of reflectively accessible state; factive reasons. A factive reason for a 
proposition p could be that I see that p or that I hear that p. These are factive reasons 
because such a reason to believe a proposition entails that the proposition is true. I can 
only see that p if p. Alan Millar describes seeing that p in terms of having ‘cognitive 
contact’ (Millar 2007:186) with the facts. When you see that p there is a connection 
between you and the fact that p.
If we compare the two subjects S, in the actual world, and S*, her recently envatted 
counterpart, then we can see that according to McDowell’s framework the two subjects 
are not alike with regard to justification, even though they may appear to be. S’s 
justification for her belief that p – for example, the proposition that there is a cup of 
tea on the table – is that she sees that p. However, the justification that S* has for that 
same proposition can only be that she appears to see that p. She cannot see that p 
because she is envatted. She has no eyes with which to see and the experience that she 
is having is not of an actual cup but is an electrically induced hallucination of a cup. In 
the good case, the experience that the subject is having ‘takes in’ the world but this 
doesn’t happen in the bad case. Although both experiences may appear the same to the 
subjects, only the one in the good case has cognitive contact with he facts.
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McDowell criticises thinking in terms of the ‘highest common factor’ (McDowell 
1998: 386-9). This way of thinking assumes that the reasons that support our beliefs in
the good case and the bad case must be the same. Because the experience of the two 
subjects is identical, it is tempting to think that both subjects are equally justified. 
Therefore, if our reasons fall short in the bad case, then they must also fall short in the 
good case. McDowell thinks that the highest common factor assumption is false. The 
reasons that one has in the good case connect to the world but in the bad case they do 
not, therefore they are not the same reasons. 
The disjunctivist approach appears to have one advantage over the other types of 
internalism namely that the disjunctivist may not need to add an extra, externalist anti-
Gettier condition to his account of knowledge. If, in Gettier cases the subject does not 
take in the world in the right way then she will not have knowledge. It also has the 
advantage that it takes account of some internalist and some externalist intuitions. It 
places an emphasis on reflective access but at the same time insists there must be an 
appropriate connection to the facts. 
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have argued that internalism about justification is plausible but when 
it comes to knowledge, externalism is more plausible. However, this does not mean 
that the importance of reflection should be downplayed. We place a lot of importance 
on justification, as evidenced by the dissatisfaction with externalist answers to 
scepticism. Internalist justification also has an important role to play with regard to 
knowledge claims. Thus, any good theory of knowledge will try to take into account 
both internalist and externalist intuitions. 
CHAPTER THREE
A Naturalist Approach 
Hilary Kornblith argues that we should take a naturalist approach to epistemology and 
that this leads to a strongly externalist theory of knowledge. As we saw in Chapter One 
Kornblith argues that knowledge is a natural kind and that as such we should not 
investigate it conceptually but in the same way that we investigate other natural kinds: 
empirically. Kornblith’s argument that knowledge is a natural kind turns on the fact 
that knowledge plays an important causal and explanatory role in cognitive ethology –
the science of animal cognition. Only natural kinds can play such a role and so 
knowledge must be a natural kind. 
Having put forward his argument that knowledge is a natural kind Kornblith goes 
about developing a theory of knowledge. Using examples from cognitive ethology he 
concludes that “The concept of knowledge which is of interest here…requires reliably 
true belief.” (Kornblith 2002: 58). He then goes on to argue that human knowledge and 
the knowledge of non-human animals is of the same kind. Neither reflective access to 
our reasons for belief nor any particular social interactions are necessary for 
knowledge, he argues. Since these peculiarly human activities are not necessary for 
knowledge there is no need to draw a distinction, as Sosa does, between human and 
animal knowledge. Thus, any theory of knowledge correctly developed from cognitive 
ethological data should apply equally to human and animal knowledge. 
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I take issue with Kornblith on two counts. Firstly, it is not clear that his argument 
that knowledge is a natural kind is correct. Secondly, even if Kornblith is right that 
animal and human knowledge are of the same kind that does not mean that we should 
therefore discount the importance of reflection and social factors to human knowledge. 
That is not to say that either is essential to knowledge but even if they are not essential
they play such an important role that any investigation that focuses simply on the 
commonality between human and non-human knowledge and ignores its differences 
will not be a complete theory of knowledge.
3.1 Knowledge as a Natural Kind
In this section we shall examine Kornblith’s argument that knowledge is a natural kind. 
If knowledge is a natural kind then investigating the concept of knowledge will not tell 
us anything interesting about the actual phenomenon. Something can only play an 
important causal and explanatory role in a natural science if it is a natural kind and 
Kornblith argues that knowledge plays this role in cognitive ethology. So, knowledge 
must be a natural kind. As a natural kind conceptual investigation is an inappropriate 
method of investigation. Instead we should look at the phenomenon of knowledge 
which we can discover through cognitive ethology. 
3.1.1 What is a natural kind?
Natural kinds are roughly groupings or orderings that occur independently of human 
beings. Standard examples of natural kinds include chemical elements, chemical 
compounds, species and elemental particles. There are various things that are 
commonly considered characteristic of natural kinds. Firstly, members of a natural kind 
should have at least some properties in common. All instances of gold have the atomic 
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number 79, for example. It may be, however, that not all the members share any one 
property; a tiger that is born without a tail or who loses a limb is still a tiger. Natural 
kinds should also permit inductive inferences and participate in laws of nature. Natural 
kinds are therefore at the heart of the natural sciences (Bird and Tobin 2009).  
There is much debate about the exact nature of natural kinds which I shall not 
enter into here. Instead I shall assume for the purpose of this discussion that the 
account of natural kinds that Kornblith adopts is the correct one. Following Richard 
Boyle, Kornblith claims that natural kinds are 
…homeostatically clustered properties, properties that are mutually supporting and 
reinforcing in the face of external change. (Kornblith 2002: 61)
There are certain ‘contingently clustered’ (Boyd 1988:197) properties in the world, 
properties that co-occur in a number of important cases. Tigers usually have four legs, 
stripes and sharp teeth. These properties are clustered together. However, no single 
one of these properties is necessary or sufficient to be a tiger. A tiger that loses a limb 
is still a tiger even though it has lost one of the paradigmatic properties of being a tiger. 
In the case of a natural kind, claims Boyd, this clustering must be due to 
homeostasis. That is, the presence of properties within a particular cluster favour the 
presence of other properties in that cluster. This could be due to intrinsic factors, such 
as a particular gene or atomic number, or to extrinsic factors such as a particular 
environmental niche. This means that any outlying cases are unlikely to last making the 
cluster self-regulating and stable. In the case of tigers, there is similarity between tigers’ 
genes that explains why they tend to have four legs, stripes and sharp teeth. Tigers that 
are born with three legs or who lose their teeth will not, in most circumstances, survive 
and so the cluster is maintained. 
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On occasion, however, mutations occur and environments change in such a way 
that a new property may prove beneficial, or at least neutral, with regard to survival. 
This may lead to variation within a kind. If, due to some change in their environment, 
it became advantageous for tigers not to have stripes then over time stripeless tigers 
would become more common (or possibly take over completely, depending on how 
disadvantageous it was to have stripes). Natural kinds, therefore, can change over time, 
a property that at one point is possessed by most members of a kind could later 
become rare and vice versa. 
According to Boyd, it is also essential that the homeostatic clustering is causally 
important. That is, there are important effects produced by a combination of the 
properties and the underlying mechanisms. The tiger survives well in its environment 
because it has camouflage and sharp teeth and these are a result of its underlying 
genetic structure. Natural kinds, under Boyd’s definition, are therefore stable enough to 
be part of natural laws and to support inductive inferences. 
3.1.2 Knowledge as a natural kind
It is common in the cognitive ethology literature to use intentional idioms to 
describe animal behaviour. Kornblith cites various examples where the behaviour of 
animals and birds is described with intentional terminology. For example, in discussion 
of the behaviour of ravens in Mongolia, Bernd Heinrich (Heinrich 1999: 133, cited in 
Kornblith 2002: 31) describes ravens as ‘distracting’ an osprey. John Alcock refers to 
animals as ‘‘hiding from’, ‘spotting’, ‘invading’ and ‘repelling’ predators’ (Alcock 1975, 
cited in Kornblith 2002:30). However, as Kornblith is aware, the fact that people speak 
in intentional terms does not prove that the animals have such intentional states, it just 
shows that people talk as if they do. People quite frequently talk about inanimate 
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objects as if they have intentional states even though we do not think that they have 
intentional states. Whilst I might complain that the printer doesn’t want to print my 
document that is not evidence that I think the printer has desires. We need more 
evidence, therefore, in order to reach the conclusion that the ethologists are actually 
ascribing intentional states to their subjects.  
It is impossible to find descriptions of animal behaviour described in non-
intentional terms, however. Kornblith (2002: 32-7) argues that this is because there
need not be any similarity between different bodily movements that come under the 
same intentional description. Even something as simple as the basic fight or flight 
reactions cannot easily be reduced to bodily movements alone. An animal may move its 
limbs quickly for many different reasons; to run away from a predator or rival, to run 
towards a food source or mate, or just for play. They may also move differently even 
when moving for the same reason; an animal could flee from a predator by running or 
walking, for example. The only way to understand a whole group of dissimilar actions 
as ‘flight’, therefore, is to refer to the reasons for the behaviour. The ravens in 
Heinrich’s raven case work in pairs to gather eggs. One distracts a nesting osprey whilst 
the other steals its eggs. The raven doesn’t necessarily use the same bodily movements 
every time it distracts a raven. It is only when we understand these diverse movements 
in intentional terms that we will fully understand the behaviour.
Kornblith (2002: 37-42) argues that we can go further then simply ascribing 
intentional states to animals; we also have the basics for a belief-desire psychology. 
Animals have certain biologically driven needs, they need to interact with their 
environment, and have information-bearing internal states about their environment. 
Informational states about the environment and ones that are and responsive to it can 
be described as beliefs of a sort and biologically driven needs are akin desires. Although 
plants also react to the environment we do not need to attribute beliefs and desires to 
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them. Plant behaviour can be explained in non-intentional, lower-level terms –
reactions to stimuli – but animal behaviour cannot. To fully understand animal 
behaviour we need to be able to group bodily actions under intentional descriptions. 
We should not worry that ascribing intentional states to animals will constitute 
anthropomorphism (Kornblith 43-8). Of course we should be cautious not to ascribe 
too much to animals but we should be equally cautious about ascribing too little. In 
general the literature has almost entirely focused on the former. Even when too much 
is ascribed to an animal, the debunking explanation does not necessarily deny 
intentionality completely.
Kornblith gives the example of tests done on young chimps (Povinelli and Eddy 
1996, cited in Kornblith 2002: 48-52). Their behaviour appeared to show that they 
were ascribing intentional states to others around them. For example, they would ask 
for food from a researcher that was facing them but not from one who was looking 
away, and they would follow the gaze of a researcher. This seems to imply that they 
had some understanding of whether or not the researcher could see them. However, 
further testing showed this initial hypothesis to be false. The chimps acted in the same 
way to a researcher with a bucket on her head and one with a bucket beside her head, 
for example. It seems, therefore, that the chimps are not aware of whether or not the 
researcher could see them as was previously thought. This does not show, however, 
that psychological explanations of chimp behaviour in general are incorrect, but rather 
that the particular hypothesis in this case was false. It certainly does not mean that all 
psychological explanations of their behaviour should be abandoned.  
For many cognitive ethologists, once intentional terminology in general has been 
deemed acceptable, use of the term ‘knowledge’ is relatively uncontroversial, claims 
Kornblith (Kornblith 2002: 55). However, there are some that look in more detail at 
the issue of knowledge specifically. One example that Kornblith discusses is that of the 
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work of Louis Herman and Palmer Morrel-Samuels’s (1990/1996) research on 
dolphins. Kornblith claims to find in their work the idea that knowledge attributions 
are derivative from knowledge-acquiring abilities. When explaining the behaviour of 
individual animals we explain behaviour in terms of beliefs and desires. According to 
Kornblith ‘a distinction between belief and knowledge is simply irrelevant here’ 
(Kornblith 2002: 57). However, he claims, talk of knowledge becomes relevant when 
looking at the species level. 
What Kornblith seems to be saying is that when trying to understand the behaviour 
of an individual animal we need not make reference to knowledge, only to beliefs and 
desires. When we want to explain the success of a particular species or type of animal 
then we need to bring in talk of knowledge. A particular species is successful in its 
environment because its cognitive capacities are adapted to that environment. Its 
success is explained by its ability to gain knowledge of its environment. We can explain 
why the plover leaves its nest in an attention-grabbing fashion on the basis of beliefs 
and desires – it believes that a predator is nearby and it wants to protect its eggs – but 
the plover would have acted in this way whether or not its beliefs were true. 
Knowledge is not important at this level, claims Kornblith. However, when it comes to 
explaining why plovers in general have such capacities we need to refer to knowledge. 
Plovers are successful in their environment because they are good at detecting 
predators and good at distracting them, so that their eggs do not get eaten, ultimately 
leading to more plovers. Plovers do not just need to be able to form true beliefs in this 
regard but they need to do so reliably. If they were not good at detecting predators, and 
doing so reliably, then they would not have been successful within their environment. 
However, it is not at all clear how Kornblith comes to these conclusions on the 
basis of the research that he cites. Kornblith claims that that ‘knowledge, on this view, 
first enters our theoretical picture at the level of understanding of the species, rather 
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than the individual’ (Kornblith 2002:57). However, Herman and Morrel-Samuels 
(1990/1996: 289) talk solely in terms of knowledge at the individual level. At no point 
in their article do they mention belief. They give a list of some of the ‘the basic 
knowledge requisites for the adult dolphin’ and claim that ‘extensive knowledge of the 
world may be required for effective functioning in that world and much of the requisite 
knowledge is gained through the exercise of receptive skills’ (289).  This is completely 
at odds with what Kornblith claims. It is true that they talk about ‘knowledge-acquiring 
abilities’ and ‘receptive competences’, which presumably equate to reliable processes of 
belief formation but these competences are described as ‘supporting knowledge 
acquisition’. It is not clear that they see knowledge attributions as deriving from the 
abilities. It is not clear, therefore, where Kornblith derives his idea that knowledge 
becomes important only at the species level. 
Even if Kornblith’s interpretation of Herman and Morrel-Samuels were correct it is 
not clear why one would need to talk of knowledge at the species level, anyway. Why 
not just say that the dolphins are successful because they consistently form true beliefs? 
It is not clear that talk of knowledge is any more necessary at this level than at the level 
of the individual. Kornblith claims that:
…the presence of cognitive capacities across individuals…is itself something that 
requires explanation; explanation of the presence of such cognitive capacities requires 
that we advert to knowledge. (Kornblith 2002: 58)
This seems to be the opposite of how epistemologists normally understand 
knowledge. Usually we think of certain cognitive capacities as explaining how we have 
knowledge but Kornblith seems to be suggesting that we only bring in knowledge to 
explain the capacities. If we are to reverse the usual direction of explanation then 
Kornblith needs to do more to show that his understanding is the correct one. It is true 
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that we need an explanation for the cognitive capacities that help a species to survive, 
but it is not clear that this explanation must make reference to knowledge. 
3.1.3 Kornblith and the value of knowledge 
It is often claimed that people value knowledge and mere true belief differently, that 
knowledge is valued more highly than mere true belief. We shall look at this issue in 
more detail in chapter five, but it is an issue that may be problematic for Kornblith.  
Even though the results of our actions would be the same whether we act on 
knowledge or a true belief, we still seek out knowledge if we can. It has also been 
suggested that knowledge closes enquiry. Once we come to know whether or not p we 
can stop investigation into the matter. For human beings, at least, there seem to be 
important differences at the individual level with regard to how we treat knowledge and 
true belief. It is not clear, on Kornblith’s theory, why we value knowledge and true 
belief differently. 
Human beings care very much whether they and other people know or merely 
believe. It is different when it comes to non-reflective, non-human animal knowers, 
however. It doesn’t seem that it would make a great deal of difference whether or not a  
cat knows that its food is in its bowl or whether or not it just believes it. Either way it 
will get to the food. It seems that we can just as well describe the behaviour in terms of 
beliefs and desires as we can in terms of knowledge. As we saw above, Kornblith 
thinks that we only need to describe it in terms of beliefs and desires. That is not to say 
that we can’t, or don’t, describe the behaviour in terms of knowledge but rather that it 
doesn’t seem that very much hangs on the distinction between knowledge and true 
belief when it comes to animal knowledge.  
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When it comes to the behaviour of human beings, however, a lot more seems to 
hang on this distinction. Knowledge plays a role in our intellectual lives in a way that it 
doesn’t for non-reflective knowers. We seek out knowledge and justification for our 
beliefs and do not consider a matter settled until we have good reason to think that we 
know the answer. We want to know rather than merely believe and this seems to be the 
case even if there is no practical difference between the two10.  
Kornblith does give an explanation for epistemic normativity in general (2002: Ch 
5.). Knowledge is conducive to fitness and so it is valuable because it helps animals to 
reach their goals. Humans are no different with regard to this; knowledge in general is 
instrumentally valuable, it helps us to survive and to achieve our goals. Even though 
knowledge is no better at getting you to your goals than true belief, it may be that we 
value knowledge more, because in general it is good to have knowledge. If you form 
your beliefs unreliably then you will often end up with false beliefs, something that will 
not generally aid your survival.
However, this would not answer the question as to why we prefer knowledge to 
merely true belief. It is true that in general it is better to have knowledge than belief but 
on any particular occasion it would make no difference whether that true belief was 
reliably formed or not, provided that it is true. What is valuable, it seems, is the ability
to reliably produce true beliefs. It is this ability that is conducive to fitness, after all. 
This would not answer the question of why knowledge is more valuable than true 
belief. This does not, however, give any explanation of why we value knowledge over 
true belief even if there is no practical difference between the two. Kornblith’s 
response to this could be that this value difference is not dependent on knowledge 
itself but the concept that we have of knowledge. His investigation is explicitly 
                                                
10 I shall discuss this question further in Chapter 5.
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focussed on the natural phenomenon of knowledge not our human concept of 
knowledge (Kornblith 2002:3), and so the value difference is not relevant. We may 
value gold more than silver, but that does nothing to tell us what gold or silver actually 
are. The value of gold will vary from place to place but its atomic number remains 79. 
However, if there are important facts about knowledge that Kornblith cannot account 
for then they must surely be problematic for his theory.
A lot of what Kornblith claims appears to turn on his claim that knowledge is a 
natural kind. However, it’s not clear that he needs to go that far. For the central claim 
that knowledge should not be investigated by conceptual analysis, all he needs to claim 
is that there are some truths about knowledge that are not conceptual truths. If it were 
the case that every truth specifying the nature of knowledge was a conceptual truth 
then it would be appropriate to investigate it by conceptual analysis. It is, however, 
inappropriate to investigate something about which there are conceptual and non-
conceptual truths in a way that only takes account of the conceptual ones. If this is the 
case then we would need to investigate both the conceptual and the non-conceptual 
aspects to get the full picture.  
3.1.4 Bermúdez’s criticism of Kornblith
José Bermúdez (2006) argues that it is not clear that even if knowledge plays an 
important causal explanatory role in cognitive ethology that this proves that it is a 
natural kind. Cognitive ethologists often characterise themselves as applying common-
sense belief-desire psychology to the behaviour of animals. If this is what they are 
trying to do, then there doesn’t seem to be any more reason to think that this would be 
part of a mature science than that folk psychology would be. Bermúdez suggests that it 
depends on which area of science you look to as a guide. Whilst modified versions of 
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belief, desire and knowledge are likely to be found in a mature computational cognitive 
science, there are unlikely to be any such things in mature cognitive neuroscience. 
Kornblith is happy to accept that the phenomenon knowledge may very well differ 
from our stereotype of it, after all, it is not the concept that he is interested in. 
However, it is not clear that we have a good way of identifying the phenomenon apart 
from our stereotype of it. In the case of ‘water’ or ‘gold’ there are canonical instances 
which fix the reference of each term but it is not clear that there are similar canonical 
examples when it comes to ‘knowledge’. Many of the disagreements in epistemology, 
for example, between internalists and externalists, seem to come down to the two sides 
taking different examples to be canonical. If we cannot agree on some canonical 
instances then it will be very difficult for us to even work out which phenomenon we 
should be investigating (Bermúdez 2006: 306-7). 
Kornblith’s answer to this problem is to suggest a new set of canonical instances of 
knowledge – those that we find in the literature of cognitive ethology. If we take these 
cases as canonical then we can investigate them to see what knowledge consists of, in 
the same way that we can investigate what water is by examining clear-cut samples of 
water. In order for this move to work, however, Kornblith needs to show that the 
knowledge that is discussed in cognitive ethology is the same kind of knowledge that 
epistemologists are interested in. This, claims Bermúdez, is the most challenging part of 
Kornblith’s project.
It is not clear, therefore, that Kornblith has done enough to show that knowledge is 
a natural kind. However, even if his arguments are successful he has only shown that 
knowledge as described in cognitive ethology is a natural kind. Epistemologists are generally 
most concerned with human knowledge, and various theories claim to show that there 
is a difference between animal and human knowledge. So, in order for Kornblith’s 
argument to be fully successful he needs to show that there is no relevant distinction 
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between human and animal knowledge. We shall examine his arguments against such a 
distinction in the next section. 
3.2 Only One Kind of Knowledge
There are two types of theories that claim that human knowledge is different from the 
knowledge of non-human animals, claims Kornblith. Theories of the first type assume 
that meta-cognition at the social level is necessary for knowledge (Kornblith 2002: Ch 
3) The second type is theories that claim that meta-cognition at the individual level is 
necessary for knowledge (Kornblith 2002: Ch 4). However, Kornblith wants to deny 
that there is a good case for theories of either of these types. He aims to show that 
there is only one type of knowledge in order to show that the conclusions that can be 
drawn from cognitive ethology apply as well to human beings as to non-human 
animals. 
3.2.1 Knowledge and Social Practices
One way of drawing the distinction between human knowledge and non-human animal 
knowledge is to claim that knowledge requires the ability to participate in certain types 
of social practice, and since animals are incapable of engaging in these practices it is not 
possible for them to have knowledge. Donald Davidson (1984) claims that to have 
belief one must be language user. Robert Brandom (1994; 1998) goes even further and 
claims that in order to be capable of belief you have to be able to engage in the practice 
of giving and asking for reasons 
Brandom (1994:214) claims that in order to believe, you need to be able to engage 
with the social practice of giving and asking for reasons. If you cannot do this then you 
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will not be able to understand the claim being made and so cannot know it. Kornblith’s 
first comment about this is that different people participate in these practices to greatly 
varying extents. Some people, who Kornblith terms ‘highly Socratic’ (Kornblith 2002: 
76), engage in this practice frequently whereas others, like Kornblith’s ‘laconic 
Yankees’ (80), will rarely engage in it. Presumably, argues Kornblith, if one does not 
engage in the practice at all then one is not a genuine believer. It also seems that 
Brandom needs an answer to the question of how far one needs to get along the 
‘Socratic scale’ (Kornblith 2002: 77) to count as a believer. Does one need to engage 
with the social practice on only one occasion or regularly? 
Brandom’s view of belief is counter-intuitive. It is not only that we would probably 
want to class people as believers who are completely silent with regard to reasons, but 
also that belief seems to be prior to the practice of giving and asking for reasons 
(Kornblith 2002: 78-9). The explanations that one gives for why someone partakes in 
the practice more or less appeal precisely to beliefs and desires. For example, we could 
explain someone’s lack of participation in the practice of asking questions by saying 
that she believes it to be boorish. Giving and asking for reasons seems to be a product 
of belief, rather than a necessary condition for having beliefs. 
In addition, it seems that we cannot make sense of the behaviour of infants or 
animals unless we ascribe beliefs to them. Brandom acknowledges that non-linguistic 
beings can have mental representations but not beliefs. However, if these 
representations help the creature to negotiate and respond to its environment then it is 
not clear, claims Kornblith, how they can be distinguished from beliefs. However, even 
if it does make sense to talk of belief and desire in animals that is not to say that animal 
belief and desire is the same thing that we have as reflective creatures. For example, as 
Alan Millar (2004: xi-x) suggests, one cannot rule out a ‘high conception’ of belief, such 
as Brandom’s on the basis of apparent propositional attitudes in animals and infants. 
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Although animals may be capable of belief in some sense, it may be of a different kind 
from the belief of creatures such as ourselves who operate ‘within the space of 
reasons’. Even if we can only explain animal behaviour in intentional terms that does 
not mean that the states are of the same kind as those that human beings have. 
The practice of giving and asking for reasons does seem to be deeply embedded in 
our culture. If you are a source of some information and know that the matter is 
important to the enquirer, then very often we will offer up the reasons without even 
being asked for them. If my friend asks what time the train is because she urgently 
needs to get to Stirling, I will not only reply that the train is a 10.33 but tell them that I 
regularly get that train and assure them of my certainty. If, on the other hand, I am not 
sure, then I will hedge my answer with ‘I think…’ or ‘I’m not sure, but…’, I will not 
make a claim to knowledge – at least with regards to something important – unless I 
can back it up with some reason for thinking that it is so. It is very hard to imagine 
someone who never at all engaged in the practice of giving and asking for reasons. 
Such a practice may not be necessary for knowledge but it is so deeply involved in our 
knowledge practices that it needs to be accounted for.  
Davidson’s position doesn’t go quite as far as Brandom’s but does require that a 
creature be a language user in order to have beliefs (1984: 164). This leads him, like 
Brandom, to deny that animals can have beliefs. He acknowledges, however, that in the 
normal run of things we do ascribe beliefs to animals and so he presents several 
arguments against the idea of animals having beliefs. Firstly, beliefs are 
underdetermined with regard to non-linguistic behaviour. For example, we cannot tell 
which beliefs lead a subject to choose an apple rather than a pear on the basis of non-
linguistic behaviour. It could be because it’s more tasty, more expensive, or simply 
because it is on the left, but we cannot settle this question with non-linguistic 
behaviour. However, there is a problem with this claim (Kornblith 2002:85-7). It seems 
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that any theoretical claim will be underdetermined in this way. We can only ever have 
finite data but our theoretical claims will have infinitely many implications. Nor will 
adding linguistic data help to solve this problem. We will still only have finite data for 
infinite implications. Underdetermination in itself is not a reason to think that language 
is necessary for belief. 
Davidson (1984: 163) also claims that there is work that can be done by language 
that cannot be done by non-linguistic behaviour. We may describe the dog as knowing 
that its master is home but we cannot tell whether it knows that the president of the 
bank is home or that Mr Smith is home, where these are one and the same person. 
Kornblith (86) gives this claim short shrift, saying that it is just obvious that the dog 
does not know that the president of the bank is home since dogs have neither concepts 
of bank or president but if needed we could construct tests to show that this is the 
case.  And, as to whether he knows that Mr Smith is home, we can create tests to see if 
dogs can recognise people by name. These issues, claims Kornblith, can be settled 
relatively easily without needing linguistic data. 
Davidson (170) also argues that one cannot have belief without having the concept of 
belief, because in order to believe you need to understand the possibility of being 
mistaken. However, according to Kornblith (86-7), this claim could be given a weak or 
a strong reading and according to a weak reading animals can understand the possibility 
of being mistaken. A dog can come to understand that it’s mistaken when it sees the 
ball in its master’s hand rather than flying across the field. This reading is the only 
plausible one, he claims, but it will not do the job that Davidson needs it to do. Thus, 
Kornblith rejects both Davidson and Brandom’s theories.
A more moderate theory in the social vein is that of Michael Williams (2000). 
Williams does not want to deny that non-human animals have beliefs, but he does want 
to claim that they cannot have knowledge. In order to have knowledge you need to be 
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inducted into a linguistic community and to be able to keep track of epistemic 
entitlements and commitments. This community provides the normative standard and 
practice against which beliefs are justified. He distinguishes between grounded belief 
and responsible belief. A grounded belief is a reliably formed true belief. A responsible 
belief on the other hand requires meeting the normative standards set by the 
community (2000: 608). Human infants and non-human animals cannot be held 
responsible for their beliefs because they cannot be members of the linguistic 
community.
Kornblith (2002: 91) believes that Williams equivocates on the meaning of 
‘justification’ and so claims that more is needed for knowledge than actually is required. 
He reconstructs Williams’ argument thus: 
1. Knowledge requires justified, true belief. 
2. Justification cannot exist apart from membership in a community with certain 
social practices. 
Therefore,
3. Knowledge cannot exist apart from membership in a community with certain 
social practices. (Kornblith 2002: 91)
‘Justification’ in the first premise is most plausibly read as meaning ‘grounded’, claims 
Kornblith, whereas in the second premise it is most plausibly read as meaning 
‘responsible’. It is this equivocation that leads to Williams’ claim that we cannot have 
knowledge apart from as members of a linguistic community. 
Kornblith seems to be very close to begging the question here. Because he believes 
that nothing more than reliable true belief is required for knowledge he reads the first 
premise as meaning this. He claims that this is the most plausible way of reading the 
first premise but it is far from clear that this a commonly held intuition. There is a very 
plausible reading of ‘justified’ in the first premise, which is only possible if you can give 
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reasons for your belief. Certainly, if someone cannot provide reasons then we will be 
doubtful of their claim to know. If we think of paradigmatic examples of human 
knowledge, then they will almost certainly meet this requirement. Because Kornblith 
wants to take animal knowledge as paradigmatic then it makes it seem more plausible 
that the ‘justified’ means something like ‘well-grounded’ or ‘reliably formed’. 
Depending on what examples you choose, either reading could be plausible. 
Perhaps, rather than claiming that animals cannot have knowledge, Williams would 
be better off claiming, as Sosa does, that there are two distinct types of knowledge, one 
that requires only grounded belief – something that adult humans, infant humans and 
non-human animals can all achieve – and then another type of knowledge that requires 
grounding plus the ability to give reasons for your belief – something that does exclude 
infants and non-human animals.. 
Although Kornblith disagrees with Williams, he notes that something important 
can be drawn from the discussion (Kornblith 2002: 91-2). Ordinary talk does not seem 
to draw a distinction between animals and humans with regard to knowledge but it 
does with regard to justification, he claims. We would not be concerned as to whether 
or not non-human animals are justified or not in their beliefs but we may ask this 
question about an adult human. We are generally happy, however, to ascribe 
knowledge to non-human animals and infants as easily as we do to adult humans. 
However, if any kind of knowledge equates to ‘justified, true belief’ then the fact that 
there are two very different understandings of ‘justified’ might show us that, although 
we are happy to ascribe knowledge to both humans and non-humans, that does not 
mean that we are talking about the same thing in both cases. I may describe both gold 
and fool’s gold as ‘gold’ but that does not mean that they are the same thing. 
Williams believes that epistemic responsibility explains epistemic normativity. The 
community holds people responsible for their beliefs, they must reach a certain 
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standard. However, Kornblith thinks that such a community is not necessary to create 
normativity. He argues (2002:92-3) that rather than creating normativity, the demands 
of the community reflect normativity that already exists. It seems that there are very 
good reasons not to drink and drive, quite apart from the social practices that frown 
upon it. Likewise, it seems that there are perfectly good reasons for wanting to hold 
true beliefs quite apart from the demands of the linguistic community.
In addition, Kornblith argues that not all epistemic social practice is in fact of value 
(2002: 95-102). Giving and asking for reasons will not always lead you to the truth. In 
part it depends on the community that you are a part of. Brandom and Williams both 
see the practice of giving and asking for reasons as having a ‘default and challenge 
structure’ (Kornblith 2002: 96). This means that within a community there are certain 
things that are accepted without question and others that need justification. In a highly 
religious community it may be certain scriptural claims that go unchallenged, which 
could lead to believing a great many untruths about the world. In other societies 
information is so heavily controlled that accepting default sources will lead you to false 
beliefs. Such social practices, claims Kornblith, can lead enquiry in unproductive ways 
and will not, in fact, be beneficial to the people taking part in it. 
Kornblith denies that involvement in social practice is necessary for knowledge and 
so for him one route to claiming that human and non-human knowledge are distinct is 
closed. However, it’s not clear that he has succeeded in this. Whilst there seems to be a 
prima facie case against views such as Brandom’s and Davidson’s – that such theories 
exclude animals and infants from having belief – such theories could, in principle, 
make sense of this by distinguishing between two kinds of belief as Williams does. 
Kornblith’s arguments against Williams also seem to fail. Kornblith claims that it is 
more plausible to think of knowledge requiring justification in the sense of epistemic 
grounding or reliability than it is to require epistemic responsibility for knowledge but 
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he offers no reason why this should be the case. He has not, therefore, shown that 
there is no distinction to be made between human and non-human knowledge.  
3.2.2 Knowledge and Reflection
a) Is reflection necessary for human knowledge?
Kornblith also denies that reflection is necessary for knowledge. Firstly, he argues that 
introspection works very differently from how we think it does, and is actually rather 
unreliable (Kornblith 2006: Ch.4; 2008; forthcoming). His other arguments are aimed 
at coherentist and foundationalist accounts of knowledge separately but can be 
understood as variations on the same argument: requiring reflection for knowledge sets 
the bar so impossibly high that no one can ever have knowledge. Assuming that we do 
not want to be led into inevitable scepticism then we should not make introspection a 
requirement for knowledge. 
Kornblith (2002: Ch. 4) begins with Descartes (1641/1996). For Descartes 
introspection has two roles to play, it can reveal defects in our epistemic position and it 
can also be used to fix those defects. Using introspection, Descartes realises that he has 
held false beliefs in the past and that consequently his current beliefs may also be false. 
The way to fix this, he suggests, is to first withhold all belief and then, through an 
introspectively accessible act of will, only believe those things that are clearly and 
distinctly true. This, Kornblith points out, would be an exceedingly slow process and 
so he suggests an alternative for the ‘Impatient Cartesian’ (Kornblith 2002: 108). What 
the Impatient Cartesian should do, he suggests, is to find out which processes of belief 
formation are faulty and dismiss any beliefs that are formed on that basis. Any beliefs 
formed by effective belief forming processes can be kept. 
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It is the program of the ‘Impatient Cartesian’ that contemporary internalists are 
pursuing, claims Kornblith. In particular he focuses on the theories of Roderick 
Chisholm (1989) and Laurence BonJour (1985). Chisholm and BonJour are both 
internalists but of differing kinds. Chisholm has a foundationalist theory and BonJour a 
coherentist theory11. Chisholm claims you can find out whether a belief is justified by 
going through a process of Socratic questioning. This process first involves examining 
your reasons for believing that p. If you find that your reason for holding that p is that 
q then you need to examine your reason for holding that q. You should repeat this 
process until you come to a proposition that is directly evident, which means that it is 
recognisable as true through introspection alone. BonJour, on the other hand, thinks 
that in order to have knowledge of p, you need to check that p coheres with your other 
beliefs. This coherence is available to introspection. 
However, claims Kornblith, introspection is not the reliable guide to our processes 
of reasoning that philosophers such as BonJour and Chisholm take it to be. Firstly, he 
takes two examples from the psychology literature that show that things that we do not 
think have an effect on our reasoning actually do. The first is described as the ‘position 
effect’ (Kornblith 2002: 112). In tests where people were asked to choose the best item 
from amongst four identical items there was a clear and significant bias to items on the 
far left. When questioned about this bias, the subjects were sure that the positioning 
had no effect on their choices and thought the experimenter very odd for even asking 
such a question. It seems here that the subjects were biased toward the leftmost items 
but when asked to introspect they were only confirmed in their belief that they were 
not. 
                                                
11 Kornblith focuses on BonJour’s coherentist theory in The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. BonJour has 
since rejected coherentism in favour of a foundationalist theory. For more on this see BonJour and Sosa 
(2003) Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues, Oxford, Blackwell Publishing. 
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The other effect that Kornblith discusses is the ‘anchoring effect’ (Kornblith 2002: 
113). In this experiment the subjects were given a number and asked whether it was 
too high or to low for the percentage of African members of the UN. When they were 
given the number 10 (chosen by a spin of a roulette wheel) the mean estimate as to the 
real number was 25, and when the number 65 was chosen as a base then the mean 
estimate was 45. It seems here that people’s estimates were significantly affected by 
random number that they were given in the first place. The subjects were not aware, 
however, of the influence that this had. Nor, claims Kornblith, is there any reason to 
think that asking the subjects to reflect on this would make a difference to the answers 
that they gave. 
There are also cases that seem to show that people are not affected by factors that 
we assume would affect our belief formation. For example, in one study the 
experimenters got subjects to read a short story about a drowning baby and asked them 
to pick out the passages responsible for the emotional impact (Kornblith 2002: 114). 
They picked the same passages that the experimenters antecedently thought were 
responsible. However, when the story was given to a second group of subjects with the 
passages removed, the subjects rated it with the same emotional impact. The passages 
that were assumed to cause it to be judged emotionally affecting were evidently not the 
cause of this judgement after all. 
A similar effect can happen in perception (Kornblith 2002:115). When on a plane it 
appears that we can judge the orientation of the plane by sight, we seem to be able to 
see that the plane is going upwards. However, it seems that this cannot be the source 
of our judgement, as this happens even when the plane is flying at night and there is 
nothing to judge its orientation against. The real source of our perception that the 
plane is ascending or descending is our kinaesthetic experience; we feel the plane 
ascending but interpret it as a visual experience.  The problem is that you will not be 
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able to answer the question ‘How do you know that the plane is moving in an upwards 
direction?’ correctly. A natural response to the question would be ‘Because I can see 
that we are moving upwards’, which is false. However, as Kornblith acknowledges, 
they are not mistaken in their belief that they are reliable at detecting the movement of 
the plane. If you have a minimal account of what it takes to be reflectively justified, 
then this may in fact be enough. 
A final example of where introspection can go wrong is that our reasoning suffers 
from confirmation bias (Kornblith 2002: 116-20). There are two forms that 
confirmation bias can take. The first is that when testing a hypothesis people only 
confirming instances of the hypothesis and don’t look at ones that would prove it false. 
The second is when disconfirming evidence is discovered it is not taken as seriously as 
the confirming evidence. Such bias leaves us in the position that if we assume that we 
are reliable (as we undoubtedly do in many cases) then we are likely only to be 
confirmed in this view. It seems that we also tend to reconstruct explanations for our 
behaviour based on what we think a rational person would have done rather than on the 
basis of what actually happened. Kornblith suggests that if this is the case then 
introspection is not the place to look for improving our cognitive functioning. 
Cognitive psychology is much more likely to give us practical, unbiased advice on how 
to improve our cognition. 
Peter Wason (1960, cited in Kornblith 2002: 117) conducted a study into 
confirmation bias where subjects were given a sequence consisting of three numbers 
that they were told conformed to a rule. They were asked to try and discover the rule 
by suggesting their own sequences of numbers. The experimenters would tell them 
after each suggestion whether their sequence conformed to the rule or not. Most of the 
subjects said that they were testing a particular hypothesis and most of them went 
about it by ‘examining only confirming instances of it’ (Kornblith 2006: 117). Once 
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they had a large number of confirming instances the subjects claimed that they had 
discovered the rule. ‘Strangely,’ suggests Kornblith, ‘when subjects were told that they 
had not discovered the rule, in more than half the cases the next sequence tested was 
an instance of the very rule that they had just been told was incorrect.’ (Kornblith 
2006: 117) Kornblith takes it that this shows that subjects only examine confirming 
instances and disregard disconfirming information. 
However, as BonJour (2006: 325) argues, it is not clear that this case of 
confirmation bias is actually very problematic for internalist theories of knowledge. 
Firstly, proposing random sequences of numbers is unlikely to tell you anything about 
the rule at all. It is highly unlikely that a subject will happen upon a confirming instance 
of the rule by accident. In the case suggested it seems that looking for confirming 
instances will be more productive than suggesting sequences at random. This, however, 
is not the strategy that the authors think that people should be pursuing. What is 
missing from people’s strategy in these cases is that they do not test to see whether 
there could be a more general rule that would include all cases of their rule. For 
example, people do not test to see whether the rule is ‘add the same number to the 
previous number’ rather than ‘add 2 to the previous number’ (BonJour 2006: 325). This 
does not seem like a case of bias but rather seems to be ‘a more general mistake of 
failing to consider the full range of possible hypotheses’ (BonJour 2006: 326). It is 
certainly not clear that this demonstrates confirmation bias.
Kornblith seems to overstate his case to some extent. There may be cases in which 
our introspection goes awry, but that does not show that it is not normally reliable.  He 
has shown that there are some everyday examples in which introspection misleads but 
he is far from showing that this is the norm. Perhaps we should not be as trusting of 
introspection as some internalists are but no one claims that it is infallible. There are
good reasons for us to have developed introspection that is usually reliable; it is useful 
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to be able to check our beliefs to see if they were formed well, since in that way we will 
be more likely to follow the reliably formed beliefs. Kornblith has shown that we can 
be affected by unexpected factors in making judgements and that we should be vigilant 
against errors. There are many occasions on which my vision or my hearing has misled 
me but that does not mean that they are not to be trusted in general. 
b) Is non-reflective human knowledge of the same kind as that of non-reflective animals? 
Even if Kornblith had shown that neither social practice nor reflection was
required for adult human knowledge, he still has not shown that animal and human 
knowledge are of the same kind. Even if he had shown that no kind of meta-cognition 
was necessary for knowledge, he would still have to do something more to show that 
human knowledge is the same kind as animal knowledge. If we think about Kornblith’s 
position in terms of Sosa’s ‘animal’ and ‘reflective’ knowledge, Kornblith is suggesting 
that the ‘animal’ knowledge cases are those that we should take to be canonical, rather 
than cases where reflection is involved. This, claims Bermúdez (2006: 308-9), is based 
on two assumptions. Firstly, that reflective knowledge simply consists of animal 
knowledge plus some second-order reflection on that knowledge and, secondly, the 
‘subtraction assumption’ (309). This assumption is that if we take away the reflection 
from reflective knowledge then we get animal knowledge, of the type that is 
investigated by cognitive ethologists. 
However, notes Bermúdez, the term ‘animal’ knowledge is doing ‘double duty’ 
(309). Animal knowledge means both, very simply, the kind of knowledge that animals 
have and also to contrast with reflective knowledge, so non-reflective human 
knowledge is also ‘animal’ knowledge. Bermúdez goes on to suggest that if there are 
significant differences between the cognitive processing of non-reflective animals and 
human beings, then these will not necessarily be the same. 
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According to Bermúdez, there are two norms that govern belief revision. Firstly, at 
the non-reflective level beliefs are subject to the ‘norm of coherence’ (310). That is, if 
there is some conflict between beliefs, or between belief and sensory evidence then this 
causes dissonance, which is removed by belief revision. Bermúdez gives the example of 
a rat who comes to believe, through experience, that food will appear when he presses 
the lever. If the system is then changed so that food appears at random then this will 
create cognitive dissonance which is resolved by the rat losing the belief that lever-
pressing and food appearance are related. At the reflective level, however, our beliefs 
are also governed by the ‘norm of truth’ (310). In addition to whether our beliefs are 
coherent we are also aware of evidential concerns. For example, a belief may be 
rejected just because the evidence available does not support it.
Reflective knowledge is only available to human beings, suggests Bermúdez, 
because it is only language using creatures that are capable of such reflection. His 
suggested reason for this is that we can only think about thoughts if they are ‘clothed in 
language’ (312). This in itself is not necessarily problematic for Kornblith as he views 
metacognition of this kind as unnecessary for knowledge, it is simply an ability that we 
have on top of our ability to gather knowledge, it is just an ability to reflect on the 
knowledge that we have which is, fundamentally, of the same type as that which 
animals have. However, Bermúdez suggests that even the non-reflective knowledge 
that humans have must be of a different kind from that of non-linguistic creatures.
If reflective knowledge is simply animal knowledge that has been reflected on then 
the relations between the beliefs and the evidence available must be present in the 
‘animal’ knowledge. However, Bermúdez argues that this cannot be the case. Logic, he 
argues, requires language, In order to entertain a thought such as “A or B” a creature 
must be capable of understanding that a certain relation holds between the two 
thoughts “A” and “B” – at the very least that they are not both false. To be capable of 
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this the creature must be able to think about the truth values of the thoughts. And, so, 
‘no creature that was not capable of thinking about thoughts could have any 
understanding of truth-functional compound thoughts’ (Bermúdez 2006: 214). This is 
not just true of logical reasoning that depends on relations between thoughts but also 
of reasoning that depends on the internal structure of thoughts such as the move from 
Fa to xFx. Thus, in order to be able to enter into such logical reasoning you need to 
be capable of thinking about thoughts, and for this you need to be a language-using 
creature, argues Bermúdez. He does not deny that animals are capable of reasoning but 
rather that it must be of a fundamentally different kind to that which human beings 
engage in. 
I shall not here debate the merits of Bermúdez’s theory. However, the interesting 
possibility is raised that human and non-human cognition may be fundamentally 
different. If this were the case then there would be good reason to think that reflective 
human knowledge cannot just be animal knowledge plus reflection but that even at a 
non-reflective level human knowledge is of a different kind. Rather than the one 
distinction that we find in Sosa it seems that there are two possible distinctions. On the 
one hand, there is the distinction between animal and human knowledge and on the 
other between reflective and non-reflective knowledge. This leads to four potential 
types of knowledge: non-reflective animal knowledge, reflective animal knowledge, 
non-reflective human knowledge and reflective human knowledge. Thus human 
knowledge may exist in two kinds but these may both be different again from any kind 
of animal knowledge. 
The implication that this has for Kornblith is that if he wants to make cognitive 
ethology the basis of our theory of knowledge then he needs to do more than show 
that reflection is not necessary for knowledge. He also needs to show that there is no 
important distinction to be drawn between animal and non-reflective human 
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knowledge. Kornblith dismisses Bermúdez’s claim arguing that logic is not in fact 
dependent on language. A creature can be sensitive to logical structure without having 
complex thoughts regarding truth values. ‘The medievals,’ he claims 
…referred to the disjunctive syllogism as “the syllogism of the dog,” and they referred 
to it in this way because, they claimed, if a dog is chasing another animal down a path 
and it comes to a fork in the path, it will smell one of the two paths to see if the animal 
has proceeded down that fork; if the result is negative, it will take the other route 
without bothering to smell it first. Disjunctive syllogism in action! (Kornblith 2006: 
341)
If a dog does indeed behave in this way then it certainly looks to be responsive to the 
constraints of logic. As there are only two options if the animal did not go down path 
A then it must have gone down path B. It is not clear if this is enough to respond to 
Bermúdez, after all, he does not deny that animals are capable of reasoning, just that it 
must be different from human reason. However, the problem still remains that we 
have no reason to presume that animal and human knowledge are of the same kind, 
even if both can be non-reflective in nature. 
Kornblith is suggesting a radical move in what is taken to be the raw data for 
epistemology. Traditionally, human knowledge has been the main focus of 
investigation. Although narrowly focussing on human knowledge may be unreasonably 
anthropocentric, it must still play an important part. In order for Kornblith’s change in 
focus to be accepted it seems that he must do more to show that there is no difference 
in kind between animal and human knowledge. The burden of proof lies with him, and 
at this point he has not yet succeeded in showing that there is just one kind of 
knowledge. 
It is not even the case that Kornblith need insist that there are no differences 
between human and non-human animal knowledge. Two things can be both of the 
same natural kind and of different natural kinds. For example, ‘tiger’, ‘whale’ and 
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‘mammal’ are all natural kinds; a whale and a tiger are therefore of the same natural 
kind – mammal – whilst simultaneously being of different natural kinds – whale and 
tiger, respectively. There could be space to allow that animal and human knowledge 
are, in fact, different, whilst still being of the same natural kind ‘knowledge’. This is not 
something that Kornblith would advocate but it is a possible route for someone who 
wants to hold on to the distinction between human and non-human knowledge and 
claim that knowledge is a natural kind.  
Also, it is not necessarily the case that the difference between reflective and non-
reflective knowledge need be one of kind. Rather, it could be the case that reflective 
knowledge is just a case of 1st order knowledge that p that is accompanied by 2nd order 
knowledge of how one knows that p. This seems to simply be a case of having more 
knowledge rather than having a different kind of knowledge. It is unclear which of 
these options would be preferable and at this point I will not explore the issue further 
but we shall return to it in Chapter 5. For now, it is simply important to note that it is 
possible, and reasonable, to draw a distinction between reflective and non-reflective 
human knowledge, whatever that distinction may, in fact, amount to. 
3.3 The Consequences of Kornblith’s Perspective
Kornblith argues for several theses. He argues that we should not investigate 
knowledge conceptually, but rather look to empirical science to give us an answer to 
the question of what knowledge is. From this he argues that the correct understanding 
of knowledge is an externalist one and that there is no distinction to be drawn between 
human and non-human knowledge. This leads to Kornblith downplaying the 
importance of reflective access in human knowledge. 
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Even if we accept that an externalist account of knowledge is preferable to an 
internalist account, this does not mean that reflectively accessible justification is not 
important. One of the consequences of taking the kind of naturalist perspective that 
Kornblith advocates is that it emphasises the similarities between animal and human 
knowledge but ignores their differences. Human beings have reflective capacities that 
other animals lack and this is bound to have an effect on human knowledge. For 
example, human knowledge can be undermined simply by uncertainty about one’s 
evidence, a problem that non-reflective creatures do not have to deal with. Knowledge 
is also of utmost importance in our interactions with other people, and for this 
reflectively accessible justification is often required. It is expected, for example, that 
one does not claim to have knowledge unless one has reflectively accessible grounds to 
back it up. Again, this is a problem that non-reflective animals do not have to face. 
None of this is to say that reflection is necessary for knowledge but rather to say 
that any perspective that downplays these differences will not be giving a full account 
of knowledge. The role that reflection plays in human knowledge is too important to 
be ignored. The similarities between animal and human knowledge are also important 
but we should not let these be the only things that we base our theory of knowledge 
on. In taking this view, Kornblith’s account obscures the important differences that 
there are in the way that reflective and non-reflective creatures interact with 
knowledge. To be a full account of knowledge we would need to add an account of 
these differences to Kornblith’s account. 
3.4 Conclusions
In order to legitimately use cognitive ethology as the basis for his theory of knowledge, 
Kornblith needs to show that there is only one kind of knowledge which encompasses 
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both animal and human knowledge. However, his attempts to dismiss both social 
theories and reflection as being necessary to knowledge fail. Although reflection may 
not be completely reliable, something that surely no one would deny, he has not shown 
that it is so unreliable that we should not trust it. Even if he had succeeded, showing 
that reflection is not necessary for knowledge would not be enough to show that 
human knowledge is of the same kind as animal knowledge. It may, therefore, be 
reasonable to draw some kind of distinction between human and non-human 
knowledge. 
Kornblith has not succeeded in demonstrating that it is not legitimate to draw a 
distinction between human and animal knowledge. However, that is not to say that we 
should draw such a distinction. If we can keep our theory of knowledge simpler by 
allowing only one kind of knowledge then that would be certainly advantageous. I 
believe that we do not need to distinguish between two kinds of knowledge, as such, 
but rather we can draw distinctions elsewhere that will accommodate the important 
distinctions that there are between human and animal knowledge. There are distinctive 
advantages and disadvantages to having the capacity for reflection as human beings do. 
Reflecting on our evidence can reinforce or undermine a belief, for example. Socially 
we are also often expected to cite our reasons for a particular belief or piece of 
knowledge. These challenges, and benefits, to being reflective, along with the social 
environment that we inhabit mean that we reflection and reflectively accessible reasons 
have a central role to play in human knowledge. This is what we shall explore further in 
the following chapter. 
CHAPTER FOUR
A Genealogical Approach
In contrast to Kornblith, Edward Craig (1990) focuses very much on what knowledge 
is for human beings. Rather that looking at how the phenomenon of knowledge 
developed in an evolutionary context, Craig is interested in how and why the concept 
of knowledge may have developed, an approach that has been described as 
‘genealogical’ (Kusch 2009; Pritchard forthcoming a). He is not interested in traditional 
conceptual analysis, however. Rather, he advocates ‘practical explication’ (Craig 1990:8) 
of our concepts, which involves constructing a new concept of knowledge, making 
changes to our intuitive concept if necessary. Whether we adapt the concept or not, we 
should not take any set of conditions we uncover as applicable to all instances of 
knowledge but rather as defining the prototype for knowledge. Variation from this 
prototype is perfectly acceptable.
 Craig argues that our concept of knowledge originates in our need to tag good 
informants. We need to be able to identify good and bad informants so that we can get 
the best information and so a protoknowledge concept would develop in response to 
that need. The protoknowledge concept has since undergone a process of 
objectivisation leading to the concept that we are investigating today. That is, it has 
gone from being about who is a good informant with regard to my information needs 
here and now to a concept that covers potential informants for potential enquirers. A 
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knower must be potentially identifiable as such, be capable of communicating the 
relevant information and be as likely to be right as an enquirer would need him to be. 
The focus on enquiry is an important move on Craig’s part. When we are 
investigating knowledge we need to think about it in the context of our everyday lives 
not just in an abstract theoretical way. However, Craig neglects something which is a 
vital part of enquiry for both enquirers and informants: reflectively accessible 
justification. In the final part of this chapter I shall expand on Craig’s theory by 
examining the important role that this plays in our interactions concerning knowledge. 
I shall also suggest a way in which the apparently contradictory theories developed by 
Kornblith and Craig might be brought together. 
4.1 Craig’s Methodology
Like Kornblith, Craig is dissatisfied with the traditional approach to epistemology of 
trying to provide ‘an explicit intension to fit the intuitive extension’ (Craig 1990: 1). 
There is, he claims, good reason to think that this approach is flawed, not least that this 
project seems to have been unsuccessful thus far. We have intuitions about the 
intension as well as the extension of ‘knowledge’. For example, one may dismiss an 
example as not being a case of knowledge on the basis that the belief in question was 
formed in a lucky fashion. We can understand sceptical problems as arising from this 
kind of conflict of intuitions, he claims. The conditions for application of the concept 
of knowledge seem to mark out a much smaller number of cases than our extensional 
intuitions would indicate (Craig 1990:1). That is, the intuitive extension of knowledge is 
very broad, including all the things that we generally take ourselves to know. The 
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intension that seems to be implied by the sceptical argument, however, seems to show 
that we know almost none of the things that we ordinarily take ourselves to know.   
Craig suggests a different starting point for our investigation into knowledge from 
the traditional approach. Instead of beginning with the ordinary usage of the concept 
of knowledge he suggests that we should begin with an ‘ordinary situation’ (1990:2).
The word ‘knowledge’, it seems, has an equivalent in most, if not all, languages. If this 
is the case then there is good reason to think that it may fulfil an important need or 
function in the lives of human beings (Craig 1990: 2-3).  The method that he suggests 
is to start with a hypothesis about what role knowledge plays for us and suggest what a 
concept that filled that role would be like. What Craig is suggesting is, in essence, a 
state of nature analysis of knowledge; how and why might such a concept have 
developed in a primitive situation? The investigation is still looking for conditions that 
govern usage but not actual usage, rather rules that would govern a concept that fitted 
the hypothetical role that we suggest. Of course, in order for it to still be a concept of 
knowledge neither the intension nor the extension must differ greatly from our everyday 
usage of the concept.
Craig describes his project as a ‘practical explication of knowledge’ (Craig 1990: 8). 
The idea of explication, which he traces to Carnap, is to 
construct a new version of [the concept] satisfying certain standards, with the proviso 
that to count as a new version of that concept it [has] to emerge with many of its 
principle features intact. (Craig 1990:8) 
The hypothetical concept that we construct must stay close to our intuitive 
understanding of knowledge. If it strays too far from this then it is the hypothesis that 
is at fault not our intuitions. We are not in the business of inventing totally new 
concepts but rather of attempting to illuminate the concepts that we already have. 
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However, our intuitions may be ‘indeterminate or elastic’ (Craig 1990:2) and such an 
investigation may give us ideas on ways in which they should be stretched, and why 
and it may also help to uncover the source of such problems. 
Searching for a list of necessary and sufficient conditions that cover every case that 
we take to be knowledge is a lost cause. If we can come up with a list of conditions that 
take this form then we should instead take them as defining the prototypical case of 
knowledge (Craig 1990:5). Deviation should be allowed from this prototype because 
the concept developed in a practical situation. An enquirer needs to have a strategy for 
finding out about the world and such a strategy should be aimed at normal cases. We 
should not expect, therefore, that all cases that we are inclined to describe as 
knowledge will meet all the criteria. 
Why should we adopt Craig’s unorthodox approach to epistemology? One reason 
that Craig suggests is that the traditional method of philosophical investigation seems 
to have failed thus far to produce a satisfactory account of knowledge, which at least 
suggests an alternative approach is needed. Also, to succeed in defining knowledge 
would not be the end of epistemological enquiry.  There would still be an open 
question as to why such a concept developed. The fact that the concept of knowledge
is so widespread amongst human communities – Craig claims that anecdotally there is 
no language that does not have a ‘comfortable and colloquial equivalent’ (Craig 1990: 
2) to the English term ‘knowledge’ –  suggests that it fulfils some important role in 
human life. What Craig is suggesting is that we take this as the starting point for our 
investigation rather than something to be investigated at a later date. 
Craig’s main defence seems to be that of the ‘proof of the pudding’. That is, if this 
methodology ends with 
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conditions of application showing a close fit to the intuitive extension of ‘know’, and 
does fit well with a variety of facts about the ‘phenomenology’ of the concept, then 
those who hold it to be mere coincidence may be requested to make a case for their 
attitude. (Craig 1990: 3-4).
Craig also suggests that in adopting this approach we can both strengthen and widen 
the basis of the theory of knowledge. Instead of looking at only intuitive ideas about 
the extension of the term ‘knowledge’ we can also take into account facts about the 
success and failure of various analyses, controversies, reactions to scepticism and so 
on. This gives us a much broader base of data to work from. This also strengthens the 
basis for our theory because these data seem to be more akin to an ‘undoctored ‘given’’ 
(Craig 1990:7) than what is normally taken into account in analysing knowledge. The 
result of which, hopefully, will be that we can develop a less theory-laden and theory-
driven account of knowledge.
A further defence of Craig’s methodology can be found in Kusch (2009). Kusch 
expands upon Craig’s idea that the concept of knowledge ‘still bear[s] certain marks of 
its origin’ (Craig 1990: 95). That is, there are signs that we can detect in our current 
concept of knowledge that indicate how it might have come about. Firstly, Kusch cites 
linguistic evidence that the concept of knowledge has roots in the practice of testifying. 
For a start there is the common use of testimonial metaphor in our talk of knowledge 
and learning. For example, ‘The tyre tracks tell us that the assassin arrived by car after it 
rained.’, ‘I couldn’t believe my eyes.’, ‘Jones is very well informed about this insect: he has 
studied it for years.’ (Kusch 2009: 81). Linguistically, it seems, we often treat non-
humans as testifiers. We may also say that someone is well informed even when there 
has been no informant involved. Secondly, there is the linguistic fact that that ‘know’ 
can take interrogative constructions as complements whereas believe, for example, 
cannot. E.g. ‘I know who she is.’ vs. ‘I believe who she is.’; ‘She knows where to go.’ 
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vs. ‘She believes where to go.’ Testimony and knowledge appear to be linked here in a 
way that testimony and belief are not. Kusch also argues that attributions of knowledge 
have the function of honouring the knower and that markers of this can be seen in the 
concept of knowledge that we have now. 
4.2 Knowledge as Tagging Good Informants
4.2.1 What is enquiry? 
For human beings there are two ways in which we can gather information about the 
world. We can get information directly from the environment by using our senses or 
we can gather information from other human beings. Of course, human beings are not 
the only animals capable of sharing information; monkeys can warn the rest of their 
troop that a tiger is approaching by making a specific call and honey bees can 
communicate complex directions to good food sites through the movements of a 
‘waggle dance’. What is unique to humans is that we can engage in the process of 
enquiry using people as informants. We can ask and answer questions that are intended 
to assist enquiry; we rely on testimony with regard to places we have never been or 
experiences we have never had; we can enquire of experts in areas that we do not know 
much about; and so on.  
By enquiry I mean nothing more than the search for an answer to a question. This 
could range from the simple ‘Is it raining outside?’ to complex investigations into the 
genetic make-up of elephants or the chemical make-up of the atmosphere on Mars. 
Enquiry is part of our daily lives. We want to know many things: at what time the bus 
leaves, where our keys are, whether the meeting is today or tomorrow, how much the 
concert ticket will cost and so on. Different enquiries will demand different methods. 
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The question of whether or not it is raining outside can be easily resolved by looking 
out of the window. On some other matters, however, the best method will be to ask 
someone else. If I do not know what time the bus leaves then one simple way of 
finding out is to ask someone who knows. Some enquiries will require a mixture of 
both. There are, therefore, two roles that one can play with regard to an enquiry. One 
can be the enquirer, who is seeking the answer to some question. Or you could be an 
informant, who can give an answer to the question. In many cases the enquirer and the 
informant will be one and the same person such as when you ask yourself ‘Now where 
did I put my keys?’ 
Enquiry and the transmission of information are vital parts of human social 
interaction. They are also distinctly human abilities. Given that we have such 
capabilities, it seems that there arises a need to be able to distinguish between those 
who testify well and those who don’t. Furthermore, given that we are presumably 
interested in good testimony there is a need to encourage accurate testimony and 
discourage bad testimony.  In the next section we shall examine Craig’s argument that 
knowledge is a concept that evolved to tag good informants.
4.2.2 What is needed to be a good informant?
a) True belief
Human beings, like all animals, need to be able to find out information about their 
environment in order to survive. As such we have certain ‘on-board’ sources of 
information – eyes, ears and so on – that help us to find out about the world around 
us. However, we are not always in the best position to find out about a certain issue 
and so it would be advantageous to be able to access the resources of other human 
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beings. As Craig suggests, Fred, who is up the tree, may well be in a better position to 
spot the approaching tiger than the person on the ground (Craig 1990: 11). It seems, 
therefore, that we have good reason to want to be able to assess and mark people as 
good or bad people to get information from. 
Getting information from an informant involves more than is required to get 
information directly from the environment. We need to be able to assess the 
informant’s competence and decide whether they are reliable, trustworthy and so on. 
This seems to be a different process to the one in which we assess the information of 
our senses. Although in some cases you may need to check that your eyes or ears are 
working properly or that the environment is normal you do not need to worry about 
whether the apple in front of you is only pretending to be red, or whether it is a reliable 
apple. Craig’s hypothesis is that the ancestor of knowledge would have developed to 
assist this process. If we can tag our potential informants as good or bad then it will 
save us having to go through these checks every time. 
What does it take for someone to be a good informant? A first requirement is that 
they will tell us the truth as to whether p. This will primarily involve the informant 
holding a true belief as to whether p. That is, ‘either p and he believes that p or not-p
and he believes that not-p’ (Craig 1990:12). This comes very close to the traditional 
truth requirement for knowledge but couched in terms of a disjunctive condition. This 
is because Craig is thinking in terms of enquiry. When we make an enquiry into a 
certain matter it is an open question as to whether-p. We will only have successfully 
completed this enquiry if we have a decisive answer either way. Traditional theory of 
knowledge, on the other hand, is couched in terms of individual propositions and 
whether they are known or not.
Chapter 4: A Genealogical Approach
125
 In addition to having the correct belief as to whether p, a good informant must 
also be able to bring an enquirer to the correct belief (Craig 1990: 13). A subject who 
will not or cannot tell us the truth will not be a good informant even if they do in fact 
have a true belief about the matter at hand. If you were to choose a compulsive liar as 
your informant then you would not be brought to a correct belief about the matter at 
hand, even if he has a true belief. Must a good informant be confident about the matter 
in question, then? Obviously, if he has a belief then he is more likely to state it with 
confidence. If he appears to be hesitant about his answer then you may not believe 
him.
However, an informant’s confidence in a proposition is not the only reason that we 
might trust an informant’s testimony. If I know independently that Mr Truetemp’s 
utterances about the temperature are reliable then I can be brought to a true belief 
about the temperature even if he himself is unsure about his beliefs. Provided that he 
states what he feels the temperature is, it is unimportant whether he has a belief about 
it or not. It looks, therefore, as if belief on the part of the informant will not be 
necessary for them to be a good informant (Craig 1990: 14-5). 
Craig draws a distinction between informants and sources of information, however, 
which is important here (Craig 1990: §V). A source of information is a state of affairs 
that tells us about the world, such as the reading on a thermometer. An informant, on 
the other hand, is an agent who responds to our question as to whether-p. The concept 
of knowledge, claims Craig, is tied to informants not sources of information (Craig 
1990:34). We do not usually claim that the thermometer knows what the temperature is 
or that a tree knows how old it is, even though we can come to know these things by 
examining the thermometer or the tree. Getting correct information from a source of 
information is simply about being able to interpret the evidence in front of you. 
Chapter 4: A Genealogical Approach
126
Human beings can be both sources of information and informants. For example, we 
can discover whether John has been knocked unconscious by testing his reactions, or 
lack thereof, without having him tell us that he has been knocked out. Here we use 
John as a source of information. He would count as an informant only if we were 
engaging with him as an agent. The distinction between informants and sources of 
information helps to make it clear why we may want to add a belief condition to the 
conditions for protoknowledge. An enquirer may be able to find out whether p from 
someone who doesn’t believe that p, but it’s not clear that they are using them as an 
informant. 
There are advantages to using informants rather than just sources of information 
(Craig 1990:36). Firstly they are convenient. You need no special skills, beyond the 
ability to communicate, to gather information from an informant. Sources of 
information, however, may require special skills to interpret the information that you 
find. An experienced tracker may be able to tell you which animals have passed by here 
recently by looking at the tracks on the forest floor but an ordinary hiker would not.  
Secondly, informants can often be more helpful than a mere source of information. 
They are able to understanding the purpose behind your enquiry and so can often give 
you additional information that will be of assistance to you (Craig 1990: 36). For 
example, if you ask where the nearest Starbucks is an informant is capable of looking at 
what motivates your request – the desire for a large cup of coffee – and will be able to 
tell you that although there are no Starbucks in the immediate vicinity, there is a very 
nice coffee shop just around the corner. An informant can empathise with the reasons 
for you asking a particular question and give you the information that is of most use to 
you in addition to, or even instead of, the information that you actually asked for.  
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Of course, there are also disadvantages to using informants. Informants may 
deliberately deceive in a way that sources of information are unlikely to. That is, they 
may give every indication of being a good informant with regard to a certain issue but 
still deliberately mislead you. Informants can also be unreliable through no fault of 
their own, we are not infallible after all. These facts, however, just underline the need 
for us to be able to tag which informants are reliable and which are not.
b) Identifiability: Condition X 
So far we have seen that the conditions for being a good informant seem to come close 
to the traditional conditions for knowledge. Firstly, a good informant must be right as 
to whether p. Secondly, he must believe that p. Like traditional epistemologists, Craig 
doesn’t think that this is sufficient. It is not enough that someone would be a good 
informant if we could never identify them as such. If nobody is aware of Mr 
Truetemp’s ability, including Mr Truetemp himself, then he will not be a good 
informant as to the temperature. If there is no way of telling that he would be a good 
informant then we might not even think to ask him and would not be likely to believe 
him if he sounded unsure about the answer. A good informant, therefore, must be 
identifiable as a good informant. To tell if someone is reliable with regard to things that 
I already know is relatively easy, I ask them questions and test their answers against my 
own knowledge. However, it is in the nature of enquiry that the enquirer does not 
know the answer to the question that they are asking. If you knew, you wouldn’t be 
asking. A good informant needs to have some feature, independent of the fact that 
they give correct answers, that identifies them as someone who is likely to be right as to 
whether p. 
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Craig examines various contemporary epistemological accounts to see if they can 
shed light on what this condition might be. Firstly, he looks at the modal account put 
forward by Robert Nozick (1981, cited in Craig 1990: III). As discussed in Chapter 2 of 
this thesis (72-3), Nozick claims that to be knowledge beliefs need to track the truth. 
S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge if: (a) in the nearest possible world in world 
in which p is false, S does not believe that p, and (b) in nearby possible worlds in which 
p is true, S continues to believe that p.
Craig (1990: 21-23) thinks that there is something to be said for accuracy across a 
range of possible worlds but thinks that the conditions should be different from those 
that Nozick suggests. There is a good reason to want an informant to be accurate 
across a range of possible worlds because we cannot precisely identify which world we 
are in and we want our informant to be correct whichever one it happens to be. 
However, to do this job we would need to fix the range of worlds according to the 
interests of the enquirer. An enquirer should only be interested in ‘open’ possibilities; 
ones that he cannot rule out for himself. If you want to know the time of the next bus 
then it you do not need to take into account the world in which your informant is 
wearing a different coloured shirt. However, Nozick’s conditionals do not exclude such 
worlds as all close possible worlds are relevant. The other problem with Nozick’s 
conditionals for Craig’s project is that we do not have a way of detecting accuracy 
across possible worlds and so it is of no use in detecting reliable informants. Although 
being accurate across possible worlds may coincide with an identifiable property, it 
cannot be what Craig is looking for. 
Craig argues that a reliabilist condition will not do the job either. As we saw earlier, 
in §2.3.2, simple process reliabilism claims that knowledge is true belief formed by a 
reliable method. However, we are not equipped to tell whether or not someone has 
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formed their beliefs in a reliable way, or at least, it is not something that is immediately 
obvious to an enquirer. If you ask someone whether or not the train is due at 5pm, you 
generally have no way of telling whether that person formed their belief in a reliable 
manner. Perhaps they looked at the current timetable, or perhaps they looked at an old 
timetable which was very different to the current one. An enquirer can’t easily identify 
someone as having formed their beliefs in a reliable way, at least not without a lot of 
investigation. Again, having reliably formed beliefs might coincide with the property 
that Craig is looking for but it cannot do the job that he’d like (Craig 1990: 30-1)
 Instead of there being one property that makes informants detectable, Craig 
suggests that the condition should be understood to cover ‘any detectable property 
which has been found to correlate closely with holding true belief as to whether p’ 
(Craig 1990: 25) and labels this X. Although this may correlate closely with beliefs 
being formed in a reliable way or to fulfilling various counterfactual conditionals these 
things are not enough. We need something that identifies a subject as an accurate 
source as to whether p. Craig is happy to allow any kind of feature to fill this role, 
arguing that being a taxi driver is a detectable property that correlates well with reliably 
giving correct answers about locations and so we can identify a taxi driver as a good 
informant in this regard simply because he is a taxi driver.
Although Craig claims that the connection between X and an informant being right 
about p must be reliable, this should be distinguished from the claims of reliabilism. 
According to reliabilism, the thing which must be reliable is the method by which the 
subject comes to believe that p. What Craig claims, on the other hand, is that X must 
reliably indicate that the subject will be a good informant about the matter in hand. 
That is, that in most cases where someone has property X, they will be a good 
informant as to whether p. This is irrespective of whether they formed their belief in a 
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reliable manner or not. Although these two things will often coincide, they are not the 
same thing. 
There are various ways in which the ‘reliable method’ of reliabilism can be 
expanded. Does it need to be reliable in producing a true belief in exactly the situation 
that obtains; in situations like the one obtaining; in all likely circumstances; or, in all 
possible circumstances? A similar question arises with regard to the good informant; do 
we need them to be a good informant just about this particular question or about many 
(or all) related questions? It seems that there may be good reason to prefer the latter. 
For a start, one way of telling that someone will be a good informant as to whether-p
may be that they have been good informants about related matters in the past. For 
many propositions the truth value of p will not vary over time and so we will not ask 
exactly the same question repeatedly. Thus, we may have only an indirect indication of 
whether a particular person will be a good informant as to whether-p. 
This does seem to be a way in which we often judge whether someone will be a 
good informant or not. If you want information regarding the result of the latest Hibs-
Hearts derby, for example, you will ask the football fan who has always been accurate 
before. This gives you a high chance of getting the right answer, even if you haven’t 
asked about that particular game or even those teams before. If, on the other hand, 
someone had been highly unreliable in this respect previously then the enquirer has 
good reason to doubt that he can accurately answer the question on this occasion. 
Previous success, or lack thereof, is a good indicator to an enquirer as to whether or 
not a person is likely to be a good informant in this case. 
c) As likely to be right as needed
So far, we have seen that a good informant should have a true belief as to whether p
and that he should be recognisable to me as a good informant. Craig also wants to add 
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that a good informant should be as likely to be right as the enquiry needs and channels 
of communication should be open between the informant and enquirer. The second of 
these is pretty straightforward – if the enquirer cannot communicate with the 
informant then she will not be able to get the information that she requires. The first 
needs a bit more explanation. A good informant, as discussed above, needs to be 
correct across a range of possible worlds because we do not know which world we are 
in. However, he does not need to be correct in those worlds which are not ‘open’ 
possibilities. Nor does he need to be correct in worlds which are highly improbable. 
How many worlds are ruled out will depend on various factors, such as: the 
urgency of the enquiry; the relative benefits and costs of being right versus being 
wrong; the enquirer’s personal attitude to risk; and, the background circumstances to 
the enquiry (Craig 1990: 86). If the train is in 5 minutes then an enquirer might accept a 
less reliable informant as to where the station is than if he has 30 minutes to find it. A 
less reliable informant will also do if there is very high potential benefit in getting the 
right answer but a low cost in getting the wrong answer. In addition, some people are 
just naturally more risk averse than others and so will be more exacting in their 
requirements for informants than those who are more inclined to take risks. Finally, 
these all need to be weighed up against the background circumstances. If a lot is riding 
on the answer to a particular question then the enquirer will be more careful over his 
choice of informants, however much of a risk-taker he might generally be. 
4.2.4 The process of objectivisation
There are several cases which appear problematic for Craig’s theory (Craig 1990:17, 
82). These are cases in which we would intuitively identify a subject as knowing that p 
but in which they would not make a good informant as to whether-p. Firstly, there is 
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the case of a subject who has information relevant to an enquiry but will not or cannot 
reveal it. For example, the case of Luigi, who knows where the body is buried but will 
not tell. Secondly, is the case where a subject has no credibility as an informant. For 
example, Matilda has repeatedly ‘cried wolf’ and so no one believes her claim that the 
house is burning down even when it is true. A final case is where it is impossible to 
identify someone as a good informant on a particular matter. The case of Fred, the 
secretly studious milkman, for example. Fred was once a reserve on Mastermind but 
didn’t tell anyone. His specialist subject was obscure and unrelated to dairy delivery. As 
such, he knows the answer to an obscure question but no one would know to ask him. 
If such cases are cases of knowledge then Craig needs to explain how we got from the 
concept of protoknowledge, which seems to exclude them, to the concept of 
knowledge, which includes them.  
Craig suggests that protoknowledge underwent a process he describes as 
‘objectivisation’ (1990: §X). Initially, creatures were only looking for things to satisfy 
their immediate desires in the here and now. However, there is pressure to move away 
from this subjective stance to something more objective. Craig takes the example of 
the concept of a chair. A ‘protochair’ is perhaps just anything in the vicinity that you 
can sit on right now but there are pressures to move away from this highly subjective 
viewpoint. You may be also interested in something to sit on in the future, or in things 
that you could sit on somewhere that you’ve never been before, or in things that other 
people, of a different size or shape to you, could sit on. In such cases you may need to 
rely on other people knowing what is suitable to sit on so that they can tell you. 
So, we move away from a context-based, highly subjective concept to a concept 
that is abstracted away from any particular person, time or place. From something that 
is useful for me to sit on right now to the idea of something that is suitable for sitting 
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on in general. A chair may be of no use to anyone right now as it is stranded in the 
middle of the ocean or because it is a chair for a doll’s house. However, these things 
are still chairs because they could be sat on in principle, although, in the second case, 
only by a vey small person. The fact that right now they cannot be used as chairs does 
not mean that they are not chairs. 
A similar thing has happened to protoknowledge, suggests Craig. In the first 
instance a good informant would be someone who has a true belief about p and meets 
the following criteria:
1. He is accessible to me here and now.
2. He should be recognisable by me as someone likely to be right about p.
3. He should be as likely to be right about p as my concerns require.
4. Channels of communication between him and me should be open. (Craig 
1990: 85)
We can see that people may fail to be good informants even though they have a true 
belief by failing to meet one of these conditions. Some may fail to be a good informant 
simply by not being here when you need the information. Others, the secretive 
milkman and Matilda included, would fail the second test. You cannot possibly be 
aware that he would have the right answer to your question as he has never given 
anyone the slightest reason to think that he would. Due to her habit of telling tales, 
Matilda, will not be recognised as a good informant, either, and so she also does not 
fulfil this condition. 
The strength of the third condition will vary with the situation. In cases where the 
matter is of great importance one may reject someone who would be perfectly 
adequate if the matter were trivial. In a life-or-death situation I should not risk getting 
the answer to my question from someone who seems even a little unlikely to get it 
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right. The final condition can fail to be met in various ways. Perhaps the enquirer and 
informant do not speak the same language, or, like Luigi, the potential informant 
refuses to reveal their information. 
In any society there are likely to be many individuals facing the same general 
problem of how to settle various whether-p questions. If the members of that society 
are responsive to the needs of others then there is a pressure towards objectivisation, 
claims Craig (1990: 87-8). We may need to recommend informants or to ask for 
recommendations and so we need to start to think outside of our own immediate 
needs. You are no longer thinking solely of informants who are of use to you here and 
now but rather of subjects who would make good informants for people in general, 
irrespective of circumstance. 
There will sometimes be good informants that you are not equipped to recognise 
and so you will have to rely on others to give you this information. Likewise, you will 
be able to recognise informants that others would not be able to. In particular, you are 
generally in a better position than other people to identify whether you yourself would 
be a good informant on a particular matter. Thus, the requirement that someone be 
recognisable as an informant becomes much broader. It does not have to be something 
that a particular enquirer can detect but rather something that someone could detect. Our 
milkman may not seem a good informant to us but it would surely be possible for 
someone, himself, if no one else, to identify him as a good informant on the subject in 
question. 
The requirement that the informant be as likely to be right as the enquirer needs 
him to be also has to change. Now, an informant must be as likely to be right as anyone
could need him to be. In different enquiries and in different circumstances the level of 
reliability needed will vary and an objectivised concept has to take this into account. 
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This means that condition (3) needs to be strengthened to require someone with a very 
high likelihood of being right (Craig 1990: 91). 
This potentially pushes the requirement up so high that no informant could 
possibly meet it, leading to scepticism (Craig 1990: 91-2, §XI). In lottery cases a 
person’s belief that she will not win is almost certain to be correct. In a lottery of 100 
tickets with only one winner, the belief that I have not won will be correct 99% of the 
time. We would not, however, take someone as a good informant as to the result of the 
lottery just on this basis. It seems that we could have a lottery with a very large number 
of tickets and this would still apply, which seems to imply that the accuracy of our 
informants should be pushed up until they are 100% reliable. 
Craig’s answer to this problem is that lottery cases are special cases. Usually we do 
not call on our informants to be 100% reliable. Our concept of knowledge is one 
which has developed in a real life situation and should be aimed on the kind of cases 
that are the norm. Although lottery cases are normal in that they happen in everyday 
cases they are unusual in that they appear to demand a much greater accuracy than 
normal. In usual, practical situations this level is very far from being required. We 
should not isolate our philosophical investigations from real life (c.f. Kaplan 1991, 
2000, discussed in this thesis §1.3) 
The final condition also changes with objectivisation. There may be cases in which 
you could not communicate with the informant but in which someone else could. 
Gareth can find out information from an Arabic speaker when I cannot, due to my 
ignorance of his language. Although Luigi will not tell you where the body is buried 
that does not mean that he would not tell Carlo. As we move to an objective concept, 
the conditions change allowing for cases where a subject may not be a good informant 
for me but may be a good informant in a more generalised sense.  
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The process of objectivisation also answers the ‘cart before the horse’ objection 
(Craig 1990: §X): it seems natural to say that someone is a good informant as to 
whether p only if they know that p in the first place. To dismiss this criticism Craig 
looks back to his comparison with chair. When investigating the concept we may first 
notice that people like to sit down and that the concept of a chair may have developed 
in response to this. Oh no, claims the detractor, there are things that are chairs that are 
of no use to people who want to sit down. There could be a chair in the middle of the 
Sahara or a chair on a blazing bonfire. These things are chairs nonetheless. You need to 
first tell us what a chair is, and then we will find out why they are good for sitting on. 
This response seems adequate when applied to the concept of a chair and Craig 
thinks that we can respond in the same way with regard to knowledge. If the cases are 
indeed parallel, then it seems that a detractor would need to find additional reason to 
reject Craig’s prioritisation of the concept of a good informant. Through 
objectivisation, the concept does move away from its origins but the mark of those 
origins can still be seen (See discussion of Kusch 2009, above). The concept of 
knowledge is not identical with the concept of a good informant but rather is an 
objectivised version of a good informant.
However, it’s not clear that the objection cannot be pressed further here. Craig’s 
hypothesis is that we can gather information about the world through our senses but 
that it is also advantageous to be able to gather information from other people’s 
sensory equipment. So, we have a need to identify those people who can give us good 
information about our environment. Because of this, we develop a concept 
‘knowledge’ that we apply to people if they are good at telling us the things that we 
need to know; someone knows whether p if they believe truly and can potentially 
inform others that p. This seems to be a strange way to put things as surely you have 
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the information available to yourself even if you can’t pass it on. Reliably gathering 
information from your senses is surely prior to being able to pass that information on.
However, Craig would claim that we would have no use for the concept of 
knowledge except in a social environment. The concept only develops because we need 
to identify who can give us good information. The idea is that the concept of 
knowledge developed in a social context to fulfil a particular need that human beings 
have. This does not mean that it cannot now be applied to those who are in some way 
removed from social interaction. The objectivised concept of knowledge says that a 
person must in principle be identifiable as an informant if they are to count as a 
knower. A person can, however, identify themselves as an informant for their own 
purposes even if they were incapable of communicating with anyone else. Robinson 
Crusoe can know that the tide is coming in even though he cannot communicate this 
to anyone. He is a good informant with regard to his own enquiry.
4.3 Building on Craig: The Role of Reflective Access in Enquiry 
Craig’s theory gives a good account of how the concept of knowledge may have 
originated. However, even though he concentrates on the importance of enquiry, he
does not place enough emphasis on the role of reflection both for enquirers and 
informants. In this section we shall explore the importance of reflectively accessible 
evidence for both enquirers and informants and build upon Craig’s theory to give a 
fuller understanding of the concept of knowledge in a social context. 
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4.3.1 The Importance of Reflective Access for Informants
Craig claims that externalism fits better with his account of what it takes to be a good 
informant and therefore his theory of knowledge (1990: 68). A good informant does 
not need to have reflectively accessible reasons for his belief in order to pass on the 
information effectively. Provided that there is some reason for the enquirer to think 
that the informant is reliable, there doesn’t seem to be any need for the informant to 
also be aware of it. 
This is only obviously the case, however, if we look at things from the third person 
perspective i.e. that of the enquirer. Frequently, a person will have to assess whether or 
not he himself is a good informant, either in order to play a part in their own 
investigation or to declare themselves an informant for the purposes of someone else’s 
enquiry. Internalist ideas are enticing in this context, claims Craig (1990: 64-5), but this 
is a mistake arising from the perspective that we have had to take towards our own 
beliefs. When assessing your own beliefs you have to play the role of both enquirer and 
informant and so you have to assess your ability as an informant. The only way that 
you have of assessing this ability is by looking inside yourself for markers that you are 
reliable as to the question of whether p.
However, this reflection is only necessary when examining oneself as a potential 
informant; it is not necessary for all informants to do this when giving information. 
The first person perspective is not primary, it is just that in certain circumstances we 
need to adopt this perspective. The football fan doesn’t need to know himself that he 
is a good informant but we need to be able to identify him as reliable. We may know 
that he’s always been reliable in the past or we may take his wearing of a football scarf 
and singing of football-related songs as an indication that he will be reliable with 
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regards to the outcome of today’s game. He need not have any reason himself to think 
that he is a good informant. Craig’s theory, therefore, is externalist in nature. 
It is not clear, however, that the first person perspective is at all unusual. A very 
common way of conducting an enquiry is to ask people if they know the answer to 
your question. A responsible enquirer would not ask just anyone – if you need 
directions to a local tourist spot, it makes more sense to ask the ice-cream vendor than 
the lost-looking tourist. However, there is often no way of telling whether a person will 
know the answer to the specific question that you are asking other than by asking them 
whether they know. In fact we often couch enquiries in terms of ‘Do you know…’ 
questions. The initial question does not state our enquiry directly but rather asks the 
potential informant whether they know the information that you seek. One does not 
ask ‘How do you get to the castle?’ but rather ‘Do you know how to get to the castle?’ 
or ‘Can you tell me how to get to the castle?’ Of course, the correct affirmative 
response is not just ‘Yes’. It is normally understood that the question does two jobs; to 
enquire as to whether you know and also to ask for the information. Even if you have 
good reason to think that the person that you have asked will be a reliable informant –
when you ask at the tourist information office, for example – you may still very well 
formulate the question in terms of the informant’s knowledge. The phenomenology of 
testimony, in English at least, seems to be that we ask people to declare or at least 
confirm themselves as informants in addition to giving the information that is required. 
To be a responsible informant you should have some idea of how you came to 
know. If you do not have some reason to think that you are correct then you should 
not put yourself forward as an informant. We can see this in the Gricean maxim that 
you should not assert knowledge unless you have adequate grounds for your 
knowledge (Grice 1975: 46).  We may be able to use someone as an informant when 
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they do not have reflectively accessible justification but we would need to have some 
other reason to think that their answer would be reliable. From the 1st person 
perspective, however, we only have reflectively accessible justification available. In 
normal circumstances, if an informant is not sure how they came by a particular piece 
of information then they will not claim it as knowledge but rather express it in qualified 
terms. When faced with difficult quiz questions, for example, someone who does not 
have reflectively accessible evidence will couch things in terms of ‘I think the answer 
is….’ or  ‘I’m not sure, but I’d say …’ and so on.  This would be the same whether you 
know the answer, have a true belief about it, or a false one for that matter. When we 
lack second order knowledge of how we came to have a certain piece of information 
we hedge what we say to make sure that the claim is not misunderstood as a claim to
knowledge. 
The fact that people on the whole are unwilling to make a knowledge claim unless 
they have some reflective backing for their belief can be taken as evidence that, as 
informants, they want their testimony to be accurate. We do not want to be understood 
as claiming knowledge unless we have reason to think that we have knowledge. Kusch 
claims that knowledge, in addition to having the role of tagging good informants, also 
has the role of bestowing honour on good informants and shame on bad ones. If an 
informant is tagged as a (proto-) knower then that is a form of praise. Reynolds (2002) 
argues that the primary purpose of classifying people as knowers is to improve 
testimony. To identify someone as a knower is to praise them, which, therefore, gives 
people incentive to testify accurately. If we have an interest in good testimony then it 
seems reasonable to suggest that a way of encouraging good testimony would emerge. 
The concept knowledge, therefore would play a dual role. From the point of view of 
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the enquirer, it would have the role of tagging informants and from the point of view 
of the informant it would have the role of encouraging them to testify well. 
As the proto-concept of knowledge was developing presumably an awareness 
would develop amongst informants as to what was expected of them. A common 
method of enquiry is to ask people whether they know the answer to a particular 
question of whether or not p. In these cases we would expect our informants to go 
through this reflective process and declare themselves as good informants, or not, and 
may enquire into the reflective reasons that they have. In fact, this is often the case, 
especially if the answer to our question is of particular importance. We very often have 
to rely on people to declare themselves as informants and so it is odd that Craig 
dismisses internalism in the way that he does. It is true that there are other ways of us 
identifying reliable informants, they may have given us good information in the past or 
they could be identifiable by their job as one likely to give good information such as 
teachers and people who work in a tourist information office. However, in many cases 
the only way I can find out if someone is a good informant is by asking them. The first 
person perspective is much more important and central to testimony than Craig claims. 
 4.3.2 The Importance of Reflective Access for enquirers
It is often stated that ‘knowledge closes enquiry’ (See, for example, Kvanvig 2003: 171, 
2009: 344). Once we come to know the answer to the question that we are 
investigating we no longer need to continue enquiring. In this section I will argue that 
it is only reflective, 2nd order knowledge that can successfully and responsibly close 
enquiry; that is, knowledge accompanied by reflective justification. 
There are two ways in which enquiry may be closed. In the first instance, the 
enquiry comes to an end because the enquirer just no longer feels the need to 
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investigate. They have come to a belief about the matter in question In this case the 
enquiry is closed because the enquirer has alleviated the ‘irritation of doubt’ (Peirce 
1877/1992: 114). We can also ask, however, what it takes for an enquiry to be closed 
responsibly and successfully. Firstly, for an enquiry to be successful, we should at least 
be brought to a true belief about the answer to the question posed. A false belief would 
not be a successful end to enquiry. Nor would it be successful if the enquirer came 
across the truth but did not come to believe it. If the enquirer has no belief about the 
answer to the question being asked then he would have no epistemic reason to stop his 
enquiry. 
To successfully close enquiry, then, one needs to have a true belief about the 
answer to the question in hand. Is a true belief sufficient or do we need knowledge? To 
a large extent this will depend on what kind of knowledge is in play. If an enquirer 
comes to have brute externalist knowledge that p then it seems that he is not yet at the 
point of being able to halt enquiry responsibly. He may know that p but this knowledge 
will be indistinguishable from a mere belief that p. There is no reason for him to think 
that his belief is true beyond the fact that he believes it and so there is no reason for 
him to cease his enquiry.  
For example, if Mr Truetemp wants to know what the current air temperature is 
then he can come to a reliably formed true belief just by thinking about it as, 
unbeknownst to him, he has a chip in his brain which accurately records the 
temperature. However, the fact that he has formed a true belief in a reliable manner 
does not give him reason to stop his investigation because from his point of view his 
belief could as easily be false as true. He does not have reason to cease his investigation 
until he has checked his belief. Once he has checked his belief against a reliable 
thermometer, he has reason to stop his enquiry. It seems, therefore that reflectively 
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accessible justification is needed in order to close enquiry. It is not enough to have 
knowledge without reflective backing because you would have no reason to stop 
enquiry at this point.
In fact, reflectively accessible justification for your belief seems to be sufficient to 
close enquiry. Of course, in some cases an enquirer will possess such justification but 
have a false belief. For example, I may think that I have found out that the bus leaves 
out at 4.15pm by looking at the timetable. If the timetable is out of date, however, and 
the bus now leaves at 4.10pm then I may have closed my enquiry too early. To 
successfully and responsibly close enquiry, however, you need to have knowledge that 
is accompanied by reflectively accessible justification. The level of justification may 
vary depending on the enquiry. For example, if it is a very important matter we may 
want stronger justification than on something trivial, or if it is urgent we may accept a 
lower level of justification than we would if we had all the time in the world. However, 
in all cases an enquirer needs some understanding of how he or she came by his or her 
belief or some reason to believe that it is true. In most enquiries it will be clear to the 
enquirer how he or she came by his or her belief – ‘I saw that the keys were on the 
table.’; ‘I read that the bus is due at 4.15.’; ‘ John told me that the party is tomorrow 
night.’ and so on. If the enquirer does not have even this level of backing for their 
belief then they it is clear that they cannot responsibly close their enquiry.  
Having closed enquiry we want it to remain closed so that we do not have to start 
investigating the matter again. A satisfactory end to enquiry then, is stable knowledge. 
A piece of purely externalist knowledge does not have this stability. If an enquirer does 
not have any reflectively accessible reason to believe the proposition then it seems that 
any counter-evidence should shake his belief. A responsible enquirer would reopen his 
or her enquiry if this were the case. So, it is preferable to have a true belief that is 
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backed up by reflectively accessible evidence for the belief as an enquirer is less likely 
to lose his belief once he has gained it. 
In order to close enquiry we need stable belief which can only come about through 
having internalist justification. We also want this belief to be non-accidental in nature –
which externalist knowledge gives us. So in order to successfully close enquiry we need 
to have knowledge which is backed-up by reflectively accessible justification. I shall 
examine the idea of stable knowledge further in Chapter 5. 
4.4 Contrast with Kornblith’s Approach
Both Craig and Kornblith take unorthodox approaches to epistemology. Unlike 
Kornblith, however, Craig does not want to abandon conceptual investigation 
completely. Although his method is unusual he is still investigating the same thing as 
the traditional epistemologists – the concept of knowledge. In fact, he dismisses a 
Kornblithian-type theory saying that he doesn’t think that knowledge is a ‘given 
phenomenon’ and our concept developed in order to allow us to speak about this 
‘common and important stuff’ (1990: 3). Craig does not put forward an argument for 
this position claiming only that the ‘proof of the pudding’ (1990: 3) will be whether his 
methodology does result in giving conditions for the correct application of ‘knowledge’ 
that fit closely with our intuitive understanding of what knowledge is. If it does, he 
suggests, then the burden of proof will be on those who suggest that this is a mere 
coincidence to show it to be so. 
I shall not attempt a direct response to Kornblith’s position on Craig’s behalf but 
rather suggest that the two theories are not at odds to the extent that they initially 
appear. Despite both ostensibly being interested in the question of what knowledge is 
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the two philosophers are focusing on very different aspects of knowledge. Craig is 
primarily interested in how the concept of knowledge as a social phenomenon 
developed – why do we need the concept of knowledge and what role does it play for 
us? On the other hand, Kornblith is interested in why the natural phenomenon of 
knowledge developed – why do animals, including human beings, need such a thing as 
knowledge? What evolutionary benefit does it have? These two different sets of 
interests are focusing on the same thing – knowledge – but there is no reason to think 
that they are straightforwardly contradicting each other. 
One way to reconcile the two positions might be to claim that there are two 
different things that fall under the description of ‘knowledge’. On the one hand is a 
phenomenon called knowledge which evolved because it assists in the survival of those 
animals that have it. In addition to that is the concept of knowledge as it is used in 
human social interaction. Kornblith claims that he has no interest in the concept of 
knowledge and is only investigating the natural phenomenon. Craig, on the other hand 
is not interested in the natural phenomenon. He is not involved in the project of 
‘Evolutionary Epistemology’ which ‘looks at our cognitive faculties as adaptive 
responses to changing circumstances and changing needs for information.’ (Craig 1990: 
10). 
Craig focuses on the role that knowledge plays in a human social context whereas 
Kornblith is primarily concerned with knowledge in the context of non-human animals 
in the natural world, although he thinks that this account extends to humans as well. As 
such, it is far from clear that they are looking at the same thing. The two investigations 
could, perhaps, even be seen as continuous. First, the phenomenon knowledge 
develops – animals need reliably-formed, true beliefs to survive. Then, once human 
beings have developed the capacity for reflection and complex communication, a new 
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need arises – to be able to sort good from bad informants – necessitating the need for 
a concept to classify people. As we saw above, Craig claims that having reliably formed 
true beliefs may correlate well with a third condition for knowledge but that it cannot 
do the job that human beings require – the identification of good informants. We 
could perhaps take this to show that there may be something that is common to both 
human and animal knowledge – reliable, true belief – but given the particular needs of 
human beings in a social environment that requires us to sort and tag good and bad 
informants we need to have a concept that reflects those needs. If these two ways of 
thinking are reconcilable in this way then perhaps taking insights from both will give us 
a better understanding of knowledge. I shall discuss this further in the following 
chapter. 
4.5 Conclusion
Craig’s methodology – to examine the possible origins of the concept of knowledge –
is a useful one and gives us a different perspective on the old question of what 
knowledge is. We can see a strong link between knowledge and the process of enquiry. 
However, Craig’s theory does not put enough emphasis on the importance of 
reflectively accessible justification in the process of enquiry. In this chapter, I have 
sketched out a way of building on Craig’s insight which restores this importance. I have 
also suggested a way in which the apparently contradictory methodologies of Kornblith 
and Craig could be reconciled. The difference between them is primarily one of focus. 
In Chapter 5 I shall go on to examine how the thoughts developed in this chapter can 
tell us something about why we value knowledge. 
CHAPTER FIVE
Value Problems 
Several value problems have come to light in recent epistemology. The first is in fact an 
old problem dating from and named after Plato’s Meno. It simply asks ‘Why is knowledge 
more valuable than mere true belief?’ The two states appear to have the same practical 
value but we seem to prefer knowledge. The Meno problem uncovers a problem with 
certain types of theory such as reliabilism. It seems that such theories cannot give an 
answer to the Meno problem because they are based on a view whereby truth is the only 
epistemic good. If this is the case then any condition on knowledge that is truth-
conducive will not add value to mere true belief. Two further value problems have also 
been identified; the secondary and tertiary value problems. The secondary value problem 
asks why knowledge is more valuable than any proper subset of its parts and the tertiary 
value problem asks why knowledge is distinctively valuable, why it has a different kind of 
value to anything that falls short of knowledge. 
This chapter will examine the challenge posed by these different value problems and 
suggest an answer. I will argue that knowledge is not in fact more valuable than mere true 
belief but that knowledge accompanied by justification is more valuable. I will argue that 
there is a difference between mere true belief and internally justified knowledge; if our 
knowledge is accompanied by justification then it is more stable and also better suited to 
being used to pass on knowledge. Most of our knowledge is accompanied by this kind of 
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value and so we can explain why we seem to think that knowledge is always more 
valuable than mere true belief even if this is not actually the case. Making this value 
distinction between knowledge and internalistically justified knowledge also has the 
added bonus of being able to explain why an externalist answer to scepticism is 
unsatisfactory. 
5.1 Value Problems
There are various value problems that crop up in the contemporary literature and that we 
shall examine here. The Meno problem asks simply, why is knowledge more valuable 
than mere true belief. The swamping problem is a particular challenge that certain 
theories face in answering the Meno problem. Those that understand truth as being the 
only thing of value in the epistemic domain cannot explain why knowledge is more 
valuable than mere true belief. The secondary value problem asks why knowledge is more 
valuable than any proper subset of its parts, and the tertiary value problem asks why 
knowledge has a distinctive value. 
5.1.1 The Meno, or primary value problem 
Why do we value knowledge? An initial and relatively straightforward answer is that it is 
very useful to have knowledge. On an everyday basis my knowledge helps me to fulfil my 
desires. If I want chocolate then my knowledge that the corner shop sells chocolate, and 
is open right now, will help me fulfil my desire for chocolate. I would find it a lot harder 
to fulfil my desire for chocolate if I was in a strange place and didn’t know where the 
nearest chocolate vendor was. 
The fact that knowledge is useful answers our initial question about knowledge but 
one may think that there are further questions that need to be answered. Is knowledge 
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distinctively valuable, for example? That is, do we value knowledge more than other 
epistemic states, such as true belief? If so, why is this the case? In the Meno, Socrates 
claims that we value knowledge more than mere true opinion. However, this seems to be 
problematic. If I have a true belief about the way to get Larissa and I act upon that belief, 
then I will arrive in Larissa just as well as if I had knowledge of the way to Larissa. There 
seems to be no practical difference between the two. 
We are therefore faced with a prima facie problem. Knowledge is more valuable than 
true belief but there seems to be no practical difference between the two. It is not clear, 
therefore where the value difference lies. We seem to value knowledge more than mere 
true belief. Given the choice between the two most people would be inclined to choose 
knowledge every time. If I want to get to Larissa, for example, I would rather know the 
way than just truly believe it. However, there seems to be no practical difference between 
the two. If I have a true belief about how to get to Larissa then it seems that I can get 
there just as well as if I knew how to get there. There seems to be a conflict between two 
intuitions about knowledge: 1) knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, and 2) 
knowledge and true belief have the same practical value. 
The most straightforward answers to the question would involve denying one of the 
intuitions behind the problem; either knowledge is not more valuable than mere true 
belief or they do not have the same practical value. A third option would be to maintain 
that both (1) and (2) are true but to claim that the value difference is not to do with 
practical value. For example, knowledge may have an intrinsic value that mere true belief 
does not. 
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5.1.2 Swamping Problem
Theories such as reliabilism seem to have a particular problem in answering the Meno 
problem; the swamping problem. It is perhaps best explained by reference to an analogy 
(originally due to Zagzebski 2003:14-15): Jill likes good coffee and she has a good cup of 
coffee in her hand. As it happens this coffee was produced by a reliable coffee-machine. 
In most cases, the coffee produced will be high quality. Jack also likes good coffee and 
has an equally good cup of coffee in his hand. This coffee, however, was produced by an 
unreliable machine which often produces terrible coffee but on this occasion just 
happens to have produced a good cup. Is Jill’s coffee worth more than Jack’s just 
because it is reliably produced? The answer to this seems to be no. If both cups of coffee 
are equally tasty, then it makes no difference how they were produced. Both Jack and Jill 
are primarily interested in having a good cup of coffee and that is exactly what they both 
have, the reliability of the production methods is irrelevant. That is not to say that 
reliability is not a good quality in a coffee machine. If Jack and Jill are interested in 
regularly having good cups of coffee, then it makes sense for them to buy the most 
reliable machine their budget can stretch to. However, the value that reliability confers 
onto the coffee machine doesn’t transfer to the coffee that is produced by that machine. 
Given that Jill has a good cup of coffee in her hand, it doesn’t matter that it was 
produced reliably. The value that it has in being the product of a reliable process is 
‘swamped’ by the value of the good coffee itself. 
The case with reliably-produced true belief is analogous. When it comes to 
knowledge we are primarily interested in getting to the truth. Once you have a truth in 
your possession it is irrelevant whether it was formed reliably or not. The value of 
reliability is swamped by the value of the truth. Again, it is valuable to have reliable 
belief-forming mechanisms because we are generally interested in getting to the truth, but 
this value is not conferred onto the beliefs themselves. If what we are interested in is 
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forming true beliefs then once we have true beliefs in our possession it doesn’t matter 
how we came by them.  
Although the swamping problem was originally aimed at reliabilism, it is in fact 
problematic for any view that has a truth-conducive condition on knowledge. One way 
to understand the swamping problem is to see it arising from a particular view of what is 
valuable from the epistemic perspective. This view, described variously as ‘epistemic 
value monism’ (Zagzebski 2004), ‘epistemic truth monism’ (Sosa 2007:70-2) and 
‘epistemic value T-monism’ (Pritchard forthcoming a: 14, and passim) claims that truth is the 
primary, only, thing that is valuable in the epistemic domain. Other valuable properties
such as justification or coherence are valuable because they are instrumentally valuable 
with regard to getting to the truth. A belief which is justified or coheres with one’s other 
beliefs, or both, is more likely to be true. These things are only valuable in so far as they 
are truth-conducive. Beliefs that are justified or coherent are more likely to be true.
Epistemic value T-monism leads to a problem for certain types of theory of 
knowledge. If knowledge consists in a true belief plus a third truth conducive condition, 
such as reliability, then it appears that we cannot explain why knowledge is more valuable 
than true belief. A true belief does not seem to gain any value from having been formed 
by a reliable process because the value of reliability is swamped by the value of truth. As 
we saw earlier, a good cup of coffee gains nothing from being produced by a reliable 
coffee machine, it is just as good however it came about12. 
It is, of course, valuable to have reliably produced beliefs in general. We want to have 
cognitive systems that reliably produce truths, otherwise we would not have much luck 
getting around our environments and getting what we want. However, this value is not 
conferred on the belief because if the belief is true then it doesn’t matter how it got to be 
                                                
12 In fact, if you know that the machine is unreliable then you might value it more because you were 
expecting the coffee to be bad.  
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that way, it is the truth that is valuable. These truth-conducive processes are valuable 
because they help us to get to the truth, their value derives from their relation to the 
thing that is of primary value – the truth. 
5.1.3 Secondary Value Problem
The primary value problem and the related swamping problem are not the only value 
problems that knowledge faces. Jonathan Kvanvig (2003) also discerns a secondary value 
problem (See also, Pritchard 2007). If we want to explain the distinctive value that 
knowledge has then we need to explain not just why it is more valuable than true belief 
but also why it is more valuable than any other proper subset of its parts. Knowledge is 
almost never analysed as simply true belief13. Rather, it is usually analysed as consisting of 
true belief plus at least one other condition, for example, justified true belief, reliably 
formed true belief or non-lucky true belief. In some cases such as subjectively justified 
true belief a fourth condition is needed in order to avoid Gettier examples. If this theory 
of knowledge was correct and we could show that justification adds value to true belief 
then we would have an answer to the Meno problem. This would not, however, explain 
the distinctive value of knowledge as knowledge is not just justified true belief. In addition 
to the primary value problem Kvanvig discerns a secondary value problem. If we want to 
explain why it is knowledge in particular that we value then we need to explain not only 
why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief but also than any other subset of 
its parts. My answer to this, however, is that knowledge does not, in fact, have a 
distinctive value. What we take to be the distinctive value of knowledge is in fact the 
combination of true belief and justification. In this section I shall argue first that it is not 
                                                
13 One notable exception is Crispin Sartwell (1991; 1992). Sartwell argues that a) there is no pre-theoretic 
commitment to the distinction between knowledge and true belief, and b) that knowledge couldn’t be 
anything but true belief. However, Sartwell’s position has been almost universally rejected, primarily due to 
its counter-intuitive nature and also on the basis of counter-examples. See, for example, Lycan (1993).
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clear that we need an answer to the secondary value problem even if knowledge is 
distinctively valuable and secondly, why I think that knowledge is not distinctively 
valuable but that justification is the important factor in the value distinction. 
The secondary value problem asks why knowledge is more valuable than any proper 
subset of its parts. For example, why is knowledge more valuable than justified true 
belief, or than non-Gettiered true belief? This is perhaps not as straightforwardly a 
problem as the value difference between mere true belief and knowledge. However, 
Kvanvig claims, this is a problem if we want to claim that it is knowledge in particular 
that we value. If knowledge is no more valuable than justified true belief, for example,  
and knowledge is more than justified true belief – perhaps it is non-Gettiered, justified 
true belief, for example – then we have not explained the distinctive value that 
knowledge has. If it is knowledge that we value then we need to be able to explain why it 
is knowledge and not some lesser state that is of importance to us. 
5.1.4 Tertiary Value Problem
Pritchard (2007: §2; 2008: §2; 2009:4, forthcoming a) has also discerned a tertiary value 
problem. In addition to asking why knowledge is more valuable than any subset of its 
parts, we can also ask why it is knowledge in particular that we value. That is, does 
knowledge have a distinctive value? 14 There are good reasons to think that knowledge is 
distinctively valuable. Firstly, we need an explanation for why it is knowledge that has been 
the focus of epistemological investigation rather than some other state. The other reason 
is that we seem to treat knowledge differently from other states, as something that is 
‘precious’. For example, we berate students who only think of their degree in terms of 
                                                
14 Kvanvig (2003) appears to lean towards the view that knowledge is distinctively valuable (e.g. xiv, xv-xvi, 
116) but he has since claimed that any suggestion of this was for ‘stylistic effect only’ (Kvanvig 2009: 343). 
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potential future monetary gain. The gaining of knowledge should be at least as important, 
if not more so, than the career advantage a degree may give you. This implies that 
knowledge has a value independently of purely practical considerations. The importance 
of the tertiary problem has been underplayed, claims Pritchard (forthcoming a: 8), as if we 
can answer this problem then we also have the answer to the primary and secondary 
value problems. 
5.2 Responses to the value problems
5.2.1 Virtue epistemology
Virtue epistemology looks as though it may be able to solve these value problems. 
Achievements seem to be finally valuable and so that can explain why knowledge is 
finally valuable. However, the going is not quite as good for virtue epistemology as it first 
seems. As Pritchard argues, the idea that knowledge is an achievement doesn’t seem to 
capture what knowledge is; cognitive achievement is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
knowledge. Knowledge may generally go hand-in-hand with cognitive achievement but 
that cannot account for the value of knowledge.
Virtue epistemology of a certain kind claims that a subject has knowledge if they form 
a true belief because of an epistemic ability (e.g. Greco 1999, 2003, 2007; Sosa 1991, 
2007; Zagzebski 1996, 1999). Sosa, for example, claims that in order to be knowledge a 
belief must be apt. That is, your belief must be true because it was formed through the 
exercise of a cognitive ability. According to this account, knowledge is best understood as 
a cognitive achievement. If you hit the target because you are a skilled marksman and it is 
properly creditable to your ability then you have achieved something. In the same way, if 
you come to a true belief that there is a target in front of you because of your excellent 
visual skills, then the achievement is creditable to you.
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This understanding of knowledge can give us an answer to the Meno problem. We 
seem to value things that are the product of achievement more than those that are the 
product of luck. We would value a shot that hits the bulls eye differently if it were due to 
the archer’s skill than if it were the product of freak winds. Hitting the target because of 
her skill is more valuable than hitting it through luck. If the same is true of all 
achievements then we can explain how knowledge is more valuable than true belief; 
knowledge is more valuable because it is an achievement in a way that mere true belief is 
not. Achievements are finally valuable. That is they are valuable for their own sake but 
because of how they are formed. Pritchard (forthcoming a: 30) suggests that it should be no 
surprise that we value achievements as they ‘constitute the exercise of one’s agency on 
the world’. Our lives are better for including these achievements even compared to a life 
where our goals are regularly met but without any achievement on our part.
The virtue epistemologist also appears to be able to answer the tertiary value 
problem. If knowledge is an achievement then it has a different kind of value from those 
states that are not achievements. A mere true belief is not an achievement, nor is just any 
reliably-formed or safe true belief. It is only if the success is creditable to the agent does 
it count as an achievement. For example, an agent ‘Temp’ forms his belief about the 
temperature according to the reading on a thermometer on the wall. However, the 
thermometer is actually broken and fluctuates within a certain range. Nevertheless, Temp 
always forms a true belief about the temperature because whenever he looks at the 
temperature a hidden second person changes the temperature of the room to match the 
reading. His belief is reliable because it will always be right15. However, it is not a 
cognitive achievement. This, therefore, can explain the distinctive value of knowledge. It 
                                                
15 This example is due to Pritchard (forthcoming a: 68) 
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has a different kind of value to states that fall short of knowledge because it is an 
achievement and achievements are finally valuable. 
Pritchard (forthcoming a) argues that although initially plausible virtue epistemology 
cannot give an adequate answer to the value problems. He argues that if knowledge could 
be equated with cognitive achievement then it would answer the problems but in fact 
cognitive achievement is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. 
Firstly, one could have achievement without knowledge. Although virtue 
epistemology rules out the kind of luck involved in Gettier cases, it does not rule out the 
kind of environmental luck that is at issue in barn façade cases. Henry is looking at an 
actual barn and forms a true belief because of his cognitive ability yet due to the 
preponderance of fake barns in the area, he does not have knowledge16. This seems to 
show that one can have a belief that is an achievement in the relevant sense yet still fails 
to be knowledge. The virtue epistemologists’ criteria do not rule out environmental luck. 
Secondly, it seems that one can have knowledge without cognitive achievement. In 
particular, it is not clear that there is any cognitive achievement in certain types of 
testimonial case. For example, in Jennifer Lackey’s case (Lackey 2007: 352), a tourist, 
Morris, arrives in Chicago and wants to find out how to get to the Sears tower17. In order 
to do so he asks the first person he sees for directions. The person he asks is local and 
gives him good directions to the tower. Intuitively we would say that Morris comes to 
know in this case. However, it doesn’t seem that the truth of the belief can be accredited 
to Morris’s cognitive abilities. Whilst it is undeniable that he deserves some credit – he 
doesn’t ask just anyone for directions but chooses someone who looks likely to know –
the fact that he is correct is not primarily creditable to his abilities. Rather, it is the person 
                                                
16 Sosa (2007) appears to bite the bullet on this issue and accept that Henry does know in barn façade 
cases. He lays out an example – the kaleidoscope case (Sosa 2007: 31-33) – that seems to be structurally 
similar and at a later point acknowledges that barn façade cases may fall into the same category (Sosa 2007: 
96n1). 
17 For further discussion of this case see also Pritchard (forthcoming: §2.6). 
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that he asks who has to be awarded the main part of the credit. It is their cognitive ability 
that has paid off with a true belief, not Morris’s. 
Thus, it seems that cognitive achievement is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
knowledge and if this is the case then we have not found an adequate solution to the 
value problems. However, not all is lost. If knowledge generally goes in hand with 
cognitive achievement, then, we can have an answer to the swamping problem (Pritchard 
forthcoming a: 64). In order to answer the swamping problem, all that is needed is that 
knowledge is sometimes finally valuable. This shows that epistemic value T-monism is 
false, undermining the basis for the problem. That knowledge is sometimes finally
valuable, because it is sometimes an achievement, shows that truth is not the only thing 
of value in the epistemic domain. 
5.2.2 Pritchard’s Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology
Pritchard (forthcoming a) argues for an anti-luck version of virtue epistemology. That is, a 
theory that combines a virtue-theoretic ability condition with an anti-luck safety 
condition. Knowledge is, according to this account, 
safe belief that arises out of the reliable cognitive traits that make up one’s cognitive 
character, such that one’s cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to one’s 
cognitive character. (Pritchard forthcoming a: 51)
The ability condition that is used here has an advantage over that used in Sosa’s account 
as it does not require that a belief be primarily creditable to the agent but only 
significantly so. This avoids problems such as the Jenny case discussed above. In fact,  
the combination of the two conditions means that this theory is well equipped to deal 
with many of the problem cases that are discussed in contemporary epistemology. It also 
has a significant advantage when it comes to answering the value problems.
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Pritchard argues that whilst it is not possible to give an answer to the tertiary value 
problem, it is possible to give a diagnostic answer as to why such an answer is not 
possible (Pritchard forthcoming a: 62-4). As we saw above, cognitive achievements are 
distinctively valuable but not all knowledge counts as a cognitive achievement, as we saw 
in the Jenny case. However, argues Pritchard, the paradigm cases of knowledge are those 
in which there is a cognitive achievement of some sort and so are finally valuable. There 
is, he argues, a type of understanding that usually accompanies knowledge, which is 
finally valuable. Although knowledge is not, in itself, finally valuable we can see how we 
might come to think that it is, as paradigm cases of knowledge have such value in virtue 
of the accompanying understanding. 
Pritchard uses a Craig-style genealogical approach to explain why knowledge has the 
bipartite structure that he claims it does (forthcoming a: 60-1). There is, he claims, an 
ambiguity in the idea of a reliable informant. In one sense an informant is reliable if she 
has a reliable cognitive ability and in another sense she is reliable if she is someone that 
an enquirer can rely on. One can be reliable in the first sense without being reliable in the 
second. For example, your informant might be a good barn-detector but you think 
(falsely) that she is in barn façade county. She is reliable in that she is forming true beliefs 
but you cannot rely on her because of you cannot defeat the (misleading) defeater 
(Pritchard forthcoming a: 61). An agent could also be reliable in that you can rely on her but 
not be reliable. For this Pritchard gives the example of an agent with poor maths skills 
who is unknowingly being helped by a benign wizard such that he gets all the answers 
right (forthcoming a:61). Pritchard argues that it is because of this ambiguity in what it 
means to be a reliable informant that knowledge has the structure it does. This Craig-
style account can also help to give an answer to the primary and secondary value 
problems. If knowledge developed to fulfil a particular need then we can see that it is an 
epistemic standing that has particular value to us. Knowledge is not finally valuable but it 
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has more instrumental value than those standings that fall short of knowledge (Pritchard 
forthcoming a: 63). 
Pritchard (forthcoming a:64) also suggests that his theory can give an answer of sorts to 
the swamping problem. One could either take the position that knowledge is not in fact 
more epistemically valuable than mere true belief but it is more practically valuable. Or 
one could take the view that since knowledge is often, although not always, a cognitive 
achievement and therefore finally valuable, we have an epistemic pluralist account.  
5.3 The Importance of Internal Justification 
Although Pritchard’s account is effective in answering the value problem, it does not do 
enough to take into account the value that justification adds to knowledge. In this section 
I shall outline an alternative account of the apparent value of knowledge, which 
demonstrates that whilst knowledge that is not accompanied by reflectively accessible 
justification is not necessarily more valuable than mere true belief, knowledge that is 
justified in this way is more valuable. 
It doesn’t seem that there is any way to hold on to both the intuition that knowledge 
is more valuable than true belief and also hold an externalist theory of knowledge. This, I 
believe is because the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than true belief is tied to 
a more internalist understanding of knowledge. The case for externalism seems pretty 
clear and no form of externalism excludes the possibility of internalist knowledge as well 
as externalist knowledge or the possibility that knowledge is sometimes accompanied by 
reflectively accessible justification. In the previous chapter, we discussed the importance 
of internalist justification when it comes to social interaction and the transmission of 
knowledge. Here we shall see why internalist justification makes a difference on an 
individual level as well.   
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It doesn’t look like an externalist account of knowledge can answer the value 
problems but if we add justification into the picture then we can solve them. Firstly, the 
primary value problem. This just asks why knowledge is more valuable than true belief. 
From a practical perspective it looks like knowledge will not be any more valuable than 
mere true belief; you will get to Larissa just as effectively if you follow a mere true belief 
as if you follow something you know. When we think in terms of internally justified 
knowledge, however, we can see a real practical difference. 
Let’s compare several cases. Firstly, the classic road to Larissa case. 
Case 1: Janet is trying to get to Larissa and is a stranger to the area. She has a mere true 
belief about the way to Larissa; let’s say it was formed in an unsafe manner and it is not 
internally justified either. When she comes to a fork in the road she believes, truly, that 
she should take the left hand fork. She follows her belief and gets to Larissa. 
As we saw above, this appears to show that knowledge is no more practically valuable 
than mere true belief. You will arrive at your destination either way. However, this is not 
as obviously the case when conflicting evidence is introduced into the picture: 
Case 2: John also has a mere true belief about how to get to Larissa and is a stranger to 
the area. When he comes to the fork in the road, he believes truly that he should take the 
left-hand fork. However, there is a signpost that says ‘Larissa’ pointing down the right-
hand fork. The signpost appears to be genuine and doesn’t seem to have been tampered 
with in anyway. In fact the signpost has been put there by the people of a neighbouring 
town who are fed up with Larissa getting the trade of every passing epistemologist. What 
should John’s response to the sign post be? He has a true belief that he should follow the 
left-hand fork, but the evidence that he is presented with seems to imply that he should 
go down the right-hand fork. It seems likely that he would change his route to go down 
the right-hand path, leading him wrong. 
The presence of the signpost will, it seems, undermine John’s belief. When faced with 
evidence that contradicts our belief then the rational thing to do is to reassess our belief. 
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It seems that the only sensible conclusion that John can come to is to take the right-hand 
fork. The only evidence that he is aware of is the sign post, as he has no internally 
accessible reason for his true belief. Although there is objective reason for John to take 
the left-hand fork – not only is it the correct way to go but he has a true belief that this is 
the case – he has no subjective reason to act on this belief. The only thing that he has to 
go on is the false evidence of the sign. As reflective creatures, we do not simply follow 
our beliefs blindly. We try to act in a way that will help us to fulfil our desires and the 
way that we do this is by assessing our internally accessible evidence. We not necessarily 
aware of the objective reasons, we are only aware of the subjective reasons. 
How then, does the subject that has knowledge fair? 
Case 3: Peter is in an apparently better situation than either Janet or John. He knows, in 
a purely externalist way, that the road to Larissa is down the left-hand fork. He formed 
this belief in a reliable way, however he has no internal justification for his belief. What 
does Peter do when faced with the misleading sign? It seems that in spite of knowing 
that he needs to follow the left-hand road, he is in no better position than John. He has 
no reason to think that his belief is true, never mind that it is knowledge. It seems that he 
too would be likely to take the wrong path. 
As we can see having knowledge is of no benefit in this kind of case, the problem being 
that he has no more evidence for his belief than John. Knowledge is of no more use than 
true belief when it comes to these kinds of situation. However, if we add internal 
justification, then we have a state that is more valuable than mere true belief. 
Case 4: Jane is a local of the Larissa area and has taken the road many times. Not only 
does she know that the way to Larissa lies down the left-hand fork but this knowledge is 
accompanied by strong internal justification. When she reaches the fork in the road she 
takes note of the road sign and surmises not that the road to Larissa has moved but that 
someone must have put the sign there for some other reason. She is not put off her 
course and successfully gets to Larissa. 
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Because Jane has internal reassurance that her belief is correct, she is able to dismiss the 
false evidence of the sign, something that neither John nor Peter could do. In this way, 
having justification is valuable and knowledge that is accompanied by justification is 
more valuable than knowledge simpliciter. 
This harks back to the original answer to the value problem given by Plato. He claims 
that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because knowledge is ‘tethered’ to 
the truth. Like the statues of Daedalus, which were so life-like that they had to be tied 
down to prevent them from running away, belief which is not tethered is likely to slip 
away. If our belief is not in some way tethered, then we might lose it, in the face of 
countervailing evidence, for example. Mere true belief has nothing to tie it down and so 
if we are faced with something that appears to contradict it then we should at least 
withhold judgement, if not reject the belief outright. Internal justification adds stability 
and durability to a belief and this is something that is in general valuable.
As Craig (1990: 7) notes, however, stability does not always add value to belief. For 
example, I may need to know what time it is right now so that I don’t miss my train. 
However, it will be of no value to me tomorrow or in three weeks time to know what 
time it was right now. We do not need to claim, however, that we should keep every 
belief that we form for an indefinite period. Obviously, some beliefs will be of use in the 
future whereas others will only be of use in the short-term. The important point about 
stability that is, for as long as they are useful, it is beneficial for beliefs to be stable. If the 
belief is of use then you do not want it to disappear with the smallest challenge. It may 
not be of any use for me to know what time it is now at some point in the future. If it is, 
however, then it will be beneficial if that belief is stable. If I am asked to account for my 
whereabouts on a certain occasion, then it is better if I have some justification; ‘I know 
that it was 7.15pm because ‘The Archers’ had just finished’ is more useful than ‘I think it 
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was around 7.15’, even if you have a true belief in the second case. So, although we do 
not need every belief to last indefinitely, stability adds value for as long as the belief is 
useful. In some cases that may just be a few minutes and in others it may be years, but 
however long the period, it is better that a belief be stable than not. 
Unlike Plato, I do not want to draw the line between knowledge and mere true belief. 
Rather, the relevant difference is between internally justified knowledge and brute 
externalist knowledge. I think that the case for externalism about knowledge is good (See 
Ch. 2) but I think that this kind of knowledge cannot answer the value problems set out 
above. Instead we need to add justification to knowledge in order to do this. Justification 
will also add value to true belief and so justified true belief will be more valuable than 
brute externalist knowledge in some cases. For example: 
Case 5: Topsy has a justified true belief that the way to Larissa is down the left-hand 
fork in the road. However, because her belief was formed in an unreliable way, this belief 
does not amount to knowledge. When faced with the misleading road sign Topsy is in a 
similar position to Jane. She can discount the evidence of the sign because of the 
internally accessible evidence that she has. 
As we can see from this case, it is the justification that is doing all of the work. The 
reason for this is simple, having internal justification for your belief is the only indication 
that you as the subject have that your belief is true. When it comes to making decisions 
about what to believe or how to act in a given situation then that is all that you have to 
go on. 
We do not necessarily need to draw a distinction between two types of knowledge as 
Sosa does (e.g. Sosa 1997: 422; 2007: Ch2, Ch5).18 That is, there is no necessity to claim 
that knowledge accompanied by reflective justification is a different kind of knowledge. It 
                                                
18 See Chapter 2 for further discussion of this. 
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is enough to claim that on the one hand there is knowledge simpliciter; knowledge of a 
brute externalist kind. On the other hand, there is knowledge plus, that is, knowledge plus 
internalist justification. It is still, at heart, the same kind of knowledge but it is 
accompanied by extra justification. It’s not clear that very much hangs on whether there 
are two different kinds of knowledge or not but either way it is not necessary to claim 
that the difference is one of kind. 
The reason that internally accessible justification is important is that we are creatures 
that are capable of reflection. A cat, who is not capable of this, does not face the same 
kind of questions that a human being does on a daily basis. Not only can misleading 
evidence undermine a true belief, the mere lack of evidence can do the same damage. If I 
cannot remember why I think that the correct road lies to the left then I will be left in a 
quandary. In such a case, once the seeds of doubt have been sown – which can be as 
simple as yourself or someone else asking ‘Are you sure?’ – you often become less sure, 
on some occasions abandoning your belief entirely. Just reflecting can sometimes 
undermine a true belief. Because we are capable of such deliberations, the role of 
reflectively accessible evidence is key. Even if we can have knowledge in the absence of 
such reflection, and I think that we can, such knowledge is of less value than knowledge 
that is accompanied by internal justification. 
If we take internally justified knowledge then we can give an answer to each of the 
value problems. Firstly, as we saw in the examples above, there does seem to be a real, 
practical difference between mere true belief and justified knowledge (or justified true 
belief). The justification adds stability, which in itself is valuable. It is beneficial if we can 
use our knowledge in the future as well as at the immediate moment and so stability adds 
value. Justification also adds value in that it makes our knowledge more useful in terms 
of sharing our knowledge. As discussed in the previous chapters, there is a norm of 
assertion that says that we should not assert something unless we have some way of 
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backing it up. Thus, if you have knowledge but no justification for proposition p then 
you should not assert that p. Justification plays an important role in the way that we 
socially transmit information and so adds value in this way as well. 
This approach can also give a response to the swamping problem. Justification is 
valuable not just for its connection to truth; that is, epistemic value T-monism is false. It 
is not solely important to gain a true belief but also to have a justified belief. Although 
our main aim may be to find out the truth, that is not the only thing that is valuable even 
within the epistemic domain. True belief that is fleeting may not be fit for purpose. 
Often in commencing an investigation we hope to gain lasting knowledge. Justification is 
not valuable simply because of any connection to the truth that it may have but also 
because it stabilises our belief, making it long-lasting and because of the role that 
justification plays in our social interactions. We need justification not just because it is an 
indicator that a belief is true but also because it can be used to back up our claims when 
acting as an informant. 
The mistake in the value problem is not epistemic value T-monism but rather that it 
isolates a single belief from the wider context. That is, it is not that there is something 
other than truth that is valuable in the epistemic domain but rather that we value truth 
for more than just the fact that we hold it in our hands right now. We don’t just want 
truth right here and now but true belief that will persist and not be easily lost. We also 
value truth that can be passed on easily. For both of these things we need internalist 
justification. When it comes to a cup of coffee, I may only be interested coffee that tastes 
good right here and now. If I am looking for some ground coffee, or coffee beans, 
however, I may have extra criteria. These may all be derived from the value that I place 
on the taste of the coffee but the swamping problem does not take into account this 
wider context. I am not interested in ground coffee that will only be good today before 
losing its flavour, as I may want coffee on another occasion. I also want coffee that I can 
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share with friends, that fits within the norms of my coffee-drinking society. Coffee that 
would not be acceptable socially – that has passed through the digestive system of a civet, 
perhaps – is not fit for purpose. So too with knowledge, if it is not long-lasting or socially 
useful then it is no more valuable than true belief. Knowledge, even justified knowledge, 
is not necessarily more valuable than true belief if you take a snapshot, but this is not a 
good way to assess whether one thing is more valuable than another. To do this we need 
to take in the wider context of knowledge and if we do this we will discover that 
internally justified true belief is more valuable than mere true belief, or even than brute 
externalist knowledge. 
We can also respond to the secondary problem. Knowledge is not more valuable than 
any proper subset of its parts. Knowledge and reliably-produced true belief are equally 
valuable. However, justified knowledge is more valuable than any subset of the parts of 
knowledge because justification adds value. That is to say, it is not knowledge simpliciter 
that is more valuable than any of the sub-parts of knowledge but knowledge plus. 
Of course, if this understanding of knowledge is correct then we need to explain why 
we have the intuition that it is knowledge that is valuable rather than that it is knowledge 
plus justification that is valuable. What I think is going on here is that we have conflicting 
intuitions about knowledge. This is why there often seems to be an impasse between 
internalists and externalists. I think it is plausible that we have both internalist and 
externalist intuitions and the different sides on this debate emphasise different sets of 
intuitions. Whilst we seem to have some intuitions that support an externalist account of 
knowledge – the importance of belief being connected to the world; ascribing knowledge 
to infants and animals; the importance of forming beliefs reliably; and so on – this isn’t 
the whole story. Reflectively accessible justification plays a central role in the way in 
which we think about knowledge, talk about knowledge and use knowledge.
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These internalist intuitions could be what lie behind our intuition that knowledge is 
more valuable than mere true belief. After all, knowledge is, in the normal run of things, 
accompanied by such justification even if there are cases where we lack it. For most 
pieces of knowledge we can give some account of how we came to know it or evidence 
that backs it up. It is a rare case in which we can give no explanation of how we came by 
a particular piece of knowledge or why one might think that it is true19. The fact that 
most of our knowledge is accompanied by justification may obscure the fact that it is not 
knowledge itself that is valuable but only knowledge that is also internally justified.
The tertiary problem still remains but it is not clear that this is a particularly 
problematic issue. The initial intuitions that we started with was simply that knowledge is 
valuable and from this we moved to the claim that it is more valuable than true belief. 
There is nothing in these intuitions that means we need to show that knowledge has a 
different kind of value to true belief. All it claims is that knowledge has more value, and 
this could be of the same or another kind. It is not clear that we need demand any more. 
Whilst it seems to be true that we value knowledge over other epistemic states, there is 
no reason to think that it is not just at the top of a sliding scale. If I can’t have knowledge 
about a particular matter, then justified, true belief is a good second and failing even that, 
true belief is acceptable. If I wanted to know which road goes to Larissa and I am 
                                                
19 There are cases in which we apparently cannot bring forth such evidence. Millar refers to such 
knowledge as ‘detached standing knowledge’ (Millar  forthcoming: 202-7). This is knowledge where we have 
lost touch with the evidence that we once had. Good examples of this are cases of general knowledge, such 
as my knowledge that the capital of Malaysia is Kuala Lumpur. Such cases definitely count as knowledge, 
but they don’t obviously count as internally justified knowledge. Millar spells out his answer to the problem 
in terms of an ability to recognise what one remembers (as opposed to what one appears to remember). In 
this it is like the perceptual recognitional abilities that he claims play a central role in knowledge. We could 
take something like Millar’s line and claim that in such cases you do have reflectively accessible justification 
for the proposition; the justification is that you know that you are reliable on such matters, it is the type of 
thing that you know. For example, I know that my belief that Accra is the capital of Ghana is questionable 
as my grasp of African geography is shaky at best. That the capital of France is Paris, however, is the kind 
of thing that I know, having a better grasp on geography closer to home. I have justification for my 
knowledge that Paris is the capital of France, even if I cannot cite any one source that lead me to believe it. 
I know that I have a reasonable grasp of European capital cities and so an justified in believing that I am 
correct in this case. 
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prevented in some way from having knowledge of this fact, then a mere true belief will 
do. Just because we value knowledge more does not mean that we value it differently. 
5.4 An Explanation of Metaepistemological Scepticism 
If we understand the value of knowledge in the way sketched out above, that is, not as 
value of knowledge but rather as value of justified knowledge, then we have an 
explanation for why the externalist answer to scepticism is unsatisfactory. Knowledge 
accompanied by justification is the only valuable type of knowledge and this is precisely 
what we cannot have in answer to scepticism.
The sceptical argument appears to show that we cannot have knowledge because we 
cannot rule out the possibility that we are not BIVs. However, the externalist counters 
that it is not necessary for knowledge that we rule out sceptical hypotheses. As long as 
our beliefs are formed in the right kind of way, as long as we are connected to the facts in 
the right way, we can have knowledge. So, my belief that I have two hands counts as 
knowledge because it is connected to the fact that I have two hands in the right way. The 
standard sceptical argument is based on the closure principle:
Closure Principle for Knowledge: If s knows that p, and s knows that p entails q, then 
s knows that q. 
So if I know that I have two hands then I must know that I am not a BIV. The 
traditional sceptical argument claims that, since you cannot know that you are not a BIV, 
you cannot know that you have two hands. The externalist denies that this is the case by 
claiming that in order to know that you have hands, you do not need to rule out the 
possibility that you are a BIV. Instead you just need to form your belief in the right way, 
whether that be reliably, safely or whatever. The externalist can maintain that the closure 
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principal holds because you can also know that you are not a BIV, provided that your 
belief is again formed in the right way. 
The reason that the sceptical argument fails, according to the externalist, is that it is 
wrong to say that you do not know that you are not a BIV. You can know this but you 
know it in an externalist way. It does not matter that you cannot rule out this possibility. 
Provided that it is the case that you are not a BIV and your belief that this is the case was 
formed in the right way then you do know that you are not a BIV. It seems that the 
internalist, on the other hand, will either have to accept scepticism or deny the closure 
principle. 
Knowledge plus internalist justification is basically equivalent to internalist 
knowledge. The only difference is that we are not claiming that the internalist 
justification is necessary for knowledge but rather that justification is a beneficial extra that 
usually accompanies knowledge. However, we can still ask whether internalist 
justification is closed. It seems that if it is then we will have to accept the restricted 
sceptical conclusion that we cannot have any reflectively justified knowledge. If this is 
indeed the only knowledge that is more valuable than mere true belief, then for it not to 
be possible would be a big problem. So, it seems preferable to take the other option; that 
is, to deny closure for internalist justification. This would mean that one could have 
internally justified knowledge of everyday propositions without having to do the 
impossible and rule out sceptical scenarios (For a similar argument, see Pritchard 2005: 
Ch3). 
It doesn’t seem that this will be particularly problematic for the view sketched above, 
as we do not need justification to be closed for either of the purposes that we discussed. 
Even if justification is not closed, it will still be able to stabilize our beliefs. Justification 
has the benefit of stabilising our beliefs, making them stronger in the face of conflicting 
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evidence. For this purpose we need to be able to respond to real and likely possibilities 
such as the possibility that the sign points in the wrong direction.
The other reason that justification is valuable is because it is needed to back up our 
knowledge claims. And this is unaffected by the denial of closure. It can, however, go 
some way to explaining why the externalist answer to scepticism seems unsatisfactory. 
Although we can have brute externalist knowledge of the denials of sceptical hypotheses, 
we cannot have the more valuable type of knowledge, that which is accompanied by 
internalist justification. If our brute externalist knowledge is no more valuable than mere 
true belief then, if this is all that we can have with regard to the denials of sceptical 
hypotheses, something will appear to be lacking. 
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I have examined the various value problems and sketched out an answer 
to them. The important factor is the value of reflectively accessible justification. This 
gives knowledge a value beyond that of mere true belief. We can understand knowledge 
in an externalist way but we must also make space to account for the importance of 
reflection. In doing so we can come to understand why we value knowledge, of a 
particular, common type and also understand why the externalist answer to scepticism is 
not satisfactory. Internalist justification is of the utmost importance even if it is not 
necessary for knowledge.  
Conclusion
This thesis had two aims: firstly, to defend a particular methodology in epistemology 
and secondly to defend the importance of reflective access. The methodology that I 
advocate is to be as comprehensive as possible rather than being very focussed on one 
particular model. When we take a very focussed perspective it can leave us blinkered to 
other important aspects of the thing that we are investigating. Within this methodology 
there will be space for traditional methodology. Although this has faced criticism from 
naturalists and experimentalists, I believe that it is still has a fundamentally important 
role to play. The concepts that we investigate in philosophy, including the concept of 
knowledge, are inherently complex and this is perhaps why we are interested in them. 
Conceptual enquiry, will, therefore be an important starting point to any investigation 
and will have to play a large part in any philosophical investigation. 
Conceptual enquiry is not, however, the only valid methodology in epistemology. 
Insights into knowledge can be gained from non-traditional sources as well. To this 
end, I examined two non-traditional approaches to epistemology, the naturalism of 
Hilary Kornblith and the genealogical approach of Edward Craig. Each of these
methodologies gives us different insights into knowledge. Kornblith, with his focus on 
knowledge in the natural world, demonstrates the important continuity between human 
and non-human animal knowledge. It also shows us how scientific data can be useful in 
giving a different perspective on the subjects of philosophical study. However, 
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Kornblith’s focus on this continuity obscures the distinctively human aspects of 
knowledge
In contrast, Craig focuses almost entirely on the human aspects of knowledge and 
ignores the continuity with the animal world. He is primarily interested in looking at 
how the concept of knowledge developed, unlike Kornblith who is explicitly interested 
in the natural phenomenon of knowledge. Craig’s approach tells us a lot about how the
concept of knowledge that we have now might have developed in a state-of- nature, 
giving us insight into the role that knowledge plays. Information exchange is a vital part 
of our interaction with other human beings and it should come as no surprise that we 
have a concept that developed from the need to assess our informants. 
Although both Craig and Kornblith have important things to say about knowledge 
the fact that they take the particular perspectives that they do means that neither of 
them can develop a comprehensive theory of knowledge. We need to take into account 
the possible evolutionary circumstances that led to knowledge existing in nature, but 
we also need to understand the pressures that have led to the cultural evolution of our 
concept. These two perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive, however. In a 
sense, the cultural evolution that Craig discusses can be seen as building on the natural 
evolution that Kornblith focuses on. Obviously, it is not as simple as to say that Craig’s 
theory takes up where Kornblith’s leaves off, but we can perhaps see them as being 
interested in such different aspects of knowledge that they are not as at odds as they 
first seem. 
Although Craig’s focus on the role of enquiry to human beings is good, I think that 
he does not go far enough in emphasising the role of reflectively accessible 
justification. This brings me to the second aim of the thesis; to bring back a focus on 
reflection that seems to have been lost somewhat with the advent of externalist 
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accounts of knowledge. I argue that reflection has an important role to play, even if it is 
not strictly necessary for knowledge. It is vital when it comes to making knowledge 
claims and in the transmission of information between agents. There are cases where 
knowledge is not accompanied by this justification, as evidenced by various thought 
experiments. However, these cases are rare. The norm is to have knowledge 
accompanied by reflective justification. 
This fact is what underlies our intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere 
true belief. Generally, it is more valuable because it is accompanied by justification. 
This justification makes our beliefs more stable in that they are better equipped to 
stand up to conflicting evidence, this stability adds value to our knowledge. However, 
knowledge that is not accompanied by this justification is not more valuable. It is these 
two different types of knowledge that underlie our apparently conflicting intuitions. 
Allowing that there is knowledge simpliciter and knowledge plus can account for our 
intuitions about value. In addition, it can explain the unsatisfactory nature of externalist 
accounts of scepticism. We cannot have the more valuable type of knowledge of the 
denial of sceptical hypotheses and so we feel as if we have not got the full answer that 
we were looking for. Instead we are left with an adequate but much less valuable type 
of knowledge. 
The methodology that I advocate I believe leads naturally to this distinction 
between different types of knowledge. If we are to fully understand knowledge then we 
need to take into account the different aspects of knowledge. As it is a complex 
concept, attached to a complex phenomenon, it should be no surprise that it 
necessitates a complex theory to explain it. I do not claim, however, to have fully 
explained all aspects of knowledge. There are bound to be other perspectives that 
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could also be brought to bear on the questions of what knowledge is and why it is 
valuable. However, such investigation will have to be left for a later date. 
APPENDIX
Real-life vs. Philosophical Chicken Sexing
The chicken sexing case, which is generally presented as evidence for externalism is 
sometimes quoted as a real-life example and sometimes as a fictional or hypothetical 
case. Although the roots of the example are in the real-world, the case is actually quite 
different. It is not clear that the real-life case supports externalism to the extent that the 
hypothetical case does. This, of course, is not necessarily of great philosophical 
importance, as there are plenty of thought experiments that are unlikely to ever actually 
occur – brains-in-vats, swampmen and Mary the colour scientist, to name but three. 
However, as this example is sometimes presented as one taken from real life it seems 
that there is good reason to try and sort the fact from the fiction. 
A.1 A Brief History of Chicken-sexing in Philosophy
The first mention of chicken sexers in a philosophical context appears to be in 
Gasking’s paper ‘Avowals’ (1963). In this paper Gasking is talking not about grounds 
for belief but rather grounds for statements. However, the example used is very similar 
to the example used later in the literature by epistemologists. Gasking presents the 
example as if it is a real-life case but doesn’t explicitly say that it is. He claims that the 
chicken sexer is trained to identify chicks by looking at photographs of chicks and 
making a judgement about whether they are male or female. He is then told whether he 
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is right or wrong. After a period of time the trainee chicken sexer is increasingly correct 
in his judgements. Gasking’s claim is that the chicken sexer does not know what it is 
that distinguishes male from female even though he can reliably sort the chicks by sex.
The example came to be used by epistemologists not as an example of statements 
without grounds but rather as a case where the chicken sexer has knowledge but lacks 
reflectively accessible grounds. There are also two major developments in how the case 
is described. The first can be seen in Richard Foley’s book The Theory of Epistemic 
Rationality (1987).
This chicken sexer has no inductive evidence that that his past beliefs about the sex of 
the chicks usually have been correct and suppose he has no other reason to think his 
beliefs have been correct. He has never been told, for instance, whether he has been 
right… he simply picks up a chick and waits for the belief… to arise in him (Foley 
1987: 168)
Foley’s chicken sexer is not just in the position that he does not know how he 
differentiates between the sexes but also he does not know whether or not he has the 
ability to differentiate. Foley sounds sceptical as to whether such people do in fact exist 
although claims that ‘some people testify that they do’ (Foley 1987: 168).
The second development can be seen in Robert Brandom’s paper ‘Insights and 
Blindspots of Reliabilism’ (1998). Like Gasking, he writes as if he sees it as a real-life 
case but does not explicitly say that it is. Brandom sets up the example such that it is 
not only the case that chicken sexers do not know how they do it but that they are 
actually mistaken about how they do it. Specifically, the chicken sexers think that they 
are using some visual cue to distinguish the chicks but in fact they discriminate on the 
basis of smell. 
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In fact, as I hear the story, it has been established that although these experts 
uniformly believe that they make the discrimination visually, research has shown that 
the cues their discriminations actually depend on are olfactory. (Brandom 1998: 575)
This development in the story means that even the limited grounds that the chicken 
sexer may have had – “I know it’s male because it looks male” – is undermined, 
making sure that there are no internally accessible grounds available to the sexer. 
Brandom is using the example as a case “in which someone in fact reliably responds to 
some sort of stimulus, without having any idea of the mechanism in play” (Brandom 
1998: 575). 
Both in this form and in the earlier varieties the chicken sexer example is used 
widely in contemporary epistemology. For example, in Virtues of the Mind (1996) Linda 
Zagzebski discusses the chicken sexer describing it as an example that highlights the 
difference between the intuitions of internalists and externalists; an internalist would 
deny that the chicken sexer knows, where the externalist is quite happy to claim that he 
knows. Although Zagzebski admits to scepticism about the veracity of the example 
(Zagzebski 1996: 301), she is happy to let it go for the sake of argument. Chicken 
sexing is also cited by Goldman (1975:114); Kornblith (1982:245); Pritchard (2005: 43-
4) to name but a few. 
A.2 Real World Chicken sexers
Where does all this talk of chicken-sexing come from in the first place? Are there actual 
chicken sexers or are they the creation of a philosopher’s imagination? Chicken sexers 
do indeed exist but are rather different to the ones in the philosophical examples. For 
the purpose of producing eggs farmers need a large amount of female chicks –
cockerels being of little use in this regard – however, in most breeds of chicken male 
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and female chicks are identical for the first few weeks of life.20 For reasons of 
economics, it is better for an egg producer not to rear male chicks that will be of no 
commercial use to him and so it is important to have a way of distinguishing between 
the sexes of the chicks. 
It wasn’t until the 1920’s in Japan that such a method was developed. In 1925 
Kiyoshi Masui and Juro Hashimoto discovered a method of determining the sex 
(Masui and Hashimoto 1933). Although there are no external distinguishing marks 
there is a genital eminence or ‘bead’ in the chicks’ cloaca - the cavity into which the 
intestinal, urinary and genital tracts open. By everting the vent the bead can be 
observed. This process is not particularly pleasant and is described by Biederman and 
Shiffrar in the following way
The chick is held in the left hand (for a right-handed person) and the fecal contents are 
squirted into a container to clear the cloaca. Gentle but firm pressure from the two 
thumbs and right forefinger are exerted to spread the ventral surface of the cloaca 
upwards to expose the eminence, called the “bead”. (Biederman and Shiffrar 1987: 
641)21
To begin with, the discovery of these beads was of little use. The eminences are about 
the size of a pinhead and sexing decisions must be made quickly because keeping the 
cloaca open for any length of time puts the chick at risk of injury or even death. 
Because of this using the beads as a sexing tool was initially impossible. People had 
trouble finding the eminence in the short amount of time required. However, a farmer 
by the name of Manabu Kojima spent three years examining the genital eminences of 
over 6000 baby chicks finally becoming extremely accurate in his determinations. From 
                                                
20 There are certain cross-breeds, such as Black Stars and Red Stars, that produce different colours in 
male and female chicks from hatching making it easy to identify the sexes. 
21 For more on the methodology of chicken sexing see Blount (1934) and Kiyoshi (1933)
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this, a training method was developed and chicken sexing academies began to spring 
up. A trained sexer will look at each chick for less than a second before making their 
judgement and can be up to 98% accurate in their judgements whilst sexing up to 1000 
chicks an hour. 
A.3 The similarities and differences
As we can see the difference between the philosophical example and the actual case is 
quite large. In the first place the chicken sexers do know how they tell the difference 
between chicks; they look for the bead and classify the chicks accordingly. Also, they 
know that they are reliable at sexing, high levels of reliability are required by employers, 
records are kept and sexers are paid according to their accuracy (Biederman and 
Shiffrar 1987 :643). Finally, I can find no research that shows that smell plays any part 
in the sexing of chicks. In the Biederman and Shiffrar experiment photographs were 
used rather than live chicks and the professional chick-sexers were still highly accurate 
(although slightly less accurate than when sexing live chicks, possibly due to the quality 
of the pictures). 
The interesting philosophical point that can be taken from the real-life chicken 
sexing example is not one about externalist knowledge but rather about skilled action. 
It is an extreme example of a case where someone is very good at something to the 
extent that they could no longer really explain how they do what they do. The chicken-
sexers do have justified beliefs because they know that they are skilled at what they do. 
However, what they can’t do is to point out exactly how they do what they do as 
quickly as they do it. There is no question about the general method by which they do 
it – they are looking at the genital eminences – but they are doing it so quickly it is 
surprising that they are able to take it in at all. What we have in real-life chickens sexing 
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cases is not a case of brute externalist knowledge but it is a case of ability knowledge 
that is hard to explain. The chicken sexers have developed such good recognitional 
capacities that they are sorting the chicks seemingly by immediate recognition, 
seemingly without thinking about it and the fact that we are capable of learning to do 
such a thing is interesting enough in itself. 
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